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INTRODUCTION

This is the City's response in opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration and Objection
to Proposed Judgment ("Motion for Reconsideration") and in response to the Memorandum in
Support ofMotionfor Reconsideration ("Memorandum") and Affidavit ofVictor Villegas in
Support ofMotionfor Reconsideration (''Villegas Affidavit") filed by Plaintiffs on June 29,
2011. This brief relies on previously defined terms.
Plaintiffs lost this lawsuit soundly. It is surprising that they continue to stir the pot when
they have nothing to offer but a rehash of prior arguments and irrelevant new evidence that
changes nothing. Even if their argument regarding the voluntariness of their actions had meritwhich it does not-it would not change the outcome of this case.
The City concurs with Plaintiffs that oral argument is unnecessary.
ARGUMENT

I.

PLAINTIFFS' UTILITY IMPROVEMEl'I'TS CLAIM IS NOTIDNG MORE THAN AN
ELEMENT OF DAMAGES AND WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED ALONG WITH THE REST
OF THE LAWSUIT.

Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the Court's Memorandum Decision on Defondant 's
Motion for Summary Judgment ("'Decision") dated June 16, 2011. They also object to the City's
proposed Judgment submitted on June 27, 2011, which would enter judgment in favor of the City
on a11 counts. Plaintiffs contend that the Court acted hastily in dismissing the entire lawsuit.
They recognize, of course, that the Court ruled against their inverse condemnation claim in
connection with the conveyance of nine lots to be used for community housing. But all is not
lost, they say, because the Court failed to separately address and discuss their claim for damages
associated with their utility and other construction improvements on the same nine lots. Thus,
they insist, the "utility" claim survived unscathed.

CITY'S REsPONSE BRIEF OPPOSING MOTION FOR RECONSJDERA TION
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This is a head scratcher. The utility issue is not set out as a separate count in the First
Amended Complaint. References to both deeds and utility improvements are sprinkled evenly

throughout each of the three counts. The deed claim and the utility claim both rise and fall on
the same legal theories. fndeed, they are referred to in the same breath in paragraph 28:
''PlaintitTs are entitled to be made whole for the value of real property and construction
improvements which benefitted the City as a result of the City's illegal acts in an amount to be
proven at trial, but not less than $10,000." (Emphasis supplied.)
Consistent with the allegations in the First Amended Complaint, the City's Afotionfor
Summary Judgment drew no distinction between the deed claim and the utility claim and plainly

sought dismissal of all claims: "This motion seeks dismissal with prejudice of all of Plaintiffs'
claims." Motion for Summary Judgment at 2. Thus, whether it was a separate claim or not, the
utility claim was put in issue by the City's motion.
Even if Plaintiffs are aHowed to think up new theories at this stage of the litigation, their
attempt tore-characterize the utility issue as a separate claim accomplishes nothing. Each of the
defenses the City presented in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment applies equa1ly to
the conveyance of the lots and to any improvements made thereon. The "claim" as to the utilities
is no more than an element of damages, for which Plaintiffs have failed to establish liability.
They are subject to the same statute oflimitations, the same tort claim notice requirement, the
same federal ripeness defenses, the same voluntary and exhaustion defenses under IGWST, UC v.
County ofAda, 138 Idaho 577, 583, 67 P.Jd 56, 62 (2003), and the same equitable defenses.

(The equitable defenses are the only ones the Court did not reach.) The deed and utility claims
have the same legal premise-they are unlawful taxes-and arise from the same factual

CITY'S RESPONSE BRIEF OPPOSING ,\.fOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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premise--the City forced the Plaintiffs to convey and upgrade the nine lots. The two claims are
joined at the hip, and there was no need for the Court to discuss them separately in its Decision.
Curiously, the Plaintiffs saw no need to discuss them separately either-until now. Not
once in all of their prior briefing or at oral argument did they suggest that there is a separate
claim (with separate facts and law) with respect to the utility and other construction
improvements. Not once did they suggest that, in some mysterious way which they have yet to
explain, they can collect damages for their utility investments when their underlying claim is
barred by something like six different legal defects (depending on how you count them).

What this boils down to is that Plaintiffs had an afterthought which they want to preserve
for appeal. They confess as much at the outset of their Motion: "Plaintiffs move this Court to
reconsider ... and to preserve the issues addressed here for appeal." Motion at 1-2.
Plaintiffs' offer of new evidence on the utility issue is not only tardy but pointless. The
July 26, 2007 email exchange between City staff (Villegas Affidavit, Exh. B) does nothing more
than explain the City's thinking as to why the developers of Greystone remained bound by their
earlier commitment to install utilities on the nine lots they had donated to the City. As Mr.
Millar explained in his email, this was an obligation the developers took on themselves when
they first platted the property-property that they then intended to develop and sell for a profit.
Plaintiffs' subsequent decision to convey the lots to the City did nothing to alter this obligation,
nor did they ask for any such relief. How this changes the Court's evaluation of the various
defenses raised by the City is a mystery upon which Plaintiffs' Memorandum sheds no light.

CITY'S RESPONSE BRIEF OPPOSING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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II.

THE VOLUNARINESS OF PLAJNTlFFS' ACTION IS FUtllL Y ESTABLlSHED IN THE
RECORD.

Plaintiffs contend that reconsideration is appropriate because there is a genuine issue of
material fact with regard to the voluntariness of their action in donating the nine lots. This is a
rehash of what they already have argued and lost.
The City's Findings and Conclusions for both S UB-05-4 and PUD-05-2 issued on April
27, 2006 each recited the following finding of fact number 16 at page 8: "While the applicant is
not required to provide a Community Housing Plan, the applicant has agreed to deed nine single
family residential lots that constitute Phase 3 of the project to the City of McCall to provide
Community Housing.·· Groenevelt Affidavit, Exhs. P and Q (reproduced here with highlighting
for the convenience of the Court as Exhibit A).
Plaintiffs quibble that the Court's Decision appears to attribute this quotation to
Plaintiffs' application rather than to the City's Findings and Conclusions. If that was an error, it
is of zero consequence. The fact that this is the City's finding (rather than the Plaintiffs'
statement) does not make it go away. Plaintiffs never objected to or offered any correction of the
finding.
Nor did they offer any correction or retort to the P&Z minutes of April 4, 2006, which
stated: "Dean Briggs on behalfofSteve Benad [the developer] said they are planning to build 9
affordable housing lots instead of61ots as originally planned. He advises the houses will be
deed restricted." Groenevelt Affidavit, Exh. I (reproduced here with highlighting as Exhibit B).
Nor did they correct or respond to the City Council minutes of April 27, 2006 which
stated: "Roger Millar, Deputy City Manager, introduced this agenda bill, stating that the
developer will deed nine lots to the City for community housing. Steve Benad introduced
himself as the developer for Greystone Village, and explained to Council that he wanted to get

CITY'S REsPONSE BRIEF OPPOSrSG MOTrON FOR RECONSID£RATlON
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some community housing built and available as soon as possible. He urged the Council to
consider allowing modular homes to be built in this development." Groenevelt Affidavit, Exh. 0
(reproduced here with highlighting as Exhibit C).
The Plaintiffs describe these minutes and findings as ''self-serving" statements by the
City. Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 4. But the fact remains that these were contemporary
statements (not made in response to litigation), and the Plaintiffs never objected to them despite
the fact that they were part of the official record. Plaintiffs cannot escape the record by saying.
'"Oh, that that was somebody else talking, not us."
Plaintiffs complain in their brief that KMST is distinguishable from the present case
because in KMST"the applicant suggested, in its application, that it dedicate a roadway."
Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 4. Plaintiffs appear to forget that their application did too. Plaintiffs'
application for final plat (dated March 20, 2006) stated: ·'The deed-restricted lots for Phase III
will be deeded to the City of McCall, please review development agreement for further details."
Exhibit 1 attached to Motion for Leave to Supplement Summary Judgment Record and to Shorten

Time (May II, 2011) (reproduced here with highlighting as Exhibit 0). Thus, the Plaintiffs, in
their own words and in their own application, stated that the lots would be deeded to the City.
Plaintiffs go on to rehash the affidavits they have previously submitted in a failed effort
to identify a material fact in dispute. Affidavits by Plaintiffs, their engineers and accountants,
and a fonner City Council member may create an issue as to their beliefs and attitudes about the
City's community housing requirements. But so what? This is not relevant to voluntariness
within the meaning of KloJST. As we have said before, K.\lST is not about voluntariness in the
sense of a freely offered gift. The developers of KMST were no doubt annoyed and aggravated
when they were told by ACHD that they needed to dedicate a road. But their actions

CITY'S RESPONSE BRIEF OPPOSING :\'lOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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demonstrated that they agreed to make the dedication nonetheless in order to move their project
forward expeditiously. That was their choice. That is all that is required to make the action
voluntary under IG\IST.
The facts here are at least as compelling as those in KMST, if not more so. Plaintiffs here
were grandfathered from Ordinance 819. They had no obligation to do anything. They did what
many developers do; they made a donation to incur good will. If they thought that would speed
things along. that was no different that the KMST developers who "voluntarily decided to
dedicate the road to the public in order to speed the approval of its development." KMST, 138
Idaho at 582, 67 P.3d at 61. As the Idaho Supreme Court said, "Having done so, it cannot now
claim that its property was 'taken.'" !d.
The voluntary nature of Plaintiffs· actions is reflected on the face of the final plat
application (Exhibit D) and the findings and minutes quoted above (Exhibit A, Exhibit B, and
Exhibit C). If that is not enough, the express words of the Development Agreement signed by
the Plaintiffs on May 3, 2006 recite and confirm the voluntary nature of the agreement:
"WHEREAS, the said approvals contain various conditions on which the City and Greystone
Village have reached agreement and which agreement the City and Greystone Village desire to
memoriaJize." GroeneveJt Atlidavit, Ex. R (reproduced with highlighting as Exhibit E). These
are definitive statements. Plaintiffs cannot escape their contemporary words and actions by
offering self-serving, after-the-fact affidavits describing unspoken things in the heads of various
players.
Even these affidavits, however, offer nothing to overcome the voluntariness standard
established in IGWST. Hehr admitted in his affidavit that the lots were dedicated to the City in
the interest of furthering the application. ·'[I]t became quite clear to me during the initial stages

CITY'S RESPOSSE BRIEF OPPOSING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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of the Greystone application process that in order to get all approvals, including building permits
and sewer connections, Greystone would be required to deal with the City's claimed need for
community housing in one way or another, or risk being denied somewhere down the line."
Affidavit of Richard Hehr,, 7. Similarly, Briggs stated in his affidavit: "Mr. Benad made it
clear to me that for Greystone's application for final plat to be approved and in order to move
through the application process in an expeditious manner, Greystone would have to address the
affordable housing issue." Affidavit of Dean W. Briggs, 16.

These statements demonstrate

that Plaintiffs undertook the dedication of the lots and the improvements in order to enhance the
attractiveness of the project and motivate the City to look favorably on the Greystone
application, exactly like the plaintiffs in Kl\1ST.
Next, Plaintiffs contend that the voluntary nature of their actions is drawn into doubt by
two items in the record. Neither have that effect.
First, Plaintiffs point to page 7 of the P&Z minutes from May 3, 2005 (Groenevelt
Affidavit, Exh. B) {reproduced here with highlighting as Exhibit F). These are the minutes that
paraphrase the P&Z Chainnan's statement as follows: "Chainnan Bailey asked- 'without City
law behind me'- is that possible to consider between now and the final plat? It's more
constructive if it's a voluntary project. ... Discussion followed concerning the need for
affordable housing." Plaintiffs make this point: ·'Had Plaintiffs offered to voluntarily contribute
to community housing in their application by conveying the nine lots at issue, there would have
been no need or purpose for this question from the Planning and Zoning Chainnan.·• Plaintiffs'
Memorandum at 5. That is true. In 2005 Plaintiffs had not yet decided to offer lots to the City.
At some point in 2006, however, they decided to make this offer, as is shown by all the evidence
discussed above and as is reflected in their application for final plat (Exhibit D).

CITY'S RESPONSE BRIEF OPPOSING MOTION FOR R!:CONSIDERATION
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In any event, the P&Z Chairman's observation made clear that any conveyance to the
City would be voluntary. Moreover, as the Court has correctly noted, PlaintitTs' offer to deed the
lots must have been voluntary because Ordinance 819 did not apply to them.
Second, Plaintiffs point to the letter from their attorney, David Penny, dated April 7, 2006
which referred to meeting the City's "requirements" for affordable housing: "I need to make
sure that we have satisfied the city's requirements for providing affordable housing. Greystone
Village intends to deed to the City of McCall nine (9) affordable housing lots along McCall
Avenue with the understanding that the value of those lots will be credited against affordable
housing impact fees/costs." Groenevelt Affidavit, Exh. L. The second sentence of the quotation
makes evident that the attorney was seeking to confirm that the donated housing would qualifY to
earn credits under Ordinance 820. There seems little doubt that the Plaintiffs wanted those
'-Tedits and this was at least a partial motivation for their donation. But the Penny letter does
nothing to overcome the evident fact that the Plaintiffs chose to make a dedication that was not
compelled by Ordinance 819.
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that their dedication of the nine lots was involuntary because
the City had a "written, required policy regarding community housing." Plaintiffs'
Memorandum at 5. For this proposition, they offer for the first time the October 19, 2006
memorandum by Steven Hasson of the City staff. 1 The City provides a legible copy, attached
hereto as Exhibit G.
Aside from being offered late in the process, this document is irrelevant. The Hasson
memorandum describes a policy that was instituted in late 2006 in response to the Mountain

1

There is nothing new about this evidence. Plaintiffs' counsel have had access to the October 19, 2006
email chain for years and apparently relied on it in their earlier litigation, Mountain Central Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v.
City of McCall ("Mountain Central"), Case No. CV 2006-490-C (Idaho, Fourth Judicial Dist., Feb. 19, 2008).
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Central case then pending. After the lawsuit was filed, the City imposed a moratorium on new

development (Ordinance 827). This was followed by Ordinance 828 that exempted from the
moratorium applications that proposed voluntary mitigation. The Hasson memorandum
explained how this would be implemented. Whether mitigation proposed under this policy was
really voluntary presents an intriguing legal question, but one that has no bearing on this lawsuit.
The policy described in the Hasson memorandum was developed after the Plaintiffs agreed to
enter into the Development Agreement on May 3, 2006 and after they conveyed the lots on July

3 I, 2006-not to mention after the eight earlier events triggering the statute of limitations
identified as bullet points in the City's Opening Brief in Support of Motion for Summary

Judgment at 15-16. ln any event, none of this had any applicablity to the Plaintiffs because they
were subject to neither Ordinance 819, nor the moratorium, nor the mitigation exception.
CO:SCLUSION

lf Plaintiffs believed that their utility improvements presented a separate issue with a
different factual and legal premise, they should have said so. The City's Motion/or Summary

Judgment put all their claims into play. Plaintiffs cannot now pretend that something less than
their entire lawsuit was on the block. Their re-argument of the voluntariness issue and offer of
irrelevant evidence contributes nothing. Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration is wholly without
merit and should be denied. The fact that the Court and the City were subjected to this
unnecessary exercise should be taken into account in weighing the City's forthcoming request
for attorney fees.

CITY'S RESPOSSE BRIEF OPPOSING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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DATED this 5th day of JuJy 2011.
Respectfu1ly submitted,

Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant
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Cr!:RTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5th day of July, 2011, the toregoing was filed, served,
and copied as follows:

DOCUMENT FILED:
Fourth Judicial District Court
Attn: Archie N. Banbury, Clerk
Valley County Courthouse
219 Main Street
Cascade, ID 83611
Facsimile: 208-382-7107

IZI
0
0
0
0

u. s. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-mail

SERVICE COPIES TO:
Jed Manwaring, Esq.
Victor Villegas, Esq.
Evans Keane LLP
1405 West Main
P.O. Box 959
Boise, ID 83701-0959
jmanwaring@evanskeane.com
vvillegas@evanskeane.com

~

0
0
0

~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-mail

COURTESY COPIES TO:
Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin
District Judge
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front St.
Boise, lD 83702
Jason Gray
Law Clerk to Judge Michael McLaughlin
Fourth Judicial District Court
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street
Boise, ID 83702
Email: jmgray@adaweb.net
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Exhibit A

City Council Findings and Conclusions (Apr.1.7, 1.006)

The following findings and conclusions for SUB-05-4 and PUD-05-2 were submitted
previously as Exhibits P and Q to the Affidavit ofMichelle Groenevelt dated Apr. 4, 2011 ). They
are reproduced here for the convenience of the Court.
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McCAU. CITY COUNCIL PLANNING AHD ZONING CoMMISSION

FINDINGS AND C0NcLtJSK)NS REGARDING

APPUCATJ()ff FOR
FINAL PuT APPROVAL

SUB-05-4
Greystone VJirag.
Phase 1, 2, & 3

The Council finds that:
1.. An application for approval of a final plat, pursuant to McCall City Code 3-21 IN&s
submitted by Briggs Engineering for Steven Benad, the owner of the property
described below:

A parcel of land located in PORTIONS OF Gov't lots 1 and 2, Section 9, AND A
PORTION OF GOV'T LOT 3, SECTION 4, Township 18 North, Range 3 East,
Boise Meridian, McCall, VAlLEY County, Idaho, more particularly desaibed as
follows:

Commencing at the Northeast comer of Section 9, T.18 N.• R 3 E., B.M., McCall,
VAUEY County, Idaho; thence N 89°52'11" W 1323.64 feet along the north line
of the NE 1/4 of said Section 9 TO the NE comer of Gov't Lot1, of said Section
9; thence S o·o7'37" W along THE east line of said Gov't Lot 1 57 4.57 feet to a
point; thence N 74•59'53• W 39.59 feet to a point on the westerly Right of Way
for Davis Street, the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING of this subdMsion;
THENCE S 0°23'10" W ALONG SAID WESTERLY RIGHT OF WAY 51.82 FEET
TO A POINT;
THENCE N 75°01'25• W 98.60 FEET TO A POINT OF CURVATURE;
THENCE ALONG A CURVE TO THE LEFT 62.12 FEET, SAID CURVE HAVING
A RADIUS OF 435.82 FEET, A CENTRAL ANGLE OF a•10'0Q'<, TANGENTS OF
31.11 FEET, AND A CHORD WHICH SEARS N 79.30'48" W 62.07 FEET TO A
POINT OF COMPOUND CURVATURE;
THENCE ALONG A CURVE TO THE LEFT 117.32 FEET. SAID CURVE
HAVING A RADIUS OF 435.21 FEET, A CENTRAL ANGlE OF 15.26'43",
TANGENTS OF 59.02 FEET, AND A CHORD WHICH BEARSS 88"40'50" W
116.97 FEET TO A POINT;
THENCE S a•33'29" W 233.09 FEET TO A POINT;
THENCE S a•58'20" W 56.60 FEET TO A POINT;
THENCE S 8"29'12" W 20.40 FEET TO A POINT;
THENCE N 87" 49'38" W 211.52 FEET TO A POINT;
THENCE S s•27'31" W 419.82 FEET TO A POINT ON THE NORTH
BOUNDARY OF McCAU'S FIRST AOOITrON;
THENCE N 86"45'16" W ALONG SAID NORTH BOUNDARY 162.74 FEET TO A
POINT ON THE CENTERLINE OF ROOSEVELT STREET;
THENCE S s•42'41" W ALONG SAID CENTERLINE 235.50 FEET TO A POINT
ON THE NORTHERLY RIGHT OF WAY OF HEMLOCK STREET;
THENCE N 81°25'25" W Al.ONG SAID NORTHERLY RIGHT OF WAY 170.18
FEET TO THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF MIU RUN CONDO 2A AMENDED;
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THENCE N 8°39'19" E ALONG THE EASTERLY BOUNDARY OF SAID MILL
RUN CONDO 2AAMENDED 219.41 FEET TOA POINT;
THENCE S 87°23'11• E CONTINUING ALONG SAID EASTERLY BOUNDARY
17.40 FEET TO A POINT;
THENCE N 14.37'26" E ALONG THE EASTERLY BOUNDARY OF SAID MIU
RUN CONDO 2A AMENDED AND MIU PARK VILLAGE SUBOIVISlON 1327.83
FEET TO THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF SAID MILL PARK SUBDIVISION,
SAID POINT BEING ON THE NORTH liNE OF SAID GOV'T LOT 1 AND
SOUTH LINE OF GOVT LOT 3, SECTION 4;
THENCE S 89•23'00• E ALONG SAID COMMON GOV7 LOT LJNES 51.55
FEET TO A POrNT;
THENCE N 14.41'5r E 593.94 FEET TO A POINT;
THENCE S 75.18'03" E 75.00 FEET TO A POINT;
THENCE S 14.41'57" W 701.16 FEET TO A POINT OF CURVATURE;
11-IENCE ALONG A CURVE TO THE lEFT 549.27 FEET, SAID CURVE
HAVING A RADIUS OF 435.16 FEET, A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 724 19'12",
TANGENTS OF 318.02 FEET, AND A CHORD WHICH BEARSS 37"57'13• E
513.53 FEET TO A POINT;
THENCE S 74'"59'53• E 164.94 FEET TO THE REAL POINT OF BEGINNING
OF THIS SUBDIVISION.
SAID SUBOMSION CONTAINS 11.71 ACRES, MORE OR LESS.
2. The property in question Is located In the CB Central Business and th8 B Medium
Density Residentla/ zoning districts.

3. The applicant is requesting final plat approval to create a subdivision containing 9
resldenHaJ rots and 24 townhomes on 11.71 acres.
4. A companion application (PU0-05-2) requests final plan approval of a Planned Urut
Development for a subdivision containing 9 residential lots and 24 townhomes on
11.71 aaes, located on the north side ot Hemlock Street, between Mill Road and
Davis Street
5. The McCall Planning & Zonmg CommiSSion held a properly posted and noticed
public hearing on April 5, 2005, at which Ume a Preliminary Plan for the PUD was
approved by the Commission. The pubRc hearing was continued to May 3, 2005. A
transcribable record was made of each public hearing.
6. The Commission received public ttmlmony, reviewed correspondence, and reviewed
staff reports dated Apri14, 2005 and Aprtl27, 2005 for prefimlnary plan and plat
approval.

7. The Commission received public testimony, reviewed correspondence, and reviewed
a staff report dated March 27, 2006 for final plan and plat approval.
8. The McCal Area Comprehensive Plan Future land Use Map (Figure 6) identifies the
subject property as 'Central Business District' and 'Medium Density Residential.' It Is
adjacent to 'Central Business District' and 'Medium Density Residential' future land

uses.
9. The Commission concluded that the proposed preliminary plat meets the
requirements of MCC 3-21, subject to certain conditions.
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10. The preNminary plat for SUB-05-4, Greystone Village, was approved, subject to the
following conditions:
1. The applicant shaH realign Mill Poinl Drive to connect directfy to
Roosevelt Avenue at Hemlock Street The realigned streel shall be
renamed Roosevelt Avenue and shal be constructed to City standard.
The right-of-way of Roosevelt Avenue north and south of Hemlock Street
shall align.

2. The applicant shal construct sidewalks to City standard on both sides of
Roosevelt Avenue from Hemlock Street to McCall Avenue.
3. Any parking on Roosevelt Avenue shall be designed to City standard and
signed to prohibit overnight parking during snow events.
4. The shared driveway between units 9 through 12 and units 13 through 22
shall be 40 feet In width and designed to City standard as a private street.
5. The applicant shall grant an easement between the end of this shared
driveway and the property to the east to provide pedestrian access and
emergency vehicle access to this property. The specffies ot this easement
shaN be addressed in the development agreement.
6. The applicant shal construct a bicycle path to Oty specifiCations from
McCall Avenue to Davis Street.

7. The applicant shaN dedicate a ten foot wide pedestrian easement for the
portion of the bicycle path from Roosevelt Avenue to Davis Street

to the bicycle path described
above from the shared driveway adjacent to unit 20. This connection and
the bicycle path from the connection to Davis Street shall be constructed
to accommodate emergency vehicles. A vehicle barrier acceptable to the
City shell be instaKed at DaVis Street to keep traffiC off of the path.

6. The applicant shalt construct a connection

9. The applicant shall provide pedestrian scale lighting along the bicycle
path from Roosevelt Avenue to Davis Street
10. The applicant shaU provide street lighting, street signs and any required
siop signs at the following Intersections:
i. Roosevelt Avenue and Hemlock Street

ii. Roosavel1 Avenue and McCall Avenue

11. All street and pedestrian lighting plans shal be submitted with the final
plat application. AJI outdoor lighting shall meet the requiremems of the
proposed Code Title 3, Chapter 14, Outdoor Lighting
12. Any perimeter fencing shall conform with the following:
f. Perimeter fencing means fencing which, in the opinion of the
Commission, substantially encloses the property In question.
Perimeter fencing enclosing residential developments is
discouraged, except fencing enclosing property with no more than
two residential units. Perimeter fencing which surrounds, or
substantially surrounds. a residential sttbdivision shall be primarily
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constructed of natural materials, such as log paes or split rails.
Perimeter fencing for residenUal developments shalf have periodic
openings to allow tor the movement of larger wild animals, such
as deer and el<, and shall be oonstructed so that the height of the
top rallls no more than forty two (42) InChes above grade and the
minimum gap betWeen the bottom rail and grade is fifteen (15)
inches. Perimeter fencing proposed for a residential development
is subject to the approval of the Commission either as a part of the
proposed subdivision or requested via a conditional use permit.
13. All shared driveways shall meet the following conditions:

i. Shared driveways shal be constructed to the dimensions of fire
apparatus access roads per IFC 503.2.1.

ii. Shared driveways in excess of 150 feet shall have an approved
turnaround for fire apparatus P« IFC 503.2.5, Appendix D.
Ill. Additional fire hydrants shan be required at the end of shared
drtveways per !FC 508.501.
lv. Hydrant spacing shall be per Table C105.1 of Appendix C of IFC.

v. The applicant shall prepare a plan detailing hydrant locations to be
submitted with the final plat application.
14. The applicant shal prepare construction draWings for the proposed
landscaping plan for City approval, to Include:

i. Landscaping along both sides ot Roosevelt Avenue.
ii. Landscaping along the bicycle path, InclUding benning between
the bicycle path and the north property line.
Ill. Landscaping and furnishings {tables, benches, picnic equipment
and pfayground equipment appropriate to a neighbortlood park
and acceptable to the CJty} for the open space adjacent to units 17
through 20.
iv. Landscaping on the east side of the origlna! railroad embankment.
15. Maintenance of landscaping {including temporary Irrigation} and
furnishings In all public lights-ot-way shall be the responsibility of the
applicant until establishment of plantings, when they will become the
responsibility of the City of McCall. At the applicant's request, the City
Atborist shall determine whether the landscaping has beoome established
and, if established, accept responsibility from the applicant.
16. The applicant shall submit construction drawings for street, snow storage,
drainage, water, sewer, and landscaping improvements to the City with
the final plat application.
17. The applicant shall submit architectural drawings to the City with the PUO
final plan application. The Commission will revieW and approve as part of
a Design Approval Process the design of an multi-family, or two family,
dweiUng units with the PUO.
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18. The appllcant shall provfde a permanent emergency access and drainage
easement as shown on the plat between units 55 and 56 for the benefit of
property owners to the east.

19. The applicant shaH negotiate a development agreement with the City prior
to submittal of the PUO final pfan application.
20. The applicant shall consider the foHowing in developing the Declaration of
CCR's to be submitted wtth the PUD final plan application:
I. The CCR's should Include the six single family rots and not be
written exclusivety for townhouse development.
ii. Paragraph 4.2 may be too restrlctlve; the appHcant shoUld
consider the option to use satellite for television, and it may not be
practical or possible to make the antennas invisible from the street
in aff cases.

iii. Paragraph 4. 16- refers to paragraph 4.17. Is an error.
iv. Paragraph 5.7.1 -define "fJSCal year".
v. Paragraph 13.1- revise the date specified.
vi. Prepare a separate document for a Home OWner's Association
Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation.

11. The Commission concluded that the final plat met the following conditions of
approvat:

1. The applicant shall realign MIN Point Orlve to connect directly to
Roosevelt Avenoe at Hemlock Street. The realigned street shall be
renamed Roosevelt Avenue and shall be constructed to City standard.
The right-of-way of Roosevelt Avenue north and south of Hemlock Street
shall align. Mill Point Drives was renamed Roosevelt Avenue and
connects directly to the existing Roosevelt Avenue at Hemlock Street
2. The applicant shall construct sidewalks to City standard on both sides of
Roosevelt Avenue from Hemlock Street to McCall Avenue. The applicant
has agreed to construct the sidewalks on both sides of Roosevelt from
Hemlocf< to McCal Avenue according McCall City standards.
3. Any parking on Roosevelt Avenue shaH be designed to City standard and
signed to prohibit overnight parking during snow events. The applicant
has agreed to design parking according to the McCall City standards and
signs wiH be posted to prohibit overnight parking.
4. The shared driveway between units 9 through 12 and units 13 through 22
shalf be 40 feet in width and designed to City standard as a private street
The shared driveways in this condition are not part of Phase 1,11. or Ill.
This condition will apply to a future phase.
5. The applicant shall grant an easement between the end of this shared
driveway and the property to the east to provide pedestrian access and
emergency vehicle access to this property. The specifics of this easement
shalf be addressed in lhe development agreement. An easement has
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been granted between the end of the shared driveway and the property to
the east. which provides vehlcUar and pedestrian access to the property.
6. The applicant shaM construct a bicycle path to City speclfic:atlons from
Meed Avenue to Davis Street The bicycle path Is not part of Phase I, II,
or Ill but will be completed In a future phase.
7. The applicant shall dedicate a ten foot wide pedestrian easement for the
portion of the bicyde path from Roosevelt Avenue to Davis Street The
easement will be discussed In the development agreement and built as a
future phase.
8.

The applicant shal construct a connection to the bicycle path described
above from the shared driveway adjacent to unit 20. This connection and
the bicycle path from the connection to Davis Street shall be constructed
to accommodate emergency vehicles. A vehicle barrier acceptable to the
City shall be installed at Da'oAs Street to keep traffic off of the path. The
applicant wiH construct an emergency access for vehicles from unit 26 to
Da'oAB Street In a later phase. This condition was approved by the Mccall
Fire District.

9. The applicant shall provide pedestrian scale lighting along the bicycle
path from Roosevelt Avenue to Davis Street The pedestrian scale
lighting will be constructed with the bike path during a future phase.
10. The applicant shalf provide street lighting, street slgos and any required
stop signs at the following intersections:

i. Roosevelt Avenue and Hemlock Street

ii. Roosevelt Avenue and McCall Avenue
The applicant Will provide street lighting for the above referenced
locations as shown on the PUD final plan.
11. All street and pedestrian lighting plans shall be submitted with the final

plat application. All outdoor lighting shalt meet the requirements of the
proposed Code Title 3, Chapter 14, Outdoor Lighting.
12. Any perimeter fencing sheU conform with the following:

i. Perimeter fencing means fencing which, in the opinion of the
Commission, substantially encloses the property in question.
Perimeter fencing enclosing residential developments is
discouraged, except fencing enclosing property with no more than
two residential units. Perimeter fencing which surrounds, or
substantially surrounds, a residential subdivision shal be primarily
constructed of natural materials, such as Jog poles ot split raJis.
Perimeter fencing for residential developments shall have periodic
openings to allow for the movement of larger wild animals, such
as deer and elk, and shaU be constructed so that the height of the
top raR is no more than forty two (42) inches above grade and the
minimum gap between the bottom ran and grade is fifteen { 15)
inches. Perimeter fencing proposed for a residential development
is subject to the approval of the Commission either as a part of the
McCall City Council
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proposed subdM$fon or requested via a conditionaJ use permit
The applicant has agreed to obtain the Commission's approval for
rendng or obtain a conditional use permlt.

13. All shared driveways shall meet the folowfng conditions;
1. Shared drivewa~ shall be constructed to the dimensions of fire
apparatus access roads per IFC 503.2.1.
il. Shared drfvewa~ in excess of 150 feet stuUI have an approved
turnaround for fire apparatus per IFC 503.2.5, Appendix 0.
Iii. Additional flre hydrants shall be required at the end of shared

driveways per IFC 508.501.
iv. Hydrant spacing shal be per Table C105.1 of Appendix C of IFC.

v. The applicant shaU prepare a plan detaBing hydrant locations to be
submitted with the final plat application.
14. All driveways will be constructed to the requirements Rsted above and are
shown on the final plat/plan.

15. The applicant shall prepare construction drawings for ttMJ proposed
landscaping plan for City approval, to Include:
i. Landscaping along both sides of Roosevelt Avenue.

ii. Landscaping along the bicycle path, including berming between
the bicycle path and the north property line.
iii. Landscaping and furnishings (tables, benches, picnic equJpment
and playground equipment appropriate to a neighborhood parl<
and acceptable to the City} for the open space adjacent to units 17

through 20.
iv. landscaping on the east side of the orlgJnal railroad embankment
16. Maintenance of landscaping (including temporary irrigation) and
furnishings in aU pubic rights-of-way shalf be the responsibility of the
applicant until estabRshment of plantings, when lhey will become the
responsibility of the City of McCall. At the applicant's request, the City
Arborlst shall determine whether the landscaping has become established
and, if established, accept responslbiNty from the applicant. The appNcant
has submitted sutftcient landscaping plans.

17. The applicant shall submit construction drawings for street, snow storage,
drainage, water, sewer. and landscaping Improvements to the City with
the final plat application. The City Engineer approved construction plans
and final platlplan for Phase I and If.
18. The appficant shall submit architectural drawings to the City with the PUO
final plan appUcatlon. The Commission will review and approve as part of
a Design Approval Process for the design of all multi-famUy, or two family,
dwelling units with the PUO. The appticant submitted elevations of the
townhouses.
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19. The applicant shall proVide a pennanent emergency access and drainage
easement as shown on the plat between units 55 and 56 for the benefit of
property owners to the east. The easement Is shown on the ftnaJ plan
and will be discussed in the development agreement
20. The applicant shall negotiate a development agreement with the City prior
to submittal of the PUD tlnal plan application.

21. The applicant shaH consider the following In developing the Declaration of
CCR's to be submitted with the PUD final plan application:
I. The CCR's should Include the nine single family lots and not be
written exclusively for townhouse development.

il. Paragraph 42 may be too restrictive: the applicant shoutd
consider the option to use sa1ellite for television, and it may not be
practical or possible to make the antennas invisible from the street
in aff cases.
iii. Paragraph 4. 16- refers to paragraph 4. 17, is an error.

iv. Paragraph 5. 7.1 - define "fisca\ year".
v. Paragraph 13.1- revise the date specified.
vi. Prepare a separate document for a Home Owner's Association
Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation.
12. The flnaf plat for SUB-05-4, Greystone VlDage, was recommended for approval by
the Planning and Zoning Commission. subject to the following conditions that shall
be met before the City staff places the application on the City Council agenda tor
consideration:
a. The applicant shal sign a development agreement with the City pursuant
to MCC 9-6-06.
b. The appii<;;ant shalt submit electronic files of the final plat in a form
specified by the aty.
13. The applicant has met conditions a and b set by the Planning and Zoning
Commission.
14. On February 23, 2006, the McCall City Counal adopted an Amended Wastewater
Poficy (Re501ution-06-8).
15. The Wastewater Polley restricts the Issuance of building permits.
18. While the applicant is not required to provide a ComiTICJrlity Housing Plan, the
applicant has agrwd to deed the nine single famly resldentiat lots that constitl.lte
Phase 3 of the project to the City of McCal to provide Community Housing.

1. The proposed final plat meets the requirements of McCaN City Code, Title 9.
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2. The City of McCall Wastewater Policy (Resolution 06-08} provides a mechanism
whereby adequate wastewater capacity can be provided to support the subdivision
while protecting the public health, safety and welfare. Building permits tor lots in the
subdMsion will be issued In conformance with the Wastewater Polley, as now enacted,
and as may be modWled by Council In the future.
3. The City of McCall accepts the nine single family residential deeded Iota from the
applicant and the applk:ant will receive the associated benefits of the community
housing contribution In the building permit allo<;ation process.
4. The final plat for SUB-05-4, Greystone Village, Is hereby approved with the
following conditions:
1. The applicant shall submit electronic fHes of the final plan in a form specified by
the City before recording the final plat

Dated: April 27, 2006
Attest:

~o·wJ)

JoeYOfk
City Clerk
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MCCALL CRY COUNCIL PLANNJNG ANO ZONING COMMISSklN
FltONOS AND CONCLU810N8 REGARDING
APPLICAllON FOR

Frrw. PLAT APPRoVAl.

PUD-05-2
Greystone VDiage

Phase1,2,&3
The Council finds that:

1. All application fot' approval of a final plan, pursuant to McCall City Code 3-21 was
submitted by Briggs Engineering for Staven Benad, the owrter of the property
described below:
A parcel of land located i'l PORTIONS OF Gov't Lots 1 and 2, Section 9, AND A
PORTION OF GOVT LOT 3, SECTION 4, TO'M"IShlp 18 North, Range 3 East.

Boise Meridian, McCaM, VALLEY County, Idaho, more particularly described as
follows:
Commencing at the Northeast comer of Section 9, T.18 N.• R 3 E., B.M., McCall,
VAUEY County, Idaho; thence N 89.52'11. W 1323.64 feet along the north fine
of the NE 1/4 of said Section 9 TO the NE comer of Gov't Lot 1, of said Section
9; thence s O"OT3r W along THE east lfne of said Gov't Lot 1 574.57 feet to a
point; thence N 74"59'53" W 39.59 feet to a point on the westerly Right of Way
for Da'tlis Street, the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING of this subdi\lision;
THENCE S o•23'10" W ALONG SAID WESTERLY RIGHT OF WAY 51.82 FEET
TO A POINT;
ntENCE N 75.01'25"W98.60 FEET TO A POINT OF CURVATURE;
THENCE ALONG A CURVE TO THE lEFT 62.12 FEET, SAID CURVE HAVING
A RADIUS OF 435.82 FEET, A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 8°10'00", TANGENTS OF
31.11 FEET. AND A CHORD WHICH BEARS N 79.30'48• W 62.07 FEET TO A
POINT OF COMPOUND CURVATURE;
THENCE AlONG A CURVE TO THE LEFT 117.32 FEET. SAID CURVE
HAVING A RADIUS OF 435.21 FEET. A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 15.26'43•,
TANGENTS OF 59.02 FEET, AND A CHORD WHICH BEARSS 88"40'50" W
116.97 FEET TO A POINT;
THENCE S 8"33'29" W 233.09 FEET TO A POINT;
THENCE S 6"58'20" W 56.60 FEET TO A POINT;
THENCE S 8"29'12" W 20.40 FEET TO A POINT;
ntENCE N a7•49'38• W 211.52 FEETTOAPOtNT;
THENCE S 8~7'31• W 419.82 FEET TO A POINT ON THE NORTH
BOUNDARY OF McCALL'S FIRST ADDITION;
THENCE N 86•45'16" W ALONG SAID NORTH BOUNDARY 162.74 FEET TO A
POINT ON THE CENTERUNE OF ROOSEVaT STREET;
THENCE S 8"42'41" W ALONG SAID CENTERLINE 235.50 FEET TO A POINT
ON THE NORTHERLY RIGHT OF WAY OF HEMLOCK STREET;
THENCE N 81"25'2s- W ALONG SAID NORTHERLY RIGHT OF WAY 170.18
FEET TO THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF MILL RUN CONDO 2A AMENDED;
McCall City Councl
Findings and Conclusions Regarding final Plan Approval
PUD 05-2: Greystone Village

page1
April27, 2006

41/

.

THENCE N 8"39't9• E ALONG THE EASTERLY BOUNDARY OF SAID MILL
RUN CONOO 2A AMENDED 219.41 FEET TO A POINT;
THENCE S 87"23'11" E CONT1NUING ALONG SAID EASTERLY BOUNDARY
17.40 FEET TO A POINT;
THENCE N 14"37'26• E ALONG THE EASTERlY BOUNDARY OF SAID MIU
RUN CONDO 2A AMENDED AND MIU PARK VILLAGE SUBDIVISION 1327.83
FEET TO THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF SAID MILL PARK SUBOMSION,
SAID POINT BEING ON THE NORTH LINE OF SAID GOV'T LOT 1 AND
SOUTH LINE OF OOV'T LOT 3, SECTION 4;
THENCE S 89°23'00" E AlONG SAID COMMON GOV'T LOT LINES 51.55
FEET TO A POINT;
THENCE N 14*41'57" E 593.94 FEET TO A POINT;
THENCE S 75" 18'03" E 75.00 FEET TO A POINT;
THENCE S 14"41'57" W 701.16 FEET TOA POINT OF CURVATURE;
THENCE AlONG A CURVE TO THE LEFT 549.27 FEET, SAID CURVE
HAVING A ~US OF 435.16 FEET, A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 72.19'12",
TANGENTS OF 318.02 FEET, AND A CHORD WHICH BEARS S 37"57'13" E
513.53 FEET TO A POINT;
THENCE S 74"59'53" E 164.94 FEET TO THE REAl POINT OF BEGINNING
OF THIS SUBDIVISION.
SAID SUBDIVISION CONTAINS 11.71 ACRES. MORE OR LESS.
2. The property in question is located in the CB Central Business and the B Medium
Density Residential zoning districts.
3. The applicant is requesting final plan approval to create a planned unit development
containing 9 residential lots and 24 townhomes on 11.71 acres.

4. A companion application (SUB-Q5-4} requests final plat approval of a subdivision
containing 9 residential lots and 24 townhomes on 11.71 acres, located on the north
side of Hemlock street, between MiU Road and Davis Street
5. The Mccall Planning & Zoning CommisSion held a property posted and noticed
public hearing on April 5, 2005. at which time a Preliminary Plan for the PUD was
approved by the Commission. The pub~c hearing was continued to May 3, 2005. A
transcribable record was made of each pubic hearing.

6. The CommiSsion received public testimony, reviewed correspondence, and reviewed
staff reports dated Apri14, 2006 and Aprll27, 2005 for preliminary plan and plat
approval.
7. The Commission received public testimony, reviewed correspondence, and reviewed
a staff report dated March 27, 2006 for final plan and plat approval.
8. The McCall Area Comprehensive Plan Future land Use Map {Figt.lre 6) identffles the
subject property as 'Central Business District' and 'Medium Density Residential.' It is
adjacent to 'Central Business District' and 'Medium Density Residential' future land

uses.
9. The Commission concluded that the proposed preliminary plan meets the
requirements of MCC 3-21, subject to certain conditions.
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10. The preliminary plan for PUO-o5-2, Greystone VHiage, was approved, subject to the
following conditions:
1. The appQcant shall realign Mill Point Drive to connect directly to
Roosevelt Avenue at Hemlock Street The realigned street shall be
renamed Roosevelt Avenue and shall be constructed to City standard.
The right-of-way of Roosevelt Avenue north and south of Hemlock Street
shall align.
2. The applicant shall construct sidewalks to City standard on both sides of
Roosevelt Avenue from Hemlock Straet to McCall Avenue.
3. My parking on Roosevelt Avenue shall be designed to City standard and
signed to prohibit overnight parking during snow events.

4. The shared driveway between units 9 through 12 and units 13 through 22
shall be 40 feet in widfh and designed to City standard as a private street.
5. The applicant shaN grant an easement between the end of this shared
driveway and the property to the east to provide pedestrian access and
emergency vehicle access to this property. The specifics of this easement
shaM be addressed in the development agreement.
6. The applicant shall construct a bicycle path to Clty specifications from
McCall Avenue to Davis Street.
7. The applicant shall dedicate a ten foot wide pedestrian easement for the
portion of the bicycle path from Roosevelt Avenue to Davis Street.

8. The applicant shal construct a connection to the bicycle path described
above from the shared driveway adjacent to unit 20. This connection and
the bicycle path from the COMec1lon to Davis Street shalt be constructed
to accommodate emergency vehicles. A vehicle barriet acceptable to the
City shall be Installed at Davis Street to keep tratffc off of the path.
9. The applicant shal provide pedestrian scale Hghting along the bicycle
path from Roosevelt Avenue to Davis Street
10. The applicant shall provide street lighting, street signs and any required
stop signs at the following intersections:

i. Roosevelt Avenue and Hemlock Street
ii. Roosevelt Avenue and McCall Avenue
11. AI street and pedestrian lighting plans shall be submitted with the final
plat application. All outdoor lighting shall meet the requirements of the
proposed Code Title 3, Chapter 14, Outdoor Lighting

12. Any perimeter fencing shall coofonn with the foNowing:
i. Perimeter fencing means fencing which, in the opinkJn of the
Commisston, substantially encloses the property In question.
Perimeter fencing enclosing residential developments is
discouraged, except fencing enclosing property with no more than
two residential units. Perimeter fencing which surrounds, or
substantially surrounds, a residential subdivision shad be prlmanty
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constructed of natural materials, such as tog poles or split rails.
Perimeter fencing for resldenlfaJ developments shal have periodic
openings to alloW for the movement of larger witd animals, such
as deer and elk. and shalt be constructed so that the height of the
top rall is no more than forty 1wo (42) Inches above grade and the
minimum gap between the bottom ralJ and grade Is fifteen (15)
Inches. Penmeter fencing proposed for a res\dential development
is subJect to the approval ot the CommissiM eiltler as a part of the
proposed subdivision or requested vie a conditional Ll88 permit.

13. AJI shared driveways shaft meet the following conditions:
i. Shared driveways shall be constructed to the dimensions of fire
apparatus access roads per IFC 503.2.1.
ii. Shared driveways in excess of 150 feet shall have an approved
turnaround for flre apparab.JS per IFC 503.2.5, Appendix D.

iii. Additional fie hydrants shall be required at the end ot shared
driveWays per IFC 508.501.

lv. Hydrant spacing shall be per Table C1 05.1 of Appendix C of IFC.

v. The applicant shal prepare a plan detailing hydrant locations to be
submitted with the final plat application.

14. The applicant shal prepare construction drawings for the proposed
landscaping plan for City approval, to include:
i. Landscaping along both sides of Roosevelt Avenue.

II. Landscaping along the bicycle path. including bermlng between
the bicycle path and the north property Una.

iii. LandScaping and furnishings (tables, benches, picnic equipment
and playground eqUipment apPropriate to a neighborllood park
and acceptable to the City) for the open space adjacent to units 17
through 20.
iv. Landscaping on the east side of the original railroad embankment

15. Maintenance of landscaping (Including temporary irrigation) and
furnishings In all public rights-of-way shall be the responslbNity of the
applicant until establishment of plantings, when they wll become the
responsibility of the City of McCaN. At the applicant's request, the City
Arborlst shall determine whether the landscaping has become established
and, if established, accept responsibility from the applcant.
16. The applicant shal submit construdfon drawings for street. snow storage.
drainage, water, sewer, and landscaPing Improvements to the City with
the tfn~ plat application.
17. The applicant shall submit architectural drawings to the City with the PUD
final plan application. The Commisseon wilf review and approve as part of
a Design Approval Process the design of all mulfi..family, or t'NO family,
dwellng units with the PUD.
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18. The applcant shal provide a permanent emergency access and drainage
easement aa shown on the plat between units 55 and 56 for the benefit of
property owners to the east.
19. The appkant shall negotiate a development agreement with the City prior
to submjttai Qf the PUD final plan apPJicatlon.
20. The applicant shall consider the folaowing In developing the Declaration of
CCR's to be submitted With the PUO final plan application:
I. The CCR's should include the six single family lots and not be
written exclusively for townhouse development
il. Paragraph 4.2 may be too restrictive; the applicant should
consider the option to use satefflte for television, and It may not be
practical or possble to make the antennas lnWJible from the street
in all cases.

iii. Paragraph 4. t 6 - refers to paragraph 4.17. is an error.

iv. Paragraph 5.7.1- define "fiscal yea(.
v. Paragraph 13. 1 - revise the date specified.
vl. Prepare a separate document for a Home Owner's AsSOCiation
Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation.
11. The Commission concluded that the final ·ptan met the following conditions of
approval:

1. The applicant shall realign Mil Point Drive to connect directly to
Roosevelt Avenue at Hemlock Street. The realigned street shall be
renamed Roosevelt Avenue and shaH be constructed to City standard.
The right-of-way of Rooseveft Avenue north and south of Hemlock Street
shall align. MRI Point Drives was renamed Roosevelt Avenue and
connects directly to the existing Roosevelt Avenue at Hemlock Street
2. The applk;ant shaft construct sidewalks to City standard on both sides of
Roosevelt Avenue from Hemlo<>k Street to Mcealf Avenue. The applicant
has agreed to construct the sidewalks on both side$ of Roosevelt from
Hemlock to McCall Awnue according McCall City standards.
3. Any parking on Roosevelt Avenue shaU be designed to City standard and
signed to prohibit overnight parSdng during snow events. The applcant
has agreed to design parking according to the McCall City standards and
signs ~ be posted to prohibit overnigtlt parking.
4. The shared driveway between units 91tlroogh 12 and units 13 through 22
shall be 40 feet In width and designed to City standard as a private street
The shared driveways in this condition are not part of Phase I, II, or Ill.
This condition wiH apply to a future phase.
5. The applicant shall grant an easement between the end of this shared
driveway and the property to the eest to provide pedeslrian access and
emergency vehicle access to this property. The specifics ot this easement
shall be addressed In dle devetopment agreement. An easement has
McCal City Counel
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been granted between the end of the shared driveway and the property to
the east, which provides vehicular and pedestrian access to the property.
6. The applicant shall construct a bicyde path to aty specifications from
McCall A\18008 to Davis Street The bicycle path is not part of Phase I, II,
or Ill but will be completed in a future phase.

7. The appBcant shall dedicate a ten foot wide pedestrian easement for the
portion af the bicycle path from Rooseveft Avenue to Davis Slreel The
easement will be discussed In the development agreement and buitt as a
future phase.
8. The applicant shaM construct a connection to !he bicycle path described
abo'Je tmm the shared driveway adjacent to unit 20. This connectiOn and
the bicycle path from the connection to Davis Street shall be constructed
to accommodate emergency vehkles. A IJehicJe barrier acceptable to the
City shall be Installed at Davis Street to keep trafflc off of the path. The
applicant wiN construct an emergency access tor vehides from unit 26 to
Davis Street in a later phase. This condition was approved by the MccaU

Fire DistriCt.
9. The applicant shaU provide pedestrian scale lighting along the bicycle
path from Roosevelt Avenue to Davis Street. The pedesfiian scale
lighting will be constructed with the bike path during a future phase.

10. The applicant shall provide street lighting, street signs and any required
stop signs at the following Intersections:

1. Roosevelt Avenue and Hemlock Street

u.

Roosevelt Avenue and McCall Avenue

The applicant wll provide street lighting for the above referenced
tocattons as shown on the PUD final plan.
11. All street and pedestrian lighting plans shall be submitted with the final
plat application. AU outdoor lighting shaU meet the requirements of the
proposed COde TIHe 3, Chapter 14, OUtdoor lighting.

12. Any perimeter fencing shalf confonn with lt1e following:

i. Perimeter fencing means fendng which, in the opinion ot the
Commission, substantially encloses the property in question.
Perimeter fencing enctosing residential developments Is
discouraged, except fencing enclosing property with no more than
two residential units. Perimeter fencing which surrounds, or
substantially surrounds. a residential subdivision shall be primarily
constructed of natural materials, such as log poles or split rails.
Perimeter fencing for residential developments shaM have periodic
openklgs to allow for the movement of larger wild animals, StiCh
as deer and el<, and shall be constructed so that the height ot the
top rail is no more than forty two (42) inches above grade and the
minimum gap between the bottom rail and grade is fifteen (15)
inches. Perimeter fencing proposed for a residential development
Is subject to the approval of the Commission either as a part of the
McCalt City Cooncil
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proposed subdMslon or requested via a conditional use permit.
The applicant has agreed to obtain the Commission's approval for
fencing or obtain a conditional use pennit.
13. Ail shared driveways shaN meet the following conditions:

i. Shared driveways shal be constructed to the dimensions of tire
apparatus access roads per IFC 503.2.1.
ii. Shared driveways In excess of 150 feet shall have an approved

tumarnund for fire apparatus per IFC 503.2.5, Appendix D.
iii. Additional fir& hydrants shall be required at the end of shared
driveways per IFC 508.501.
lv. Hydrant spacing shalt be per Table C105.1 of Appendix C of IFC.

v. 1lle applicant shaU prepare a plan detaiUng hydrant tocatlons to be
submitted with the final plat applicatiOn.

14. All driveways will be constructed to the requirements listed above and are
shown on the final plat/plan.

15. The applicant shall prep81'8 construction drawings for the proposed
landscaping plan tor City approval, to indude:

1. Landscaping along both sides of Roosevelt Avenue.
II. Landscaping along the bicycle path, including benning between
the bicycle path and the north property line.
ill. Landscaping and furnishings (tables, benches, picnic equipment
and playground equipment appropriate to a neighborhood park
and acceptable to the City) for the open space adjacent to units 17
through 20.
lv. landscaping on the east side of the original railroad embankment.
16. Maintenance of landscaping (lnduding temporary irrigation) and
furnishings in all pubfic rights-of-way shal be the responsibility of the
applicant until establishment of plantings, when they will become the
responsibility of lhe City of McCall. At the applicant's request the City

Arborlst shall determine whether the landscaping has become established
and, if established, accept responsibility from the applicant. The applicant
has submitted sufficient landscaping plane.
17. The applicant shall submit construction drawings for street, snow storage,
drainage, water, sewer, and landscaping improvements to the City With
the final plat application. The City Engineer approved construction plans
and final plat/plan for Phase I and 11.
18. The applicant shal submit architectural drawings to the City with the PUO
ffnaf plan application. The Commission wiff review and approve as part of
a Design Approval Process ror the design of aB multi-family, or t\W family,
dwelling units with the PUO. The applicant submitted elevations of the

townhouses.
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19. The applcant shaY pro'iide a permanent emergency access and drainage
easement as shown on the plat between units 55 and 56 for the benefit of
property Ownef'1 to the easl The easement Is shown on the final plan
and will be discussed in the development agreement
20. The applicant shall negoUate a development agreement with the City prior
to submittal of the PUD final plan application.

21. The applicant Shall consider the following in developilg the Declaration of
CCR's to be submitted with the PUD final plan application:

i. The CCR's should Include the rnne single family lots and not be
written exclusively for townhouse developmenl
ii. Paragraph 4.2 may be too restrictive; the applicant shot.rid
consider the option to use satellite for television, and it may not be

practfcal or possible to make the antennas invisible from the street
in all cases.
ill. Paragraph 4. 16- refers to paragraph 4.17, is an error.

iv. Paragraph 5. 7.1 -define ·nscal year".
v. Paragraph 13. 1 -revise the date specified.
vi. Prepare a separate document for a Home Owner's Association
Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation.

12. The final plan for PUD-05-2, Greystone Village, was recommended for approval by
the Planning and Zoning Commission, subject to the following conditions that shalt
be met before the City staff places the appftcatlon on the City Council agenda for
consideration:
a. The applicant shall sign a development agreement with the City pursuant
to MCC 9-8-06.
b. The applicant shall submit e~tronic files of the final plat in a form
spec:ifled by the City.

13. The applicant has met conditions a and b set by the Planning and Zoning
Commission.
14. On February 23, 2006. the McCall City Council adopted an Amended Wastewater
PoUcy (Resolution-06-8}.
15. The Wastewater Policy restricts the issuance of building pet1l'Uts.

16. While the applicant Is not required to provide a Comnunty Housing Plan, the
applicant has agreed to deed the nine single fanjy residential lots that constitute
Phase 3 ot the proiect to the City of McCall to provide Community Housing.

The Council concludes that:
f. The proposed finat plan meets the requirements of McCan City Code, Title 9.
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2. The City of McCaN Wastewater PoHcy {Resolution 06-08) provides a mechanism
whereby adequate wastewater capacity can be provided to support the subdivision
while protecting the poblfc health, safety and welfare. BuRdlng pemtlts for lots In the
subdivision will be issued in confoonance with the Wastewater Policy, as now enacted,
and as may be modlfled by Council in the future.

3. The aty of McCall accepts the nine single family residential deeded lots from the
applicant and the applicant will receive the associated benefits of the community
housing contribution In the building permit aDocation process.
4. The final plan for PUC-05-2. Greystone Vlftage, is hereby approved with the
following conditions;
1. The applicant shall submH electronic files of the final plan in a form specified by
the Oty before recording the f1nal plat.

Dated:April27,2006

~~Mayor

McCall City Councj
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McCall Area
Planning and Zoning Commission
Meeting Minutes
April 4, 2001

CALL TO ORDER AND ROLL CALL
Chainnan Bob Youde called the McCall Planning and Zoning Commission meeting to
order at 6:00 pm. Commissioners Jeff Schaedler, Phil Feinberg and Sarah Jessup were
present

REVIEW & APPROVAL QF MINUTES
The March 7, 2006 minutes were approved as read.
OLD BUSINESS
No old business items.

NEW BUSINESS
PRE·APPLJCATfON
1103 McCall Avenue
Heather Fried ricks from McCall Design: A request for a pre-application meeting for 1103
McCall Avenue to (a) rezone from CBD to R4 or (b) add live work space to the project to
conform to the requirements of the underlying zone. NOT A PUBLIC HEARING.
Ms. Friedricks said the property at 1103 McCall Avenue is currently zoned in the Central
Business District but it is a residential project Since the residential house is located in
the CBO, an addition is not allowed because it is a non-conforming use. Therefore, they
could either incorporate commercial use into the project which is not the first choice or
apply for a rezone which appears that R4 would be the most suitable for the project. She
showed the Commission the site plan. She explained her client was considering a bed
and breakfast however on-site parking is an issue. She said she they are looking for
guidance from the Commission as to which direction they should go considering the
challenges they are facing. The parcel is mostly surrounded by single-family residences.
The Commission directed staff to look into the issue of spot zoning. Staff will get back to
the applicant as soon as possible.

SUB-05-4
Greystone Village
The applicant is requesting final plan approval of a Planned Unit Development and final
plat approval for a subdivision containing 9 residential lots and 24 town-homes on 11.71
acres, located on the north side of Hemlock Street, between McCall Avenue and Davis
Street. The remaining 28 town-homes. bike path, and the emergency access from
Roosevelt Avenue to Davis Street will be developed in a future phase. Phase 1 & 2
encompass the townhouse and Phase 3 includes the 9 single family lots. NOT A
PUBLIC HEARING.
The McCall Area Comprehensive Plan Future land Use Map identifies the subject
property as 'Central Business District' and 'Medium Density Residential.' It is adjacent to
'Central Business District' and 'Medium Density Residential' future land uses.

The project is proposed to be served by City water and sewer.
CITY OF MCCAll Pv.NNIHG AND ZON!Ml COMMISSION
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The interior road is proposed to be public. Access to individual town-homes will be from
shared driveways off of the interior road. Access to the subdivision will be from public
roads (i.e. Mill Road and Roosevelt Avenue). The shared driveways specifics will be
covered in the development agreement.
Staff recommends that the Planning & Zoning Commission approve the final plat for
SUB-05-4 and recommend approval of the final plan for PU0-05-2, subject to the
following conditions:
1. The applicant shall sign a development agreement with the City pursuant
to MCC 9.6.06.

2. The applicant shall submit electronic files of the final plat in a form
specified by the City.
The City Council must also approve the Final Plat and Plan.
Dean Briggs on behalf of Steve Benad said they are planning to build 9 affordable
housing lots instead of 6 lots as originally planned. He advised the houses will be deed
restricted. The question was brought forth to Mr. Millar if this could be possible since the
preliminary plat was approved with 6. Mr. Millar looked this up in the City Code and
advised that since the amendment is less than a 10% increase the conditions of
approval is acceptable.
Commissioner Schaedler made a motion to approve SUB 05-04 with the conditions as
submitted, Commissioner Jessup seconded, and the motion carried.

PUD-05-2
Greystone Viflage
Briggs Engineering, representing Steve Benad: A request for final plan approval for a
Planned Unit Development Phase 1, 2, and 3 containing 24 townhouses and 9 single
family lots, north of Hemlock Street. east of McCall Avenue and west of Davis Street.
NOT A PUBLIC HEARING.
The final plan for PUD-05-2, Greystone Village, is hereby recommended for approval,
subject to the following conditions that shall be met before the City staff places the
application on the City Council agenda for consideration:

1. The applicant shall sign a development agreement with the City pursuant to MCC
9-6-06.
2. The applicant shall submit electronic files of the final plan in a form specified by
the City
Commissioner Schaedler made a motion to approve PUD 05-02 with the conditions as
submitted, Commissioner Jessup seconded, and the motion carried.
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SUB-05-1
Whitetail, Phase II
The applicant is requesting both final plat and final plan approval for the second phase of
a Planned Unit Development containing 130 single family residential lots on
approximately 335 acres. NOT A PUBLIC HEARING.

The Future Land Use Map in the McCall Area Comprehensive Plan identifies the
property as ·'Low Density Residential.· It is bordered by other properties identified as
"Low Density Residential."
Staff recommends that the Planning & Zoning Commission recommend approval of the
final plat for SUB-05-1 and the final plan for PUD-05-1 with conditions. Draft Findings
and Condusions for each application are attached.
Steve Millemann addressed the Commission and advised them they are working with
ITO on improvements to Gun Hill Rd. Club Hill Blvd and Hwy 55. ITO will be conducting
a speed study to look at the feasibility of decreasing the speed limit. Chairman Youde
asked Mr. Millemann if he could foresee any problems with the conditions of approval to
which he replied that they did not.
Commissioner Schaedler recused himself. Chairman Youde made a motion to approve
SUB-05-1 with conditions # 1-10 listed in the Findings and Conclusions, Commissioner
Feinberg seconded, and the motion carried.
PUD-05-1
Whitetail, Phase II
Steve Millemann for Whitetail, A Club for All Seasons LLC and Summit Resources, Ltd.:
A request for final plan approval for a Planned Unit Development containing 130 single
family lots on approximately 335 acres located at Part of Sections 12 and 13, Township
18 North, Range 2 East, B.M., Valley County, Idaho. NOT A PUBLIC HEARING.

Chairman Youde asked Mr. Millemann and John Sabala if they had any problems with
the 5 conditions of approval to which they replied they did not.
Chairman Youde made a motion to approve PUD-05-1 with the five conditions,
Commissioner Jessup seconded and the motion carried.
SUB-04-15
Timbercrest, Phase II
The applicant is requesting final plat approval for Phase 2 of a subdivision containing 20
residential lots on 7.24 acres, located on Verita Road (west side of Boydstun Road
between Pinedale and Rio Vista).

The Future Land Use Map in the McCall Area Comprehensive Plan identifies the
property as "Low Density Residential.· It is bordered by other properties identified as
"Low Density Residential" and "Rural Residential.·
The Planning and Zoning Commission approved the preliminary plat for the subdivision,
subject to conditions. The applicant has met all the conditions relevant to Phase 2.

McCall Area Pfanning and Zoning Commission
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The applicant will need a letter from CH2MHill recommending engineering approval of
the final plat and construction drawings before staff places the application on the City
Council agenda.
Staff recommends that the Planning & Zoning Commission approve SUB-04-15. Draft
Findings and Conclusions are attached.
The City Council must approve the Final Ptat
Neither the applicant. nor a representative was present.
Commissioner Feinberg recused himself from voting. Chairman Youde made a motion
to approve SUB-04-15. Commissioner Schaedler seconded, and the motion carried.

SUB-05-14
Broken Ridge Commons
The subdivision application, Broken Ridge Commons, is a modification of Broken Ridge
Subdivision Phase 3. The applicant is proposing the final plat approval to create four
lots on the parcel. The applicant is proposing to construct Phase 1 (lot 1) which includes
72 condominium units in 9 multi-family structures on a nine acre lot.
The Future Land Use Map in the McCall Area Comprehensive Plan identifies the
property as "High Density Residential." It is bordered by other properties identified as
''Medium Density Residential" and "Industrial."
The applicant shall submit an application to rezone lots 2, 3, and 4 to Community
Commercial prior to submitting applications for building permits on lot 1.
The project is proposed to be served by City water and Payette Lakes Recreational
Water and Sewer District (PLRWSD) sewer. The applicant must verify with PLRWSD
that the district has adequate capacity to serve the proposed development and provide
documentation of same with the final plat application.
Commissioner Schaedler made a motion to approve SUB-05-14. Commissioner
Feinberg seconded, and the motion carried.

ADJOURNMENT
As there was no further discussion, Chairman Youde adjourned the meeting at 7:30 p.m.

ATTEST:

Carrie Rushby
Community Development Admin. Assistant

Robert Youde
Planning and Zoning Commission
Chairman
McCall Area Planning and Zoning Commission
April4, 2006 Minutes
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MCCALL CITY COUNCIL- REGULAR MEETING
APRIL 27, 2006

MINUTES
TABLE OF CONTENTS

CALL TO ORDER AND ROLL CALL
PUBLIC COMMENT
CONSENT AGENDA
BUSINESS
REPORTS
COMMITIEE MINUTES
EXECUTIVE SESSION
ADJOURNMENT
CALL TO ORDER AND ROLL CALL

Mayor Robertson called the regular meeting of the McCall City Council to
order at 6:03 p.m. Council Member Kraemer, Mayor Robertson, and Council
Member Scott (by telephone) answered roll call. A quorum was present.
Council Member Bailey and Council Member Bertram were absent.

Bill Nichols, City Attorney, was present.
City staff members present were City Manager Lindley Kirkpatrick, City
Manager; Roger Millar, Deputy City Manager; and Joanne York, City Clerk.
Michelle Groenevelt, Community Development Planner, joined the meeting in
session.
Mayor Robertson led the audience in the Pledge of Allegiance.
PUBLIC COMMENTS

ROBERTSON opened the meeting to Public Comments at 6:04 p.m. Hearing
no comments, he closed the Public Comments at 6:05 p.m.

CONS EN f AGENDA

There was a brief discussion concerning the Consent Agenda.
City Council Minutes - Regular IIAeellng
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MCCALL CITY COUNCIL- REGULAR MEETING
APRIL 27, 2006
ROBERTSON moved to adopt the Consent Agenda as presented. KRAEMER
seconded the motion, and the motion carried.
BUSINESS /\GENOA

AB 06-94 Reoort from the Library Advisorv Board
Robyn Armstrong presented a report from the Library Advisory Board, including
the history of the board, their Strategic Plan Mission Statement, current
activities, and future goals.
The Council expressed their appreciation to the library Advisory Board for their
commitment to improving and expanding the library.
AB 06-96 Vallev Adams Regional Housing Authority Joint Powers
Agreement Resolution 06-11
Roger Millar, Deputy City Manager, introduced this agenda bill, and recounted
the process that culminated in forming the Housing Authority. Greg Lovell,
McCall's representative to the Housing Authority, was elected chairman at their
first meeting.
ROBERTSON noted a clerical error in Resolution 06-13, paragraph 5.
Mr. Millar informed the Council that a Request for Proposal had gone out for an
entity needed to oversee community housing on city properties, to begin in
July.
ROBERTSON moved to adopt Resolution 06-13, with the correction as noted,
and authorize the Mayor to sign the necessary documents. KRAEMER
seconded the motion, and the motion carried.
AB 06-81 MIC 2006 Gem Action Plan
Curt Spalding, Chairman of the McCall Improvement Committee (MIC),
introduced himself and said he was available for any question from Council
concerning this plan. The Council expressed satisfaction with the plan as
presented.
ROBERTSON moved to approve the MIC's recommended list of priority
projects and adopt the 2006 Gem Action Plan. KRAEMER seconded the
motion, and the motion carried.
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MCCALL CITY COUNCIL- REGULAR MEETING
APRIL 2 7, 2006
AB 06-90 SUB-QS--4 and PUD-QS-2 Greystone Village Final Plat. Final Plan and
related Development Agreement
Roger Millar, Deputy City Manager, introduced this agenda bill, stating that the
developer will deed nine lots to the City for community housing.
Steve Benad introduced himself as the developer for Greystone Village, and
explained to Council that he wanted to get some community housing built and
available as soon as possible. He urged the Council to consider allowing
modular homes to be built in this development.
KRAEMER moved to adopt the draft Findings and Conclusions and approve
the Final Plat for SUB-05--4 and the Final Plan for PUD-05-2, Greystone
Village. SCOTT seconded the motion. In a roll call vote, KRAEMER, SCOTT,
and ROBERTSON voted aye, and the motion carried.
ROBERTSON moved to approve the related Development Agreement and
authorize the Mayor to sign. KRAEMER seconded the motion. In a roll call
vote, ROBERTSON, KRAEMER, and SCOTT voted aye, and the motion carried.
AB 06-95 SUB-05-02 Spring Mountain Meadows Final Plat and related
Development Agreement
Michelle Groenevelt, Community Development Planner, introduced this item.
KRAEMER moved to adopt the draft Findings and Conclusions and approve
the Final Plat for SUB-05-2, Spring Mountain Meadows, and approve the
related Development Agreement and authorize the Mayor to sign.
ROBERTSON seconded the motion.
In a roll call vote, KRAEMER,
ROBERTSON, and SCOTT voted aye, and the motion carried.
AB 06-9] McCall-Donnelly School District Bond Proposal
lindley Kirkpatrick, City Manager, reminded the Council that this was a followup to the discussion from last week's meeting since Council had wanted to have
a week to decide whether or not to give public support to the School District.
ROBERTSON stated that he believed that supporting the bond issue was the
right thing to do. KRAEMER also voiced his support. SCOTT expressed her
support, stating there was also a safety factor in the need to separate the grade
school students from the high school students.
SCOTT moved to support the passage of the bond proposed by the School
District. ROBERTSON seconded the motion, and the motion carried.
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MCCALL CITY COUNCIL- REGULAR MEETING
APRIL 27, 2006
ROBERTSON requested that Tom Grote, Editor of The Star-News, publish a
statement of support from Council.
REPORTS

Bill Nichols, City Attorney, distributed copies of his Clients Services Survey to
the Council and discussed the results with them.
Mr. Nichols also reported to the Council that the Fish Pen Dock judicial review
was scheduled for argument on May 31, 10 a.m., in Cascade.
He said
members of the Council were welcome to attend if they were interested, but
their attendance was neither necessary nor required.
Lindley Kirkpatrick, City Manager, stated he had submitted his written report to
Council and asked if there were any questions.
There was a brief discussion concerning Chad Olsen's agreement for the
Boydstun Street water line improvements. Mr. Millar, Deputy City Manager, said
the deadline for Mr. Olsen to begin work was May 8.
At 6:55 p.m., ROBERTSON moved to go into Executive Session. KRAEMER
seconded the motion. In a roll call vote, ROBERTSON, KRAEMER. and SCOTI
voted aye, and the motion carried.
EXECUTIVE SESSION

Executive Session was held pursuant to Idaho Code §67-2345(1 )(f), to
discuss litigation issues.
At 8:05 p.m., ROBERTSON moved to return to open session. KRAEMER
seconded the motion. In a roll call vote, ROBERTSON, KRAEMER, and SCOTI
voted aye, and the motion carried.
ROBERTSON moved to authorize Bill Nichols, City Attorney, to proceed with
condemnation of properties on Boydstun Street. KRAEMER seconded the
motion, and the motion carried.

City Council Minutes - Regular Meeting
Page4of5
April 27. 2008

429

MCCALL CITY COUNCIL- REGULAR MEETING
APRIL27, 2006
ADJOURNMENT

Without further business, ROBERTSON adjourned the meeting at 8:06p.m.

William A. Robertson, Mayor

ATTEST:

Joanne E. York, City Clerk
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Exhibit D

Plaintiffs' Appllcatioa for Final Plat (Mar. 20, 2006)

The following document was provided to the Court earlier as Exhibit l to Motion for
Leave to Supplement Summary Judgment Record and to Shorten Time (May 11, 20 ll ). At oral

argument, Plaintiffs offered no objection to the exhibit. It is reproduced here for the convenience
of the Court.
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Mardl20, 2006
Honorable Mayor and McCall City Council
216 Bast Part Street
McCa11, Idabo 83638
RE: Pbuuaed Uait Develop.._t Fblal P1aa!Fblal Plat
On behalf of my client Steve Benad and Greysmno ViUagc. p.leeae accept t.hi& application
for Planned Unit Development Final Plan and Final Plat. The subject property ia in
Government Lot I &2, Section 9, Government Lot 3, Section 4. Township 18 North, Range
3 Bast, B.M. City ofMcCaU, VaUey County, Idaho.

I

Addreued Coltditias ol Approval

I

1. Tho applicant shall ..Usn Mill Point Drive to connect directly to Roosevelt
Avenue at Hemloclc: Street. Tho realigned street shall be renamed Roosevelt
Avenue and shall be constructed to City standard.
MfD Poiat Drive wu reaamed Roosevelt Ave, all4l ha dJt"ect

couectiOII to Roosevelt Ave. at Hemlock Street. Pleue review Phase
l t1aa1 plat for Greyatoae VUiap tor dlaapa.

~·

2. The applicant 8llaiJ con~truct sidewalk.s to City standard on both sides of
Roosevelt Avenue from Hemlock Street to McCall Avenue.
AD aidewaJb wUI be eoastncted to City or McCall'• staadard 011 bGtJa
Hies of Roosevelt Ave. frorrt Heraledc Strut Co McCaU Ave.
3. Any parking on Roosevelt Avenue shall be desip.ed to City standard and signed
to prohibit overnight parking.
AU partiq oa RoMeVelt Ave. •••• be deslpeci Co City standards and
sipa wtll be posted to prolllbk ovel'BiPt parklq.
4. 1"hc shared driveway between units 15 through 18 and units 19 through 22 shall
be 60 feet in width and designed to City standard as a private street
This shared driveway between Wlitll~ tlaroap 18 aad uaits 19
throup n, are aot put of tlae CUI'ftllt appHadoas for pllues l, 1

aad3.
S. 1"hc applicant shall grant an easement between the end ofthia shared driveway
and tbe property to the east to provide ~ar and pedestrian access to this
property.
All eaaemeat has beea grated betweell the end or the s•ared
driveways ad tlte property to die east, whlell provides veldallar aad
pedestrian aecas to the property to t1te east.

)
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6. The applicant shall constntct a bicycle path to City specifteatioos from McCall
Avenue to Davis Street.
A blcyde Pldl to the Clty'ta{*l1kadou ftola McCIII Ave. to Davll
Street are llOt carreatly part oll'base t, 1, or 3, dais will be addreued
Ia a later pllue for Greystoae VWap.
7. Tho applicant sbaU dedicate a ten-tOot wide pedestrian e&aC!IIlOftt for tho portion of
the bicycle padl from Roosevelt Avenue to Davia Street.
A tela-foot pedeltriaa easemeat of the bicycle padt trmn Roosevelt
Ave. to Da'Yft Street II not ca.rrently part ol Pllue l, 1, or 3; tllil will

\

be addreued Ia a later phase for Greystae VBiqe.
8. The applicant shall constnlct a connection to dtc bicycle path described above
from the shared driveway adjacent to unit 26. Thia connection and tbe bicycle
path ttom the connection to Davis Street shall be constructed to accommodate
emergency vehieles. A vehicle barrier acceptable to the City shall be installed at
Davis Street to keep traffic off' of tho path.
All emerpaey aeeea wiU be eoa!Uneted to .eeomm.odate emeraeuey
vetddet from aalt l' to Davia Street, llowever, tbft II aot carreatly
part or Pilate l,l, or 3; dtil wiD be addretsed ill a later plaue for
Greyatoae vmaae.
9. The applicant sbaU provide pedestrian scale Jigbting along the bicycle path from
Roosevelt A venue to Davis Street.
Pecleetriaa seale lfptilla aloq tile bicycle IH'tla ti'OIII Ro01evelt Ave. to
Davia Street wll be eoastnc:tecl, laowever, tllil II aot eurreat17 part ot
Pll... t, l, or 3; thil wil be addreaed Ia a later plaue for Greystoae

vm-...

10. The applicant .shaJl provide street Iigbting at tbc following intmections:
a. Roosevelt Avenue and Hemlock Street
b. Roosevelt Avenue and McCall Avecue
Tile applcut wDI pnvtde atreet IJcladaafor tbe above refereaeed street
loeadoal. pleue view PJaaaed. Uait Developmeot plat for l1Ptlo1
~ationa.

11. All streot and pedestrian lighting plana sbaJl be submitted with tho final plat
application.
Street and pedatrfaa Uptlag piau have beeJa desipated per tbe
Planaed Uait Dewlopmeat plat, please review piau.
12. Any perimeter fencing shall conform with' the fullowing;
Perimeter fencing means :tencina wbic.b, in the opinion of the
Commission, subetantially eoclosea tho property in question. Perimeter
tcmcing enclosing residential developments is discouraged. except fencing
enclosing property with no more than two residential units. Perimeter
f'encing. wbich surrounds. or substantially SliiTOUl1ds. a residential
subdivision shall be primarily oonstructed of natural ma&eriala, such as log
polea or split rail& Perimeter fencing for residential developments sbal1
have p«iodic openings to allow Cor the movement of larger wild animals,
such as deer and elk. and shall be constructed so that the height of tho top
rail is no more than forty two ( 42) irl(ihea above grade and the minimum

COM000317
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pp b«weea the boaom rail - glde ia fttte. (1 S) incJJe& Perimeta'
r~ propoeed for a reaidential development Is subject to the appron1
of the Commillioll either 11 a pet of the ~ aubdiviaioo or
roqUCitecl via a coadittooal1110 permit.
Perlmetw faellla wtl be caaatldld te tile opiUoa of~.
c....... ad wm be Abject t. •• approorll of tile CCI•mlato.
eitller a a part of tile,...,......~ or • a req.....a .ta a
eoadfdnallllepermlt.
13. All slwed drivewa)'ll aba1l meet tbo fO!lowiq coaditiana:
a. Shln:d drivewayslball be COD8trtlcted to tho dimanlioaa of fire appuatua

accea roada per IFC 503.2.1.
b. Shared driveways in acea of l SO feet abal1 haw an approved tuma'oUDd
fer fire llppll'ltul per IFC 503.2.5, Appeadix D.
c. AdditiOMifire h~ abal1 be required It the ODd of sblred driveways
per IFC .508.501.
d. Hydrud spiCing shall beperTIIJioC105.1 ot Appeodix C ofiFC.
e. Tho applica abiJJ preparo a plaD detaiq hydrant locationa to bo
submiued witb the thud plat~·
A.ldaml drlvewaJII
be '*lltnleW to .eet d tile above
req....._tl, pleale rntew ......_. Ualt Dwelop. .cpiM for JocadoJis
tor nn llyclruts.
14. The applicant sbaU prepare COIIItruction drawinp Cot the proposed landacapina
plan for City IPPfOval. to include:
a. LaDdlcapiaa alona both aide8 ofR.ooeevelt Avenuo.
b. I .aodiC8ping a1ona tho bicycle path.
c. Laodscapiq and f\mlishinaa (bcncbaa. tralh receptacles acceptable to the
City) for the open space adjacent to units 23 throuah 26.
Pleae ..mew au.dled ladsape,..... ,._lppi'Oftd eoutruetioa
dnwillp r... tile abon ........... ......,. l'eqllinnaeabl.
IS. Maintt.olnco of landsciiPius and .t'bmilbinp in all public rights-of-way shaD bo

w•

the 1'elp0nlibility of the applicaat UDtil establishmant of pl•tinp, when they will
become the RlllpO!Wibility of the City ofMcCall. At the applicua'a requeat, the
City Albori.at ab8U cleCcmUne wbetber tho laodacapins hill become established
and. if established, accept l'tllpODiibility &om tbc appliclnL
Malaleaaace ollacllapiDa lllCI r.......w.p • al JMIItJk ript!HI-ways
daU be die~ oltM appltcut.
All conditions for Grcystono Village phaaea 1, 2, and 3, wiD either bo COJl"'l .stnwJdwcdlilol..LoriL..W.WJw'11_ _ _ __.
be bonded. per City of McCaJJ.'s boudins requiremenl8, prior to bavina the final plata

===•.:·~~~..:..d becleededtDtheCityofMclCIIJ, pleue

COM000318

434

If )'011 should have any questions, ple~ae feel free to contact me at 208-344-9100 or
§lbrinaw@briaJHPsineeriq.com.

Thdyou.

.

~2-~~~;.:'_-~
Sabrina Whitehead
Llllld Uso Ptamu:r
Brigs Engineering

COM000319
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Exhibit E

Development Agreement (May J, 2006)

The following Development Agreement was submitted previously as Exhibit R to the

Affidavit of Michelle Groeneve/1 dated Apr. 4, 2011 ). The original is 45 pages. Page 1 is
reproduced here for the convenience of the Court.
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•

City Oat
City of McCall
216 But .hrk san.t
McC.U. lcWio 13638

Far l.ec:CIIdiJic Pmpoeee Do
Not Write Abow Tbia LiDe
DtVELOPM.INT AGRI.DUNT

'Thit o.veiopma A~ btniatftc refcmd to as '"Aare--t", i.s Cilda'ed

into by aed b«weea tbe City of McCall, a muaicipal corporatioll of tM s.... of ldllbo,
hereiDak ma1ed to 11 the '"City", mel "'reystone Viltaae, LLC", blniaafter
to u '"<lnr)stoDe Villqe", whole addawl ia 1909 PiJpim Cove .Roed, ~aU, ldllbo,
83638, IDd who il the owner of the OreystoDe Villap, which il 1110re palticul..ty
delcribed ia the

lttacbld-

maTed

WHEJU!AS, Approval of the Final Plat for Greystooe Villap bu been Jl'8llted by
the Mce.JJ City Council u of April 21', 2006.
WHI!It.!AS, till llicllfiiiOYIII..,w Yllioul ccati.,_ a. wticta

e. City _.

ar.,..... ViDIIt haw r..w ............ whidl . . . . . . . City ... OnY*M

ViDIIt ..... ....wiz&

WHEREFO~ the City of McCall mel Oreystooe Vill... do •*- into this
Aareement IDd ror aad ill considention of tho mutaal covtnlllts, duties lftd oeliptiollt
btninMt b1b. do aarw u follows:

Aln'ICL&I
LI!GAL .AtrniORlTY

1.1
Thil D~vt~opmtDt Aaroema iiiMde punuiDt to IDd m KCOrdaDce with
the p:oYi.1ioa1 ofldlho Code f67-6,11A IDd McCall City Code, Tide 9, Chlrptcr 6.

AAnCLI.B
ROADWAY AND STORM OJlAINAG.&

2.1
EitiMr pll'ty sha1J pve the odw at least thirty (30) days prior writtea
notice bdlrc proccedina with an or •Y part of the Road and Stona Dninap

......

~mprov
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Exhibit F

P&Z Commission Minutes (May 3, 2005)

The following P&Z Commission minutes were submitted previously as Exhibit B to the

Affidavit of Michelle Groenevelt dated Apr. 4, 2011 ). The original minutes are 26 pages. Pages
1 and 7 are reproduced here for the convenience of the Court.

CITY'S RESPONSE BRIEF OPPOSING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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City of McCall
Planning and Zoning Commission
Meeting Minutes
May 3, 2005
Call to Order
Chairman Bailey called the McCall Planning and Zoning Commission Meeting to order at 7:00
PM. Commissioner Don Bailey, Commissioner Bob Youde, Commissioner Phil Feinberg and
Commissioner Jeff Schaedler were present.

City staff member present was Roger Millar, Community Development Director and Joanne
York, Administrative Assistant.

Review and Aoproval of Minutes
Chairman Bailey stated that there were no minutes prepared for approval.
Mr. Millar spent a few minutes explaining the pre-session concept. Pre-sessions are for the
purpose of general information sharing only; and remarks by the Commission or City staff
cannot and should not be relied upon as decisions, pre-decisional approval, or disapproval, or
any other binding official action. Pre-sessions are not part of the decision making process or
decision record. This informal discussion will be held from 6 PM to 7 PM before the formal
Planning and Zoning Commission meeting convenes. This opportunity is open to anyone. The
first session was held tonight with the owners of the Hotel McCall.

Chairman Ba1ley stated there is still one vacancy on the Planning & Zoning CommissiOn.

Old Business

SUB05-S Uck Creek Meadows
Mr. Millar introduced the application which was being continued from a previous meeting. The
applicant is Scott Findlay, for J. B. Scott The application is for preliminary plat approval for a
subdivision containing 146 residential lots on 57.22 acres, located on the south side of Lick
Creek Road, near the intersection with Pilgrim Cove Road. This is a Public Hearing.
Printed 51191200!1

1_,..WI

tJ1/y f'~ llbtl:17iiJcWiillt/N,,
Ja fxwtwll+ AlffJ.~~~·t l:l~t. tl

iGr ~~-nrc. ~,.t.

_~~
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Commissioner Youde asked about a final landscape plan. Mr. Millar replied that it will be
submitted along with the final plat.
Chatrman Bailey asked if there ~re 52 planned units. Mr. Millar stated yes, in the latest

version.
Chairman Bailey asked the developer if he recatled a discussion from their first or second

meeting regarding providing affordable community housing at Greystone on Payette and at that
time you said no. What are your findings now? The developer replied that we all need to come

together to plan for affordable housing, but this project won't lend itself to that. Chairman Bailey
asked - "without City law behind me• - is that possible to consider between now and the final
plat? It's more constructive if it's a voluntary project. Because of where this housing is located

and the need for affordable housing, this would be a good place for it. Chairman Bailey asked
the developer to look at costs and see if it's feasible. It might be doable with this many units
since you have control of the entire multi-family units.
Discussion followed concerning the need for affordable housing.
Chairman Bailey asked if there were any further questions. He stated that our preference would
be for the design where Roosevelt Street continues.
Chairman Bailey stated that the Public Hearing was open for anyone wanting to speak in favor
of the development There was no response. He asked if anyone wanted to speak in
opposition of the development.

President of the Aspen Homeowners Association stated that he appreciated the changes made
in the project. He stated that the Roosevelt Avenue/McCall Avenue option would allow more
space between the condo property and Roosevelt if Units 21 and 22 of the project were
eliminated, or he would like to see very heavy landscaping along the property line and berms.
Discussion followed.
Chairman Bailey stated there seems to be plenty of land - 65' - between the street and the
property line.
Printed 511912005

Page 1 ot26
May3. 2005
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ExbibitG

Memorandum from Steven Hasson (Oct. 19, 2006)

A legible copy of the memorandum from Steven Hasson dated October 19, 2006 is
attached hereto as Exhibit G. A partially illegible version of this document was provided to the
Court as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Victor Villegas in Support ofMotion for Reconsideration
dated June 29, 2011. The City contends that evidence is tardy and immaterial. However, if the
Court wishes to consider it, it should have a legible copy.
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1cOJ902~ 1~. 44n-4

44/

CITY OF MCCALL

October 19, 2006
To: McCaU City Staff

From: Steven Hasson, AICP
Subject: Advising applicants about vojuntary affordable housing mitigation payment
Dear staff: Here Is a format that you should rely upon for addressing voluntary affordable housing
mitigation proposals.
· Advise the applicant that they have the option to move forward on their buUding permit application
during the moratorium - provided they offer a form of affordable housing mitigation that is In
keeping with the sprit and intent of the housing policy and ordinances that has been adopted by
the City.
Because this Is a voluntary effort on their part - applicants are free to propose what they believe
is in keeping with the spirit and Intent of the City's affordable housing program. 1f the applicant
asks for assistance in fee determination we should provide them a copy of the fee structure
without offering comment that they must follow this payment plan.
If they ask to rely upon that compensation formula we should accommodate them without making
comments to the effect that they made the right or wrong choice. If they propose to pay fees they
should be given a copy of the waiver/release form they will be asked to sign.

If the applicant inquires as to what others have done, it would be acceptable to state they have
paid the fees and signed a waiver. In that circumstance, staff should qualify that even though
others have ~ to pay the fees and sign. the waiver, the applicant can propose something
different if they choose and aU proposals will be fairly evaluated.

If they propose a means of compensation as mitigation lhat Is cfearty Insufficient we should just
return the permit to them with a comment that in our judgment the form of consideration does not
resolve the effect the construction of the r&Sidence will have on the City's affordable housing
needs. The ordinance fee structure should be considered a guide you can use to detennine If the
offered compensation is adequate.
Staff should make no effort to tell them how to cure the offer of insufficient compensation. Staff
can and should ask any application why they believe the offered compensation Is adequate.
If they offer a fonn of compensation or mitigation that is original (such as 12 buffalo) then the

determination of whether that is sufficient mitigation to resolve the City's affordable housing
needs created or Increased by the construction of the residence should be forwarded to Roger
Millar for his assessment. If you feel uncomfortable returning the permit because it is likely
insufficient in its means of compensation - then feel free to forward that to Roger for his review.
Tell the applicant that the offered mitigation will be reviewed and a decision made. They wiN be
informed of the decision.
Advise the applicant that any staff determination is appealable to a higher authority.
We should try and be as neutral as possible and not encourage or discourage the mitigation

offered.

116 Eut PJrt Strut • McCall, ldah• IHJI • (laiJ 634-7141 • FAX {lGI) 634-JtJI
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Christopher H. Meyer, ISB #4461
Martin C. Hendrickson, ISB #5876
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Otlice: 208-3 88-1200
Fax: 208-388-1300
chrismeyer@givenspursley.com
mch@givenspursley .com

CaseNo·--~~Na~-
A.M. ~. l)
P.M.

FBed

Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant City ofJkCa/1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE
VILLAGE, LLC,

Case No: CV 2010-276C
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM

F. NICHOLS

Plaintiffs,

v.
CITY OF McCALL,
Defendant.

CITY OF McCALL,
Counterclaimant,

v.
RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE
VILLAGE, LLC,
Counter-defendant.

:HFIDAVIT OF WILliAM F. NICIIOLS
1207704_1 docx I 4432-4
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State ofldaho
County of Canyon

)
) ss.
)

WILLIAM F. NICHOLS, being tirst duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states:
l.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho. I make this

Aftidavit based upon personal knowledge and to the best of my information and belief.
2.

Since August 2005, I have been the City Attorney for the City of McCall, Idaho,

which is the DefendanUCounterclaimant in this action.
3.

The stakes involved in this litigation are substantial, particularly given the City's

current tinancial situation.
4.

This case called for the assistance of outside counsel qualified to address a broad

range of state and federal constitutional issues as well as associated procedural and jurisdictional
issues. In my experience, it is necessary to look outside of Valley County to obtain counsel
qualitied to handle litigation of this sort. This is particularly true given the conflicts of interest
that often occur with local attorneys. I was aware that Givens Pursley LLP, and specifically
Christopher H. Meyer, had dealt with affordable housing and inclusionary zoning related cases in
Blaine County and had considerable expertise in these types of cases. Upon contacting him I
discovered that he was also retained by Valley County for litigation that involved issues of
impact fees which, though different from the issues in this case, presented similar constitutional
issues. For these reasons, and upon my urging, the City retained the firm of Givens Pursley

LLP

to serve as lead counsel in this matter.
5.

In addition to being the City Attorney for the City of McCall, I am also a

shareholder in the Jaw firm of White, Peterson, Gigray, Rossman, Nye & Nichols, PA, located in
Nampa, Idaho. I have practiced law in Idaho since 1986. During that time, I have handled

AFFIDAVIT OF WILH\~1 F. NICHOLS
1207704_1 docx I 4432-4
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numerous cases in state courts throughout Idaho. I am a past chair of the Real Property Section
of the Idaho State Bar, and also a past president of the Idaho Municipal Attorneys Association.
6.

In my capacity as City Attorney for the City of McCall, I was involved

throughout the course of this litigation on a consultation and review basis, and I am familiar with
the issues and pleadings in this action. However, in order to avoid potential redundancy in
billing, the City is not seeking recovery of attorney fees associated with my role in this litigation.
7.

Although the state statute of limitations and lack of notice issues were relatively

straightforward, the litigation also presented a variety of other issues, particularly those involving
federal and state constitutional claims and associated procedural and jurisdictional issues, as well
as discovery. These issues demanded experienced litigation counsel familiar with this
specialized area. Likewise, the merits of the case called for assistance of counsel familiar with
the specialized area of affordable housing and inclusionary zoning, as well as impact fees and
their constitutionality under state and federal law. Mr. Meyer is a highly regarded expert in
these areas. From my review of the court's decision, the underlying briefing, and the time sheets
of the City's counsel submitted in support ofthe attorney fee motion, the work performed by Mr.
Meyer and his co-counsel and legal assistant was reasonable and necessary. In my experience
there are only a small number of law firms in the state, and few in Valley County (especially
ones that would not be contlicted out of representing the City), that are available to handle this
type of action.
8.

I am familiar with the current hourly rates generally charged by attorneys

litigating matters such as this one in Idaho. For these types of proceedings in 2010 and 20 ll,
lawyers in the Boise, Idaho market generally charge hourly rates ranges between $200 and $400.
9.

I am familiar with the qualifications, experience, and abilities of Christopher H.

Meyer and his law tirm, Givens Pursley
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM F. NICHOLS
1207704_1.docx 1 4432-4

LLP.

I know of Mr. Meyer's work and reputation from
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his presentations at Continuing Legal Education conferences, his written materials for those
presentations, his publication of articles, his work managing the Idaho Environmental Forum,
and my involvement in matters where his tirm was opposing counsel. I believe that the hourly
rate charged by Mr. Meyer in this matter ($31 0/hour) is reasonable in light of the nature of this
litigation, the stakes involved, and his abilities, skills, and experience in these matters, and his
total years of practice and experience.
I0.

I have reviewed the rates charged by other counsel at Givens Pursley LLP who

performed work in this matter. I believe, based on my experience and knowledge and what I
personally charge similarly situated clients in similar matters, that those rates are reasonable and
are at or below current hourly rates charged in the market for litigated matters involving land use
~xactions

with administrative and constitutional law dimensions.

I l.

I have reviewed the total amounts of the attorney fees requested to be awarded in

this matter by the City. In my opinion, the total requested attorney fees represent a reasonable
charge for the work performed given the nature of the matter, the etTort required, the stakes
involved, and the issues required to be addressed.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
DATED this

g~ day of July, 2011.

~/~~
William F. Nichols

.\HII>.\\IT OF WIJ.U.\\Ufiinl...~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

J/1!_ day of July, 2011, the foregoing was filed,

served, and copied as follows:

DOCUMENT FILED:

~

Fourth Judicial District Court
Attn: Archie N. Banbury, Clerk
Valley County Courthouse
219 Main Street
Cascade, ID 83611
Facsimile: 208-382-7107

0

0
0

0

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-mail

SERVICE COPIES TO:

~

Jed Manwaring, Esq.
Victor Villegas, Esq.
Evans Keane LLP
1405 West Main
P.O. Box 959
Boise, ID 83701-0959
j manwaring@evanskeane.com
vvillegas@evanskeane.com

0
0
0

~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-mail

COURTESY COPIES TO:
Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin
District Judge
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front St.
Boise, ID 83 702

~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail

0
0
0

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
E-mail

0
0

Jason Gray
Law Clerk to Judge Michael McLaughlin
Fourth Judicial District Court
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street
Boise, ID 83 702
Email: jmgray@adaweb.net

~

~~Mvf.~
Christopher H. Meyer

:\J:FIDA VIT OF Wll.LL\~1
1207704_1 docx/4432-4

F.

NICIIOtS
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Christopher H. Meyer, ISB # 4461
Martin C. Hendrickson, ISB #5876
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Office: 208-388-1200
Fax: 208-388-1300
chrismeyer@givenspursley.com
mch@givenspursley .com

;ase No. _ _--..~n~N~u----
Filed
A.M . 'I ?J P.M.

Attorneys for Defendant and Counterc/aimant City of McCa/1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE
VILLAGE, LLC,
Plaintiffs,

Case No: CV 201 0-276C
AFFIDAVIT OF
MARTIN C. HENDRICKSON

v.
CITY OF McCALL,
Defendant.

CITY OF McCALL,
Counterclaimant,
v.

RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE
VILLAGE, LLC,
Counter-defendant.

AFFIDAVIT Of MARTIN C. HE:'IIDRICKSON
1206268_3.DOC /4432-4
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State of Idaho

)
) ss.
)

County of Ada

MARTIN C. HENDRICKSON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states:
I.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho. I make this

Affidavit based upon personal knowledge and to the best of my information and belief.
2.

I am a partner in the firm of Givens Pursley LLP which represents

Defendant/Counterclaimant City of McCall (the '"City") in the above-captioned civil action.
3.

I am admitted to practice in Idaho, the United States District Court for the District

of Idaho, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
4.

I hold a J.D. degree, magna cum laude, from Texas Tech University School of

Law ( 1998) and a Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Idaho ( 1994).
5.

In 2009, 2010, and 2011 I was listed as a "Rising Star" by 1\-fountain States Super

Lawyers®. I am "peer review rated" by Martindale-Hubbell.
6.

Prior to joining Givens Pursley LLP in 2006, I was an associate at the Boise law

firm of Moore, Baskin & Parker, where I practiced in the areas of civil litigation defense and
civil rights defense.
7.

During my practice at Givens Pursley LLP, I have handled numerous cases in state

and federal courts throughout Idaho in a variety of commercial and real estate related matters.
My areas of practice include civil litigation, administrative law, civil rights, land use, and
constitutional law.
8.

I billed the time I spent on this matter at a rate of $200.00 per hour in 20 I 0 and

$210.00 per hour in 20 II. This is my regular billing rate, as retlected in the itemized billing
sheets for this matter that are Exhibit B to the Affidavit ofChristopher H :Heyer.
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9.

The time entries on the itemized billing sheets for this matter set out in Exhibit B

to the Affidavit ofChristopher H. Jfeyer accurately reflect the work that I completed on this
matter.
l 0.

The rates charged for the time spent by Givens Pursley LLP attorneys and staff on

this action are at or below the prevailing charges for like work in McCall, Idaho, and throughout
the State when undertaken on a hourly fee agreement.
ll.

I undertook to make my interactions with co-counsel as efficient and productive

as possible while avoiding duplication of effort.
12.

During the course of this proceeding, I and others representing the City made

every effort to communicate forthrightly with counsel for the Plaintiffs in order to avoid surprise
and unnecessary litigation costs.
13.

Because of the importance of the questions involved in this case, including the

potential for further litigation by those similarly situated, and the complexity of the federal law
issues pressed by the Plaintiffs, this case required a considerable amount of time as well as
specialized expertise in the areas of land use, administrative law, constitutional law, and civil
procedure.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
DATED

this~day of July, 2011.
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t!l.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _J_1_day July, 2011.

Notary Public or
Residing at: __,o..=-..;:;....a.-~r---o~-r--'-'....,...__My Commission Expires:
ll..o
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•
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

·I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ll 1h day of July, 2011, the foregoing was tiled, served,
and copied as follows:
DOCUMENT FILED:

rgj

Fourth Judicial District Court
Attn: Archie N. Banbury, Clerk
Valley County Courthouse
219 Main Street
Cascade, ID 83611
Facsimile: 208-382-7107

0

0
0
0

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-mail

SERVICE COPIES TO:

rgj

Jed Manwaring, Esq.
Victor Villegas, Esq.
Evans Keane LLP
1405 West Main
P.O. Box 959
Boise, ID 83701-0959
jmanwaring@evanskeane.com
vvillegas@evanskeane .com

0
0
0

rgj

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-mail

COURTESY COPIES TO:
Honorable Michael R. Mclaughlin
District Judge
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front St.
Boise, ID 83702

rgj

U. S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail

Jason Gray
Law Clerk to Judge Michael Mclaughlin
Fourth Judicial District Court
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street
Boise, ID 83702
Email: jmgray@adaweb.net

0
0
0

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
E-mail

0
0

rgj

~~J!~~~
Christopher H. Meyer
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Christopher H. Meyer, ISB # 4461
Martin C. Hendrickson, ISB #5876
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
60 I West Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83 70 l-2720
Office: 208-388-1200
Fax: 208-388-1300
chrismeyer@givenspursley.com
mch@givenspursley .com

Ni

;ase No·----._lnst
Fl/ecJ
....AM.Ii. ~ ~;zr--_-P.M-.

Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant City o/AfcCall

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE
VILLAGE, LLC,
Plaintiffs,

Case No: CV 20 l 0-276C
AFFIDAVIT OF
CHRISTOPHER H. MEYER

v.
CITY OF McCALL,
Defendant.

CITY OF McCALL,
Counterclaimant,
V.

RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE
VILLAGE, LLC,
Counter-defendant.
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State of Idaho

)
) ss.
)

County of Ada

CHRISTOPHER H. MEYER, being tint duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states:
I.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho. I make this

Atlidavit based upon personal knowledge and to the best of my infonnation and belief.
2.

I am a partner in the finn of Givens Pun ley LLP which represents

DefendanUCounterclairnant City of McCall (the ·'City") in the above-captioned ci vii action.
3.

I am admitted to practice in Idaho, Colorado (inactive), and the District of

Columbia (inactive), as well as numerous federal courts.
4.

I hold a J.D. degree, cum laude, from the University of Michigan Law School

( 1981) and an A.B. degree in economics, magna cum laude, from the University of Michigan
School of Literature, Science and the Art ( 1977). During my undergraduate yean, I was named
a James B. Angell Scholar and was awarded the Osterweil Prize in Economics.
5.

For the year 2011, I was selected by Best Lawyers in America® as the top natural

resources lawyer in Idaho. I have been listed in the Best Lawyers in America® since 2006 (listed
in each four practice areas), in Chambers USA's listing of America's leading lawyers for
business since 2008 (highest ranking, "Band 1"), in ,\;fountain States Super Lawyers® since
2007, in Who's Who Legal, the International Who's Who for Environmental Lawyers since 20 I 0
(one of only seven lawyers named in Idaho for the 2012 edition), and as a fellow in the honorary
society, Litigation Counsel ofAmerica, since 2010. Martindale-Hubbell has awarded me its
highest ranking ("AV") in each year since 1994.
6.

I have authored numerous articles and am a regular speaker at legal forums

throughout the nation.
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7.

The Idaho Yearbook Directory (2001) named me as "a key figure in Idaho water

law" and ..centrally located in the world of Idaho public affairs."
8.

I began my practice of law with the National Wildlife Federation in Washington,

D.C. in 1981. From 1984 through 1991, I was an Associate Professor Adjoint with the
University of Colorado School of Law in Boulder where I taught seminars in advanced water
law, environmental law, and negotiation. During that time, I also litigated environmental cases
for the National Wildlife Federation's legal clinic at the law school where I was employed.
9.

I have practiced law with Givens Pursley LLP in Idaho for twenty years. During

that time, I have handled numerous cases in state and federal courts throughout Idaho and
elsewhere. I have also represented a variety of clients at the administrative level before planning
and zoning commissions, cities, and counties. I have also played a significant role in shaping
legislation in Idaho, including the 1992 amendments to the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act
and the Municipal Water Rights Act of 1996 and the 2003 amendments thereto.
10.

My practice emphasizes land use (including zoning, permitting, and impact fees).

I also practice in the areas of water law, road and public access law, and environmental and
natural resources law. My practice includes extensive experience in constitutional and
administrative law.
11.

Further information about my professional background, including litigation

experience and publications, is included in my resume, which is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
12.

I billed the time I spent on this matter at a rate of $305 per hour in 20 I 0 and $310

per hour in 20 I 1. This reflects a discount on my regular billing rate. This discount was provided
as an accommodation to the City.
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13.

lam the lead attorney working on this matter. I am assisted by Martin C.

Hendrickson and, on occasion, by other attorneys and staff as reflected in the itemized billing
sheets for this matter that are attached hereto as Exhibit B.
14.

In addition to me, the other attorneys and paralegals from Givens Pursley LLP who

assisted on this matter are identified on the billing sheets as follows:

Martin C. Hendrickson. Mr. Hendrickson's credentials are described in his separate
Affidavit. Mr. Hendrickson's billing rate was $200 per hour in 2010 and $210 in 2011.
Justin M. Fredin. Mr. Fredin is an associate at Givens Pursley LLP whose practice
concentrates in land use and litigation. Mr. Fredin's billing rate was $195 per hour.
Alison S. Berriochoa. Ms. Berriochoa is a paralegal who assisted with compiling and
organizing documents in connection with discovery and motion practice. Her work made
case management more etlicient and thereby reduced attorney fees. Ms. Berriochoa's
billing rate was $100 per hour.
15.

While serving as lead counsel, I consulted with other members of this tirm and

delegated where appropriate to other partners and associates in order to minimize litigation
expense and take advantage of specialization.
16.

The rates charged for the time spent by Givens Pursley LLP attorneys and staff on

this action are at or below the prevailing charges for like work in McCall, Idaho, and throughout
the State when undertaken on a hourly fee agreement.
17.

I undertook to make my interactions with co-counsel as etlicient and productive

as possible while avoiding duplication of effort.
18.

During the course of this proceeding, I and others representing the City made

every etfort to communicate forthrightly with counsel for the Plaintiffs in order to avoid surprise
and unnecessary litigation costs.
19.

Because of the importance of the questions involved in this case, including the

potential for further litigation by those similarly situated, and the complexity of the federal law
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issues pressed by the Plaintiffs, this case required a considerable amount of time as well as
specialized expertise in the areas of land use, administrative law, constitutional law, and civil
procedure.
20.

The costs and attorney fees displayed in Exhibit B reflect a summary of the

monthly billing statements provided by Givens Pursley lLP to the City in connection with this
matter.
21.

I exercised my professional judgment in reviewing all monthly billings to ensure

that charges were reasonable, necessary, and appropriate. Where appropriate, I reduced or wrote
off attorney time spent on the matter where I felt that the time could not be justified on the basis
of the work produced.
22.

With the assistance of staff, I prepared the Memorandum of Costs and Attorney

Fees submitted on behalf of the City herewith. The Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees is
based on the detailed billing summary set out in Exhibit B. The Memorandum of Costs and
Attorney Fees is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge.
23.

Total attorney fees charged in this matter (through June 30, 20 II) were $82,023.

24.

I served as lead counsel in the cases of Schaefer v. City ofSun Valley, Case No.

CV-06-882 (Idaho, Fifth Judicial Dist. July 3, 2007), and Cove Springs Development, Inc. v.
Blaine County, Case No. CV2008-22 (Idaho, Fifth Judicial Dist., June 3, 2008). My partner,

Martin C. Hendrickson, assisted in both cases. The description of those cases (including the
attorney fees awarded in the Schaefer matter) is set out in City's Memorandum of Costs and
Attorney Fees with Supporting Statement is accurate. A true and correct copy of the Judgment

entered in the Schaefer case is attached hereto as Exhibit C.
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I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

DATED this ll tb day of July, 2011.

~~~
Christopher H. Meyer

Subscribed and sworn to before me this llth day July, 2011.

Notary Public for I
Residing at:--.......,.-=-'--...---=;;-='--,..--My Commission Expires: _ ___,""+.....,....L...f-'-"~~ J~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the II th day of July, 20 II, the foregoing was filed, served,
and copied as follows:

DOCUMENT FILED:
Fourth Judicial District Court
Attn: Archie N. Banbury, Clerk
Valley County Courthouse
219 Main Street
Cascade, ID 83611
Facsimile: 208-382-7107

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-mail

SERVICE COPIES TO:
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-mail

Jed Manwaring, Esq.
Victor Villegas, Esq.
Evans Keane LLP
1405 West Main
P.O. Box 959
Boise, ID 83701-0959
jmanwaring@evanskeane.com
vvillegas@evanskeane.com
COURTESY COPIES TO:
Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin
District Judge
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front St.
Boise, ID 83702

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail

Jason Gray
Law Clerk to Judge Michael McLaughlin
Fourth Judicial District Court
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street
Boise, ID 83 702
Email: jmgray@adaweb.net

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
E-mail

C!d~
Christopher H. Meyer
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CHRISTOPHER H. MEYER
In 2011, Best Lawyers in America named Chris Meyer "lawyer of the Year" in Idaho
for natural resources. This capped three decades of work in water law, land use and
zoning law, natural resources law, road and public access law, and constitutional law.
His clients include Fortune Ten companies, major league energy companies, food
producers, mining companies, municipal water providers, land developers, and local
governments. He is described in the Idaho Yearbook Directory as ..centrally located in
the world of Idaho public atTairs" and ..a key figure in Idaho water law." He has
served for over a decade as President of the Idaho Environmental Forum. Before
joining Givens Pursley in 1991, Chris taught water law and negotiation at the
University of Colorado law School. Prior to that, he practiced environmental law in
Washington, D.C. Chris has written extensively on natural resource law subjects and
lectures on a variety of legal topics. Chris has broad experience in transactions
involving land use and water rights. He also has extensive litigation experience and
has played a significant role in shaping legislation.
LEGAL EMPLOYMENT

Givens Punley LLP, Boise, Idaho.
Partner. August 1991 to present.
University of Colorado Law School, Boulder, Colorado.
Associate Professor Adjoint. August 1984 to July 1991. Held this teaching position while serving as counsel to
NWF Natural Resources Clinic. Taught seminars in advanced water law, environmental law, and negotiation.
National Wildlife Federation, Washington, D.C.
Counsel. May 1981 to July 1984.
PROFESSIONAL R£CQGNIIION

Best lawyers in America (since 2006)
Named "lawyer of the Year" (top lawyer in Idaho) for natural resources in2011
Recognized in water law, land use & zoning law, natural resources, and environmental law
Mountain States Super lawyers (since 2007)
Recognized in energy and natural resources law
Chambers USA (since 2008)
Band l (highest ranking) for natural resources and environment
Who's Who Legal: The International Who's Who of Environment Lawyers (since 2010)
One of only seven environmental lawyers recognized in Idaho
Litigation Counsel of America (since 2010)
Fellow in honorary society composed of less than one-half of one percent of American lawyers
Marquis' Who's Who in the World, Who's Who in America, and Who's Who in American Law
Martindale-Hubbell
Highest ranking: "'AV" (since 1996)
Idaho Yearbook Directory (200 1)
Described as a "key figure in Idaho water law" and ..centrally located in the world of Idaho public affairs"
Listed among top 100 most influential Idahoans
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EDUCATION

University of Mic:higan, School of Law
Juris Doctor, 1981
•
cum laude
University of Michigaa

Degree in economics, 1977
•
•
•
•
•

high distinction (magna cum laude)
Phi Beta Kappa
James B. Angell Scholar
honors program in economics, class honors
Osterweil Prize in Economics
SELECTED LITIGATION

American Independence Mines and lt.linerals Co. v. USDA, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (D. Idaho 2010) (NEPA,
standing, and road law issues).

In Re SRBA. Case No. 39576, Subcase Nos. 29-00271 et al. (Idaho, Fifth Judicial Dist., Nov. 9, 2009 and April 12,
201 0) (upholding position of clients regarding alternative points of diversion in City of Pocatello municipal
water rights litigation) (now on appeal to Idaho Supreme Court).

Sopatyk v. Lemhi County, Case No. CV-07-402 (Idaho, Seventh Judicial Dist., Oct. 22, 2009) (upholding County's
validation of Anderson Creek Road) (now on appeal to Idaho Supreme Court).

In Re SRBA, Case No. 39576, Subcase Nos. 63-02779 et al. (Idaho, Fifth Judicial Dist., June 3, 2009), Subcase Nos.
63-02449 et al. (Fifth Judicial Dist., May 20, 2009) (secured partial decrees for each of the City of Nampa's
water rights).

Galli v. Idaho County, 146 Idaho 155, 191 PJd 233 (2008) (amicus brief in public access case).
Cove Springs Development, Inc. v. Blaine County, Case No. CV2008-22 (Idaho, Fifth Judicial Dist., June 3, 2008)
(declaring unlawful and unconstitutional various exaction and comprehensive plan ordinance provisions).
Schaefor v. City ofSun Valley, Case No. CV-06-882 (Idaho, Fifth Judicial Dist. July 3, 2007) (declaring
unconstitutional Sun VaHey's affordable housing fee).
American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dep 't of Water Resources, 143 Idaho 862, 154 P.3d 433 (2007)
(conjunctive management of ground and surface water).
Chisholm v. Idaho Department of Water Resources, 142 Idaho 159, 125 PJd 515 (2005) (water rights-local
public interest).
Davisco Foods lnt'l, Inc. v. Gooding Cotmty, 141 Idaho 784, 118 P.3d 116 (2005) (land use).
Farrell v. Board of County Comm 'rs oflemhi County, 138 Idaho 378, 64 P.3d 304 (2002) (public road access-the
Indian Creek Road case).
Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 134 Idaho 916, 12 P.3d 1260 (2000) (wilderness water rights).
State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 727, 947 P.2d 400 (1997) (partial forfeiture water rights
case).
Fremont-Madison Irrigation Dist. v. Idaho Ground Water Appropriators, Inc., 129 Idaho 454, 926 P.2d 1301
(1996) (interpretation of water right amnesty statute).
State, ex rei. Higginson v. United States, 128 Idaho 246,912 P.2d 614 (1995) (constitutionality ofSRBA
amendments- water law).
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Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Administration, 23 F.3d 1336 (8th Cir. 1994), afrg, 1993 WL 662353 (D. Neb
1993) (scope of environmental trust's authority to litigate).
Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 991 F.2d 1405 (lOth Cir. 1990) (federal reserved water rights- amicus brief).
State v. Morros, 766 P.2d 263 (Nev. 1988) (instream flows recognized under state law).
Catherland Reclamation Dist. v. Lower Platte North Natural Resources Dist., 433 N.W.2d 161 (Neb. 1988) (water
rights and state endangered species act).
Hitchcock and Red Willow Irrigation Dist. v. Lower Platte North Natural Resources Dist., 410 N.W.2d 101 (Neb.
1987) {right to build water project).
Tu/alip Tribes of Washington v. FERC, 732 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1985) (hydropower licensing).
Escondido it,lutual Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765 ( 1984) (mitigation for
hydroelectric developments on public lands).
National Wildlifo Fed 'n v. Marsh, 568 F. Supp. 985 (D.D.C. 1983) (administrative law under NEPA).
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rei. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (ban on water export in violation of commerce clause)
(brief available at 1982 WL 608572).

LEGISLATION

Local Public Interest Amendments (water rights), 2003 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 298, codified at Idaho Code§ 422028(3), 42-203A(5), 42-222( 1), 42-240(5), 42-1763.
Idaho Municipal Water Rights Act, 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 297, codified at Idaho Code§ 42-202(2), 42-2028,
42-217("4."), 42-219( 1) & (2), 42-222(1 ), 42-223(2), 43-335, 43-338)).
Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, logical outgrowth rule, Idaho Code§ 67-5227.

PUBLICATIONS

Allen, Meyer, Nelson & Lee, Idaho Land Use Planning Handbook, Givens Pursley (20 11 ).
Fereday, Meyer & Creamer, Water Law Handbook: The Acquisition, Use, Transfor, Administration, and
Management of Water Rights in Idaho, Givens Pursley (2011).
Meyer, Road Law Handbook: Road Creation and Abandonment Law in Idaho, Givens Pursley (2011 ).
Meyer, Ethics Handbook: Ethical Considerations for the Client and Lawyer in Idaho, Givens Pursley (20 11 ).
Meyer, Planning for Future Needs Under the Municipal Water Rights Act of 1996, Association of Idaho Cities
Conference on Municipal Issues (2011).
Meyer, Municipal Water Rights and the Growing Communities Doctrine, The Water Report at 1 (Mar. 15, 2010).
Meyer, ''Development, Codification, and Application of the Growing Communities Doctrine in Idaho," presented at
American Bar Association, Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources, 28th Annual Water Law
Conference: Whose Spigot Is It? (Feb. 18-19, 201 0).
Meyer, An Introduction to the Law of Interstate Water Allocation: From Compacts to Common Sense, Law
Seminars International (2009).
Meyer, Interstate Water Allocation. The Water Report (Aug. 15, 2007).
Meyer, Idaho Chapter Author for Brownfields Law and Practice, Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. (2004) (named Best
Law Book of the Year by the American Association of Publishers).
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Meyer, A Comprehensive Guide to Redeveloping Contaminated Property (Idaho Chapter), American Bar
Association (2002).

Meyer, 'Die Federal Reserved Water Rights Doctrine in a Skeptical Age, 39 American Law Institute- American
Bar Assn. 219 (200 l ).
Meyer, All I Really Need To Know About Legal Ethics I Learned in Law School, 43 The Advocate (Idaho Bar
Assn.) 15 (2000).
Allen, Him berger, Honhorst & Meyer, Land Use Law in Idaho, National Business Institute ( 1999).
Meyer, Aquifer Storage and Recovery in Idaho, University of Idaho ( 1999).
Meyer, Complying with Environmental and Special Use Regulations, in LAND USE LAW IN IDAHO, National
Business Institute (1999).
Meyer, Municipal Water Rights in Idaho: 'Die Growing Communities Doctrine and Its Recent Codification,
Northwest Water Law & Policy Project ( 1996).
Meyer, Small Handles on Big Projects: 'Die Federalization ofPrivate Undertakings, 41 Rocky Mountain Mineral
Law Institute 5-l (1995).
Meyer, lnstream Flows: Integrating New Uses and New Players into the Prior Appropriation System, in INSTREAM
FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST, Natural Resource Law Center ( 1993).
Meyer, Water Conservation: Looks Can Deceive, in RIVER VOICES (1993).
Meyer, Instream Flows: Coming ofAge in America, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE WESTERN REGIONAL INSTREAM
FLOW CONFERENCE ( 1989).
Meyer, Western Water Law: 'Die New Frontier, in AUDUBON WILDLIFE REPORT (1989).
Meyer, New Developments in Water Rights on Public Lands: Federal Rights and State Interests, paper presented at
conference sponsored by the Natural Resource Law Center, University ofColorado School of Law, Water as a
Public Resource: Emerging Rights and Obligations ( 1987).
Meyer, Navigating the Wetlands Jurisdiction of the Army Corps of Engineers, 9 Resource L. Notes 3, Natural
Resources Law Center ( 1986).
Meyer, Two papers published in Winning Strategies/or Rivers: Proceedings of the Tenth Annual National
Conference on Rivers, American Rivers Conservation Council {1985).
Osann, Campbell, Meyer, & Allemang, Shortchanging the Treasury: 'Die Failure of the Department of the Interior
to Comply with the Inspector General's Audit Recommendations to Recover the Costs ofFederal Water
Projects, National Wildlife Federation (1984).

Anderson, Campbell & Meyer, Solving the Water Crisis, V-7 Policy Report 9, the Cato Institute ( 1983).
Meyer, Sporhase v. Nebraska: A Spur to Better Water Resource Management, l Envtl. Forum 28, Environmental
Law Institute ( 1983).
Burwell & Meyer, A Citizen's Guide to Clean Air and Transportation: Implications for Urban Revitalization, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency ( 1980).
Meyer, The Effects of Labor Organization on the Functional Distribution of Income in Manufacturing Industries in
the United States for the Years J948 through J972, Senior Honors Thesis, University of Michigan ( 1978).
BAR ~IEMBERSHIPS

Member of the bars of Idaho, Colorado, and the District of Columbia.
Admitted to practice in federal courts in the District of Columbia, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.
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PERSONAL

Born September 29, 1952, in Springfield, Missouri.
Married to Karen A. Meyer. One child, C. Andrew Meyer.
I have made my home in Boise, Idaho since 1991.
I have lived in tifteen cities in thirteen states: Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland,
Michigan, Missouri, New York. Virginia, Washington, D.C., and Florence, Italy.
CONTACT INFORMATION

Christopher H. Meyer
GIVENS PuRSLEY

lLP

601 W. Bannock Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
208-388-1236
chrismeyer@givenspursley.com
www .givenspursley.com
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Fees Listing
Feu Workecllhrv Jua JO 2011

Entered
Timekeeper

Date Worked Fee Type

Status

Hours

Rate

Amount

Date

By

Tran. II

Martin Hendlictson
812512010 No Fee Type
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432/4)
won. on Answer to First Amended Complant

HisiOI'(

1.50

20000

300.00

8127/2010

MCH

1343929

Martin Hendrickson
812612010 No Fee Type
City of McCaa I Greystone Village ( 4432/ 4 )
ContlntJt worll on Answer: analyZe polentlal afflrmatl'le defenses.

HiSIOI'f

2.10

200.00

420.00

812712010

MCH

1343926

6126/2010 No Fee Type
HiSIOI'f
030
30500
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 )
Stra1egy discussion with Manln Hendrickson re answer, motion to diSmiss, and motion for summary judgment; quick email to client

9150

91112010

ch1

1344687

8/2712010 No Fee Type
HiSIOI'f
2.80
20000
56000
812712010
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432/4 )
Continue worll on Answer and AfftnnaUve Defenses; review P&Z and City Council minutes re: approval of appllcaUona; review comespondenoe from City re·. timellnt and approvals.

MCH

1344037

9/1/2010

chi

1344697

Martin Hendrickson
812812010 No Fee Type
2.50
HisiOf'/
20000
500.00
8/28/2010
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 14 )
Conference wltn C. Meyer re: anomey tee prov1s10111n Development Agreement. poten«al counlerclalm, motion to diSmiSs; review documents from client; work on Answer and
Counterclaim.

MCH

1344049

Christopher H. Meyer
8/2612010 No Fee Type
600
HisiOI'f
305.00
I .830.00
911/2010
City of McCall/ Greys tone Village ( 4432 /4 )
Research and drafting of Ans-; compile and review adminiStrative record; prepare detailed timellne wttl'l quotations and comments; coordinatiOn and stralegy discussions with Manln
Hendrickson·. emalis to client.

chi

1344702

Christopher H. Meyer

Martin Hendrickson

Chnstopher H. Meyer
8127/2010 No Fee Type
City of McCaU 1 Greystone Village ( 4432/4)
Review and edit answer, coordination wttl'l City staff re tJmeHne and ordinance ISsues.

HisiOIY

140

305.00

Martin Hendrickson
8/29/2010 No Fee Type
1.20
HiSIOf'/
20000
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432 14 )
Continue review of city documents re: approval of applications; wonc on Answer and Counterclaim; conference with C. Meyer re: same.

427.00

240.00

8/30/2010

MCH

1344077

30500

2.592.50

9/1/2010

chi

1344705

8/3012010 No Fee Type
History
2.70
10000
City of McCan I Greystone Village ( 4432 14 )
Assemble client documents In chronology binder; research bankruptcy ot Greystone Village, LLC, Steven Benad and Richard Hehr.

270.00

8/3012010

ASB

1344078

813012010

MCH

1344093

Chnstopher H. Meyer
8130/2010 No Fee Type
History
7 10
91112010
305.00
2.165 50
City of McCall I Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 )
Final round of edits 10 Answer. extensive coordlnalion with C1ty stall re documents; review additional documents: coordillalion with BIU NichOlS re substitution of counsel and oilier

chi

1344707

812912010 No Fee Type
HiStOf'/
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432 I 4 )
Furtner research and drafting of Answer, coonlination and strategy discussions with Martin Hendrickson.

Christopher H. Meyer

850

Alison S. Bemochoa

8130/2010 No Fee Type
HistOI'(
150
20000
30000
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432 I 4 )
Rev- and rev1se updated draft of Ans- and Counterclaim: review addHional documents trom City; conference wltn C. Meyer re. Rllng Answer and Counterclaim

Martin Hendrickson

matters.

Alison S Berriochoa
9/1312010 No Fee Type
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432 I 4 )
Begon revtew and organ<zati0<1 of documents produced by client.

HiSIOf'/

0 20

10000

2000

9/13/2010

ASB

1346898

Alison S. Bernochoa
9114/2010 No Fee Type
C1ty of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432 14 )
Complete initial review of addilional records produced by client

HiSIOI'f

100

10000

100.00

911412010

ASB

1346978

Martin Hendrickson
9116/2010 No Fee Type
City of McCall/ Greyslone Vt~age ( 4432/ 4)
Re..- documents from clienl re: develOpment application and hearings.

History

340

20000

680.00

101612010

MCH

1351042

HiS IOf'/

020

10000

20 00

9117/2010

ASB

1347668

Alison S. Berriochoa

911712010 No Fee Type

City of McCan I Greystone Village ( 4432/4 )
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F«s WorkN thru JunJO 2011

Entered
Date Worked Fee T~j!!
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Hours

Rate

Amount

Date

By

Tran. t

912012010 No Fee Type
Alison S BeniochOa
City of McCaa I Greystone ViRage ( 4432 I 4 }
Assemllle email recoros of Greystone.

HiStOtY

150

10000

15000

912012010

ASS

1347800

9/21/2010 No Fee Type
Alison S. Beniochoa
City of McCall/ Greystone Vinage ( 4432 I 4 }
Finish O!Vat1iZ>ng email from Valley Coonty.

HiStOtY

190

100.00

19000

912112010

ASS

1347971

Martln Hendrickson
912812010 No Fee Type
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 /4}
Wort. on discovery requests to pli!lnllffs.

History

400

20000

80000

10/612010

MCH

1351028

t0/512010 No Fee Type
Martln Hendrickson
HiS!OfY
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4}
Continue revieW of records and worll on discovery requests including requests for admissions.

350

200.00

700.00

10/812010

MCH

1351047

100.00
Alison s. Berriochoa
101812010 No Fee Type
2.70
HistOtY
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 }
Organize and review all addijional documents received from client for duplicates in preparation of assembling C. Meyer worlling binder.

270.00

10/812010

ASS

1351857

1011012010 No Fee Type
History
100.00
Alison S Berriochoa
350
35000
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/ 4}
Assemble all additional documents received from client In chronologie order: draft Index of same in preparation of assembling C Meyer worl<lng binder

10/10/2010

ASS

1351897

History
Martln Hendrickson
10/12/2010 No Fee Type
200.00
700.00
10/1312010
350
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/ 4 }
RevieW reply to counterclaim: review pleadings for starus conference: stallls conference re: scheduling order and deadlines; conference with C. Meyer re: document management
continue wor1< on dlscowry requests to plainlltfs.

MCH

1352490

Tlmekeel!!r

Begin review of addi11onat documems produced by client

Christopher H Meyer
10/12/2010 No Fee Type
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/4 }
RevieW illOd prepare for starus conference: pantcipalll In stallls conference.

HistOtY

0.80

30500

244.00

10/15/2010

ch1

1352840

10/1812010 No Fee Type
Alison s. Berriochoa
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 }
RevleW all Outlook files received from C!lent regarding Fakway Condos pro~t.

HiStOtY

1.10

10000

110.00

t0/18/2010

ASB

1353048

11/1112010 NoFeeType
Martln Hendrickson
HistOtY
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 }
Draft email to client re sc~aduling order and starus: worl< on discovery requests to plaintiffs.

380

20000

760.00

11/12/2010

MCH

1357632

t1117/2010 No Fee Type
Martln Hendrickson
City of McCall/ Greys tone Village ( 4432 14 )
Continue revieW of admmlstratlve recoro and drattlng diSCOvery requests to plainlltfs.

History

5 30

20000

1.060.00

t1123/2010

MCH

1359302

Christopher H Meyer
117/2011 No Fee Type
City of McCaU 1 Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 )
Ema~ to client: evaluate impact of Buckskin case on Greystone litlglltfon.

HiSIOfY

050

310.00

t55.00

t/1012011

ch1

t367302

1114/2011 No Fee Type
'Aartin Hendrickson
HiStOtY
3.30
21000
City ol McCaN I Greystone Village ( 4432 /4 }
RevieW discovery responses and documents produced by Plamtlffs: wor1< on conespondence to Plaintiffs' counsel re deficient responses.

69300

1/1412011

MCH

1368170

HiSIOfY

0.20

100.00

2000

111412011

ASB

1368222

1/17/2011 No Fee Type
Alison S. Berriochoa
His!OtY
City of McCan I Greys tone Village ( 4432/4)
Beyln .mllal reVIeW of documents produced by Plalnllfl 111 response to dlscowry rnquests.

0 40

100.00

40.00

111712011

ASS

1368345

Christopher H. Meyer
1118/2011 No Fee Type
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/4 }

130

31000

40300

1121/2011

ch1

t368921

1/14/2011 No Fee Type
Alison S Berriochoa
C1ty of McCan I Greystone Village 14432 /4 }
Bum copy of Pli!lntifl's Discovery Responses !or C. Meyer review.

HistOtY

468
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Fees Listing
Fees Worked lbru Jun JO lOll

Entered

Tlmeketl?;!r
Ret~>ew

Date Worked Fet T~l?;!

Status

Hours

Rate

Amount

Date

By

Trtn. II

1121/2011

cn1

1368924

diScovel'f. prepare ootllne le< tunhet diSCOvefY. etc.

1!1912011 No Fee Type
History
0.70
310 00
21700
Christopher H. Meyer
City of McCaH I Greystone Village ( 4432 /4)
Revtew pleadings and a11alySis of statute of llm•tallons 1ssues: tefepl\011t confel1l\C8 Wlth Martin Hendnckson re nmtno and scopt of mollon ror >ummafY tudgmenl
190

100.00

t9000

1122/2011

ASB

1368994

350

31000

1,085.00

1124/2011

cn1

1369145

1/24/2011
1/24/2011 No Fee Type
History
100.00
Alison S. Berriochoa
0.60
60.00
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432 I 4)
Conference with C. Meyer regardlnglimellne and additional documents to be addad; obtain a11d review docket for filing and service of original ce<nplalnt; telephone conference with
Valley County Cler1< regattlmg discrepancy on filing date of Amended Complaint; draft email to C. Meyer regarding same.

ASB

1369074

Chrislopher H. Meyer
1124/2011 No Fee Type
History
400
310 00
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4)
Research and dran brief in suppor1 of motion for sumffi31'f judgment coordination with City staff re various plats and documents.

1122/2011 No Fee Type
Alison S Beniochoa
City of McCall 1 Greyslone Village ( 4432 I 4 )
Orgaruze client documents and documents produced by Plalnllft, update timellne.

History

History
Chnstopher H. Meyer
1122/2011 No Fee Type
City of McCall 1 Greyslone Village ( 4432 I 4 )
Prepare motion tor summ3fY judgment telephone conference witn Martin Hendnckson re strategy fe< same.

I ,240.00

1/2512011

en I

1369392

Alison S. Berriochoa
1/2512011 No Fee Type
History
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 )
Update tlmellne and C Meyer notebOok With additional client doCuments and City ordinances.

4.80

100.00

480.00

1/25/2011

ASS

1369204

Christopher H. Meyer
t/25/2011 No Fee Type
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432/ 4 )
Researcn and draft motion ror summary judgment.

4 40

310.00

I ,364 00

1/2612011

en I

1369698

1/26/2011

ASB

1369691

Martin Hendrickson
112612011 No Fee Type
His lory
4.50
21000
945.00
City of McCall/ Greys lone Village ( 4432/ 4 )
Wort< on letter to opposing coursei re· discovefY responses: wor1< on additional discovery requests to plalntil!s; review and edit bnef in support of summafY judgment

2/7/2011

MCH

1372154

Christopher H Meyer
112612011 No Fee Type
City of McCall/ Greys lone Viffage ( 4432/4 )
Drafting and research on motion tor partial summary judgment

History

2.30

31000

713.00

2/1/2011

en I

137(}706

Chnstopher H. Meyer
1/2912011 No Fee Type
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 )
Research and draft motion tor partial summary ;udgment.

History

2.80

310.00

868.00

2/1/2011

en I

137fr7t2

Martin Hendnckson
21112011 No Fee Type
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432/4 )
RevieW and reVIse opening brief in supper! of mellon fe< summil'f judgment.

History

4 60

210.00

968.00

316/2011

MCH

1376781

Chnstopher H Meyer
212312011 No Fee Type
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432 14 )
RevieW and edit draft motion IO< summil'f judgment.

History

080

310.00

248.00

212812011

chi

1375579

Christopher H Meyer
3/t512011 No Fee Type
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432 14 )
Work on motion to diSIT\ISS blieflng.

History

1.10

310.00

34100

3/1612011

en I

1378533

Chnstopher H. Meyer
3/21/2011 No Fee Type
City of McCan 1 Greyslone Village ( 4432/4 )
'!eseanch re Mction tor Summil'f Judgme.1t

Histoly

080

310.00

248.00

3/22/2011

en I

1380141

Chnstopher H Meyer
3/2212011 No Fee Type
C1ty of McCan I Greyslone Village ( 4432/4 )

History

8 20

310 00

2,542 00

3/23/2011

chi

t380376

History

Alison S Berriochoa
1/2612011 No Fee Type
History
tOO.OO
0.30
30.00
City of McCall/ Greys tone Village ( 4432/ 4 )
Teiephone conference with Valley Co Cier1< requesting copy of original complaint: review records requested !rom Valley Co.: elect!1lnlc document management of same.
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~·ea

Worked thru Jun JO 2011
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Tlmekee~r

Date Worked FeeT~~

Status

Houra

Rate

Amount

Date

By

Tran. t1

Histoly

0.60

210.00

126 00

3/2412011

MCH

1380455

Christopher H Meyer
History
730
312312011 No Fee Type
2,263 00
31000
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 )
Review the record and mal:e deta~led notes; edits to brief in support of motion for summary Judgment correspond wM City Stall and ~nsel re record issues.

3124/2011

ch1

1380539

AlisOft S Berriochoa
3/24/2011 No Fee Type
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/4 )
Update llmetine and C Meyer worl:ing notebOOk.

History

0.30

100.00

30.00

312412011

ASB

t380430

Christopher H. Meyer
3/24/2011 No Fee Type
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/ 4 )
Research and draft brlef In support of motion lor summary judgment

History

3 10

31000

961.00

312812011

ch1

1380814

Christopher H. Meyer
3/2912011 No Fee Type
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/ 4 )
Research and draft brief In support of moiiOn lor summary judgment

History

070

31000

217.00

3130/2011

ch1

1381143

Christopher H. Meyer
3/3012011 No Fee Type
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/ 4 )
Research and drafting lor brlelln support of rootlon lor summary judgment.

History

700

31000

2,170.00

4/1/2011

ch1

1381476

History
Martin Hendriclcson
3/3012011 No Fee Type
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/ 4 )
Revise stipulation and order 10 modify expen disclOsure deadlines; W!ite to opposing counsel re: same.

0.30

210.00

63.00

4/6/2011

MCH

1382538

Christopher H. Meyer
3/31/2011 No Fee Type
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 14 )
Research and drattlng on motion lor summary judgment

History

680

310.00

2,108 00

4/1/2011

ch1

1381477

Christopher H. Meyer
4/1/2011 No Fee Type
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/4 )
Edit brief in support of motiOn for summary judgment

History

130

310.00

403.00

4/4/2011

ch1

1381982

63.00

4/6/2011

MCH

1382540

744.00

4/7/2011

ch1

t383167

41412011 No Fee Type
Martin Hendriclcson
History
210.00
650
1.365.00
416/2011
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/ 4 )
WOO< on memorandum In support of rootlon tor summary judgment; 'AOf!t on affldM in support; wrt1e to Michelle Groenevett wl1h revised affidavit draft affidavit of counsel: dratt roollon
and order tor leave to exceed page limit

MCH

1382542

Research and draft bl* 1n support of rootion lOt summary ~l
Martin Hendrictcson
312312011 No Fee Type
City of McCaN I Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 )
Review and revise bnef '"support of roo110n lOt summary Judgment

Martin Hendrickson
4/112011 No Fee Type
History
030
210 00
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/4 )
Review email trom opposing counsel re: expen deadlines: revise stipulation and order; W!ite to opposing counsel wl1h reviSed stipulatiOn and order.
Christopher H. Meyer
41?12011 No Fee Type
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 14 )
Edits to bner '"support of motiOn for summary Judgment

History

2.40

310 00

Christopher H. Meyer
4/4/2011 No Fee Type
City of McCaa I Greystone Viffage ( 4432/ 4)
Edits to brlef In support of roo110n tor summary i'Jd9ment

History

460

310.00

1.426 00

417/2011

ch1

1383168

AliSOft S. Berriochoa
4/512011 No Fee Type
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 1 4 )
Assemble final exhibits to Affldavij of M Groenevelt In preparation of flRng.

History

040

100.00

40.00

4/512011

ASB

t382055

Martin Hendridtson
41512011 No Fee Type
History
City of McCall/ Greystone Vinage ( 4432 I 4)
Rev- atftdavH or Groeneven tor !!ling wl!ll Court: check on staiUS ot healing on mollon lor summary ;udgment

030

210.00

63 00

41512011

MCH

1382499

4/512011 No Fee Type
Chnstopner H. Meyer
Ctty of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/ 4)

100

310.00

310.00

4/7/2011

ch1

1383170

History
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~·ea

Worktcllhrv Jun lO 10 II

Entered

Timekeeper

Date Worked Fee Type

Statui

Date

By

Tran. 1

Christopher H. Meyer
Histofy
4J1212011 No Fee Type
3.00
31000
93000
411312011
C rty of McCaY I Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 }
COOidlnalion re hearing for motion lor summary judgment otftce cooterance wrtl'l Ma111n Hendnckson re same; email exchanges Witt! clients/stall re upcoming meeting and preparalion
ot iellel1; research and prepn draft senlement offer letter.

ch1

1384047

Hou11

Rate

Amount

Precaration and filing of affidavit >n support ol >rotlon fOt summaty Judgment pr1)Cn summary chart

Martin Hendridlson
4/1212011 No Fee Type
HiStOIY
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 }
Rll'iiew and revise letter 10 opposing counsel demanding dismissal ot suit write to C Meyer re: same.

0.40

21000

8400

411312011

MCH

1384155

4/13/2011 No Fee Type
Christopher H. Meyer
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432 14 )
Telephone conference With BiH NiChols; edits to draft settlement letter lor Greystone

0.50

310.00

155.00

4/1812011

ch1

1384639

Christopher H. Meyer
4/14/2011 No Fee Type
HiSIOI'f
4.50
310.00
1,395 00
4/1812011
City of McCall I Greyslone Village ( 4432 14 )
Edits 10 settlement offer kltte~ prepare summary notes and update spreadsheet review and P'llCate for meeting with City Council; drive to McCall; artend executi'le comm1ttee meeting.

ch1

1384643

Christopher H. Meyer
4/15/2011 No Fee Type
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432 /4)
Drli'le 10 Boise; edits to settlement offer kltter, review file and update notes.

HiStOI'f

1,240 00

4118/2011

ch1

1384645

8400

515/2011

MCH

1387522

4122/2011 No Fee Type
Christopher H. Meyer
HiSIOI'f
100
310 00
310.00
4/27/2011
City of McCall I Greystone Village ( 4432/ 4 )
Telephone conferences with Ma111n HendriCkson, opposing counsel (ViCtor Villegas), Bill Nichols, and lindley Klr11patr1ck re follow up on settlement offer, upcoming hearing on motion,
and discovery deadlines; notes to file.

ch1

1385563

Martin Hendrie~~ son
4/2212011 No Fee Type
HistOI'f
210.00
080
16800
5/512011
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 44321 4 }
Conference with C. Meyer re: serttement kltter. pending discovery; confe'llnCe Witt! C. Meyer and V Villegas re: pending discovery, opllon to save costs by postponing unUI after motion
heartng; conference wrt!1 C. Meyer re discovery.

MCH

1387523

HiSIOI'f

400

31000

4120/2011 No Fee Type
Martin Hendridlson
0.40
21000
HiSIOIY
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432 I 4 )
Review emalls re: service of affidavrt and exhibits supporting motion for summary judgment on opposing oounse; reply to C. Meyer re: same.

Christopher H. Meyer
4123/2011 No Fee Type
HisiOI'f
1.50
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 44321 4)
Pnepare letter 10 Victor Villegas; telephone conference wlt!1 Marlin Herienckson re edits to letter, review discovery requests.

310.00

465.00

4/2712011

ch1

1385567

4/23/2011 No Fee Type
Martin Hendrickson
HiSIOI'f
City of McCaN 1 Greyslone Village ( 4432/ 4)
Review emaillrom C Meyer and draft klnlliiO V. Villegas re: discovery; reply to C. Meyer re: same.

210.00

84.00

SiS/2011

MCH

1387524

100.00

370.00

4/25/2011

ASB

1385200

Martin Hendridlson
4125/2011 No Fee Type
750
210.00
HiSIOI'f
City of McCall/ Greyslone ViHage ( 4432/ 4)
Wrrte to M. Groenevett re discovery responses and additlonal documents; wor11 on objections and responses 10 discovery requests.

1.575 00

5/5/2011

MCH

1387525

70.00

4/2612011

ASB

1385353

Martin Hendridlson
4/2612011 No Fee Type
HiStOI'f
1,617 00
770
21000
City of McCall Greyslone Vinage ( 443214 )
Work on diSCovery objectiOns and responses; review necords and emalts from C•ty and remove prlvifeOed and unrelated materials; draft prMiege IOQ.

515i2011

MCH

1387570

0.40

Alison S Berriochoa
412512011 No Fee Type
3 70
HiSIOI'f
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432/ 4)
Conduct pnvilege review in preparation of responding 10 diSCovery requests; dra!l emau to M. HendriCkson regarding same.

Alison S. Bemochoa
4126/2011 No Fee Type
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 443214)
Complete pMVilege log in preparallon of M Hendnckson review.

Alison S. Berriochoa
4/2712011 No Fee Type
C1ty of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 443214 }
ReviSe Pr1\>1lege Log, complete assembly of documents In pr1)Carallon of production.
Martin Hendridlson

4127/2011 No Fee Type

History

0.70

100.00

HiStofy

460

100.00

46000

4/27/2011

ASB

1385632

HiSIOI'f

6.50

21000

1.365 00

5i5/2011

MCH

1387526
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Date Worked Fee TyJ?!

By

Tran. I

515/2011

MCH

1387527

91650

51212011

JMF

1386167

651.00

51212011

cn1

1386354

Martin Hendrickson
412912011 No Fee Type
History
4.50
21000
94500
51512011
City of McCan 1 Greystone ViRage ( 4432/4)
Study PlaintiffS' ma!etlals In opposition to motion for summary judgment conference with C. Meyer re: lssuas and dwlslon of tasl<s; researcn cases cited lOr quasi esiOppel: conference
wtth J. Fredin re same; review stlll\dards lOr motion to continue summary judgment hearing; worlt on response to motion for continuance.

MCH

1387528

Justin Fredin
51212011 No Fee Type
Billed
6.40
195.00
1,248 00
51912011
City ot McCafl/ Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 )
Researcn regarding application of quasl-esiOppel; resean:h regarding extension or revwal of flllng deadHne under Idaho Tort Claims Act, discuss findings witll M. Hendrickson.

JMF

1386349

Martin Hendrickson
51212011 No Fee Type
Billed
750
210.00
1.575 00
61212011
City ot McCaU I Greystone Village ( 4432 /4 )
Analyze PlaintiffS' brief In opposition to motlon lor summary judgment supponing materials 111\d cases; outline issues lor reply brief; research application of estoppel to extend statute of
Hmhattons or revive claim.

MCH

1392142

Timekeeper

Stltut

Rate

Hours

Amount

Date

City of McCall I Greystone ViAage ( 443214)
Review documents and compu~et ~les from City for privlleged and untelated aocumeniS 10 PIVPft for production 10 opposlnQ counsel: pntpare privilege lOg and table of document

ctescnp!IOnt.
Histoly
Martin Hendmson
4128/2011 No Fee Type
21000
1 092.00
5.20
City of McCaA 1Greystone ViHage ( 4432 I 4 )
Cononue review of City recolds lOr production 10 opposlng counsel. preparation of pmllege lOg and tallle 01 doclirneniS; write 10 opposing counsel re: same.
Justin Fredin

412912011 No Fee Type

History
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19500

City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/4)
Researcn regarding application of quasi-estoppel; research regarding extension or revwal of flHng deadHne under Idaho Tort Claims Act
Christopher H. Meyer

4/2912011 No Fee Type

Histoly

2.10

310.00

City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 )
Review response brief and other submissions by plaintiffs; telephone conferences with '-4artin Hendrtci<Son re strategy for response.

Christopher H. Meyer
51312011 No Fee Type
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 /4 )
Resean:n and dran brief 1n suppon of motion for summary judgment

Billed

3.90

310.00

1.209 00

51512011

ch1

1387594

Martin Hendrickson
51312011 No Fee Type
City of McCall I Greystone Village ( 4432/ 4 )
Researcn and wor1t on reply brief In support of motion for summary judgment

Billed

750

21000

1,575 00

6/312011

MCH

1392481

514/2011 No Fee Type
Martin Hendrickson
Billed
8.10
21000
1.70100
51512011
City of McCall/ Greystone Vinage ( 4432 I 4 )
Continue work on reply bnef In support of motion for summary judgment; review memoflll\dum In opposition to motiOn to vacate; drat! motiOn to exceed page limit conference witll M.
Wilfiams re: ability to file via fax thrOugh his offlce; conference Nitll M Groeneveit re: reoordS ooncemlng credtt IOward community housing fees; review emaH from City re additional
reSOlutions 111\d ordinances on community hOusing Issue.

MCH

1387587

Christopher H. Meyer
5/412011 No Fee Type
Billed
City of MeCaB I Greystone Village ( 4432/4 )
Researcn and drat! ceply bnef on motiOn lOr summary Judgment edits 10 brief In cesponse 10 Rule 56(1) motion.

10 30

310.00

3.193.00

5/512011

cn1

1387596

Christopher H. Meyer
51512011 No Fee Type
Billed
5.00
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/4 )
Coordination Nitll clients. coordination re today's diSCovery responses; preparation for oral argument next Wednesday.

31000

1.550 00

519/2011

cn1

1388495

Martin Hendrickson
515/2011 No Fee Type
Billed
6.70
210.00
1.40700
61112011
City ot McCall! Greystone Village ( 44321 4 )
Draft supplemental reply brief, motion for ieave.lllld motion 10 shorten tlrne; continue wor1< on Objections 111\d responses 10 dtscovary requests: write to MicneHe Groeneveit re: re<:ordS
concerning refunds 01 hOusing fees; review email from M!cheHe Groeneven with spreadSNiel 01 refunds; conference with Micneite Groeneven re: ether objectiOns or requested refunds.

MCH

1391642

Chnstopher H Meyer
5110/2011 No Fee Type
Silted
310.00
9.50
City ot McCall! Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 )
Prepare for oral argument (reviSe spreadsheet. master notes. ouHine of argument. new exhibits. etc.): oooldinatlon with Mar!ln Hendrickson.

2.945 00

511312011

ch1

1389231

Chnstopller H. Meyer
511112011 No Fee Type
Billed
1080
City of McCaA 1Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 )
Rev- 111\d file motion 10 supplefnent record: pntpare fOr oral argument: participate in oral argument drwe 10 111\d from Cascade.

31000

3.348 00

511312011

ch1

1389232

210.00

1.806 00

511712011

MCH

1389726

Martin Hendrickson

5111/2011 No Fee Type

Billed

860

4 72
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Worked thru Jun JO lOll

Entered

Timekeeper

Oatt Worked Fee Type

Status

Hours

Rate

Amount

Oatt

By

Tran. 1

City of McCaB I Greystone Village ( 443214)
Prepare tor oral 319umen1 on motion to postpone hearing; draft motion to supplement recotU and 10 shorten nme: conference .villi C. Meyer rt: oral iiii!Ument tssues tor motion tor
summary judgment '1!vlew and '1lvlse C. Meyer outilne tor oral iiii!UITWiflt tl'l'ttl to Cascade; attend r.taring on pending motions; return travtl.
Christopher H Meyer
511212011 No Fee Type
City of McCaH I Greystone Village ( 4432 /4 )
Follow up ne dlscovety, etc. ioiiOwing yesterday's heanng.

090

310.00

279.00

511312011

ch1

1389234

Martin Hendrickson
61312011 No Fee Type
Billed
160
City of McCaU I Greystone Village ( 4432 14 )
Review letter fnom opposmg counsel '1!: prlvilege log and additiOnal records. review withheld recOrds referenced in lener.

210.00

336.00

61612011

MCH

1392922

Martin Hendrickson
61812011 No Fee Type
Billed
City of McCaU 1 Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 )
Continue nevlew of withheld documents requested by Plaintiffs and wor1t on letter to opposing counsel re: same.

210.00

63000

61812011

MCH

1393338

Martin Hendrickson
61912011 No Fee Type
Billed
2.20
21000
46200
61912011
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 443214)
Revise leHer to opposing counsel re: pri'lileged recOrds; conference wiUl M. Groeoevelt ne: additional community hOusing documents: wor1t on supplemental discovery response.

MCH

1393453

Billed

300

Christopher H. Meyer
6/1612011 No Fee Type
UnbiRed
100
310 00
City of McCan I Greystone Village ( 44321 4 )
Review dectsiOn on motiOn for summary judgment coordinate wnh client and co-counsel; begin preparing for attorney fee request.

310.00

612012011

ch1

1394642

Martin Hendrickson
611612011
City of McCall I Greystone Village ( 44321 4 )
Review decision granting summary judgment.

No Fee Type

Unbilled

0.40

210.00

8400

71612011

MCH

1397449

Christopher H. Meyer
611712011
City of McCall I Greystone Village ( 4432/ 4 )
Pre pane memorandum of costs and fees.

No Fee Type

Unbilled

3.40

310.00

1.054 00

612012011

ch1

1394646

Martin Hendrickson
612312011
City of McCall 1 Greystone Village ( 44321 4 )
Draft proposed judgment

No Fee Type

Unbined

040

210.00

84.00

71612011

MCH

1397467

Christopher H. Meyer
612912011 No Fee Type
Unbilled
31000
300
930.00
6/3012011
City of McCan I Greystone Village ( 44321 4 )
OffiCe conference with Manln Heodrlcltson to diScuss strategy for attorney fee recovery (interaction of 12-117 and contract claim, and its relationship with judgment); edijs to appliCation
for attorney tees; telephOne conference with Murray Feldman re his af!ldavrt; coordination with accounflng office re costs and fees.

ch1

1396449

Christopher H. Meyer
6130/2011 No Fee Type
Unbtlled
City of McCaH I Greystone Viftage ( 44321 4)
Review and respond to motion lor reconsiderallon; coordinatiOn wiUl =unset and client re same.

2.20

310.00

Martin Hendrickson
613012011 No Fee Type
Unbilled
210.00
2.80
City of McCan 1Greystone Village ( 44321 4 )
Study Plaintiffs' motion tor reconsideration and cited au!hontles; conference willl C. Meyer re: same; review and edU memorandum of costs and lees.

Report Totals

336.80

682.00

715/2011

ch1

1396697

58800

7/612011

MCH

1397484

$82,023.00
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Exhibit C JUDGMENT IN SCHAEFER

AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTOPHER H. MEYER
1206259_4/4432-4

V. CITY OF SUN VALLEY
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COUNTY JUDICIAL

P. 02

•

Christopher H. Meyer [ISB No. 4461]
Martin C. Hendriclcson [ISB No. Sl76]

GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Strecrt
P.O. Box 2720 .
Boise, Idabo 83701-2720
Office: (208) 388-1200
Fax: (208) 388-1300
www.givenspurslcy.com
Artonreysfor Plaintiffs/CounterdefendantJ Phil and LyM Schaefer
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TilE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICf
OF THE STATE OF' IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

PHIL AND LYNN SCHAEFER,

Case No.: CV-06-882

Plaintiffs/Countcrdefendants,
JUDGMENT

v.
CITY OF SUN VALLEY,
Defendant/Counterclairnant.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon the Motions for Summary Judgment
filed by Plaintiffs and the Defendant, and this Court having issued ita Decision on Summary

Judgment on July 3, 2007. in favor of the Plaintiffs;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Summary Judgment is
granted in favor of the Plaintiffs and the City of Sun Valley's Motion for Summary Judgment is
DENIED; and the Plaintiffs arc entitled to a refund from the Defendant in the amount of
$11,989.97.

The Court, having considered the Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs and Requests for

Attorneys• Fees. the Defendant's objection thereto. and the arguments of the partie!, it is hereby

Pllge I of3
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7

JAN-24-2011 MON 10:56 AH

•

COUNTY JUDICIAL

FAX

NO.

•

7

P. 03

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECRBBD that Plaintiffs are awarded attorneys' fees in tho
amount of$60,703.00 and costa in the amount of$88.00 for a total amount of$60,791.00, plus
interest at the statutory rate of 10% annually from and alter the date of Judgment.

DATED:

~ )Jj ~f
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COUNTY JUDICIAL

FAX NO. 208

P. 04

•

CLERI'S CQIIFJ,AII OF SERVIQ

1hereby certifY that on thia :kJ day of February 2008, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicatod below, and addressed to the following:

~u.s. Mail

Christopher H. Meyer
Martin C. Hendrickson
Givens Pura.Iey LLP
601 W. Bannock Street
P .0. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701

_
_

-

Geoffrey M. Wardlc, Esq.
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley
877 W. Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1614
Rand L. Peebles, Esq.
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley
540 North 2nd Avenue
P.O. Box297
Ketchum, ID 83340-0297

Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Fax

/ U.S.Mail
_ Overnight Mail
_Hand Delivery
Fax

i

I

_!__U.S. Mail
_Overnight Mail
_Hand Delivery
Fax

I

I
I

I

I

I
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Christopher H. Meyer, ISB # 4461
Martin C. Hendrickson, ISB #5876
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Office: 208-388-1200
Fax: 208-3 88-1300
chrismeyer@givenspursley.com
mch@givenspursley .com

Jase No. _ __.nst.No_._~-
Filed

A.M ...: I

:I2

P.M.

Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant City ofAlcCall

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE
VILLAGE, LLC,
Plaintiffs,

Case No: CV 201 0-276C
CITY'S MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES WITH SUPPORTING
STATEMENT

v.

CITY OF McCALL,
Defendant.

CITY OF McCALL,
Counterclaimant,

v.
RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE
VILLAGE, LLC,
Counter-defendant.
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INTRODUCTION

Defendant and Counterclaimant City of McCall ("City"), by and through its undersigned
attorneys of record, and, pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. P. (''Rule") 54 and Idaho Code§§ 12-117 and
12-121, hereby submits its Jfemorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees with Supporting Statement
(''Memorandum").

The City is not claiming any costs as a matter of right under Rule

54( d)(l )(C), nor is it claiming discretionary costs under Rule 54( d)( l )(0). However, it is
seeking attorney fees in the amount of $82,023 pursuant to Rule 54( e)( 1). The City seeks
recovery of these attorney fees against Plaintiffs Richard Hehr and Grey stone Village, LLC,
jointly and severally.
The City tiled a counter-claim seeking attorney fees based on violation of its contract
with the Plaintiffs. An award of attorney fees under this Memorandum, however, would moot
the contract claim presented in the counter-claim.' The contract-based claim is not presented
here but is instead reserved in the event that attorney fees are not awarded as sought under this
Memorandum.
This Memorandum consists of two parts. The first is a Memorandum of Costs and
Attorney Fees in accordance with Rule 54(e)(5). The second is a Supporting Statement
explaining the basis for the request. This Memorandum is further supported by the Affidavit of

Christopher H ,\4eyer, the Affidavit of.Hartin C. Hendrickson, the Affidavit of William F
Nichols, and the Affidavit ofAiurray D. Feldman, which are submitted herewith.

1

Although the attorney fees sought here and in the counterclaim are the same fees, the standards would be
different: Fees under the contract are awarded to the prevailing party as an entitlement (without a showing that the
non-prevailing party lacked a ·•reasonable basis"). To recover under the contract, however, the City would need to
establish the factual premise that the contract was breached.
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MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES

Costs as a matter of right under Rule 54(d)(1)(C) ................................................. $0
Discretionary costs under Rule 54( d)( 1)(D) .......................................................... $0
Attorney fees under Rule 54( e)( l) ................................................................ $82,023
A detailed breakdown and description of the attorney fees sought is set out in the

Ajfidavit of Christopher H Jfeyer.
SUPPORTING STATEMENT

I.

THE STANDARDS UNDER SECTIONS

12-117 AND 12-121

ARE FUNCTIONALLY

IDENTICAL.

The City seeks attorney fees under both Idaho Code § 12-117 and Idaho Code § 12-121.
Under section 12-11 7, parties in actions involving a state agency or local government
may recover their costs and attorney fees if they prevail and can show that the other party acted
"without a reasonable basis in fact or law." The statute provides:
( 1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any
administrative proceeding or civil judicial proceeding involving as
adverse parties a state agency or political subdivision and a person,
the state agency or political subdivision or the court, as the case
may be, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees,
witness fees and reasonable expenses, if it finds that the
nonprevai1ing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
Idaho Code§ 12-117( 1) (emphasis supplied). 2
Idaho Code § 12-121, in contrast, reads like a pure, English-style prevailing-party statute:
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable
attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties, provided that this
section shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute which otherwise
provides for the award of attorney's fees. The term "party" or
2

This statute was amended in 20 I0, 20 I0 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 29, to change the result obtained in
Rammel/ v. ISDA, 147 Idaho 415,210 P.3d 523 (2009). The amendment restored the prior law, which is that
attorney fees may be awarded in administrative proceedings, not just court proceedings. Accordingly, prior
precedent remains valid. Subsequent decisions interpreting the 20 I0 amendment (e.g., Laughy v. Idaho Dep 't of
Transportation, 149 Idaho 867,876-77,243 P.Jd 1055, 1064-65 (2010); Smith v. Washington County, 150 Idaho
388, 392, 247 P.3d 615, 619 (20 I0) (replacing earlier opinion) have held that the amendment bars recovery in
judicial review proceedings. However, that has no bearing on this matter, which is a civil action.
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"parties" is defined to include any person, partnership, corporation,
association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political
subdivision thereof.
Idaho Code§ 12-121.
Section 12-121 is moditied, however, by Rule 54(e)(l), which states: "Provided, attorney
fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the court only when it finds, from the
facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or
without foundation." (Emphasis supplied.)
While these two standards ("without a reasonable basis in fact or law" and "frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation") read differently, there is little if any difference between
them in application. Indeed, our appellate courts have equated the two standards. Total Success

Investments, LLC v. Ada County Highway Dist. ("Total Success If'), 148 Idaho 688, 695, 227
P.3d 942, 949 (Ct. App. 20 I 0); Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC

("Total Success f'), 145 Idaho 360, 372, 179 P.3d 323, 335 (2008); Jenkins v. Barsalou, 145
Idaho 202, 207, 177 P.3d 949, 954 (2008); Nation v. State, Dep 't of Correction, 144 Idaho 177,
194, !58 p .3d 953, 970 (2007).
The only difference between the statutes is that section 12-121 entails an exercise of
discretion. Consequently, on appeal, the reviewing court reviews section 12-121 claims under an
abuse of discretion standard. In contrast, appellate courts freely review section 12-117 claims.

Total Success II, 148 Idaho at 695, 227 P.3d at 949.
There is a line of authority holding that if section 12-117 is available, it is exclusive and
section 12-121 is unavailable. Potlatch Educ. Ass 'n v. Potlatch School Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho
630, 635, 226 P.3d 1277, 1282 (2010). On other occasions, the Court has applied both sections
12-117 and 12-121. E.g., Total Success I and Total Success II. We are unable to reconcile these
two lines of cases. To be on the safe side, the City seeks fees under both provisions. Each of the
CITY'S MUIORA:'III>l'\1 OF COSTS c\:'110 AITORNEY FEES WITH Sl:PPORTING STATEMENT
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arguments below showing that the Plaintiffs' actions were "without a reasonable basis in fact or
law" should be understood to apply equally to the corresponding standard under section 12-121.

fl.

THE CITY IS ENTITLED TO FEES UNDER SECTION

12-117 AND/OR SECTION

12-121.
A.

Section 12-117 is intended to deter litigation like that brought by
Plaintiffs.

This case satisfies the threshold requirements in section 12-117: the case is a civil action
involving a governmental entity and private entities as adverse parties, and the City prevailed.
All that remains is to establish that the Plaintiffs pursued the matter "without a reasonable basis
in fact or Jaw" or, under section 12-121, that Plaintiffs brought or pursued this case "frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation."
The Idaho Supreme Court has often described the purpose of an attorney fee award:
"First, it serves 'as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency action; and [second, it provides]
a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against
groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes agencies never should have made.'"

Reardon v. Alagic Valley Sand and Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 118, 90 P.3d 340, 343 (2004)
(brackets original) (quoting Rincover v. State of Idaho, Dep 't of Finance, 132 Idaho 547, 549,
976 P.2d 473, 475 (1999), and Bogner v. State Dep 't of Revenue and Taxation, 107 Idaho 854,
859, 693 P.2d 1056, I 061 ( 1984)). These important goals are often discussed by the Court in
explaining what actions constitute pursuing an action "without a reasonable basis in fact or law."
Indeed, the language on the importance of deterrence and appropriate remedies has been quoted
20 times by Idaho's appellate courts.
These words are particularly applicable here. The City and its taxpayers have endured a
costly and unnecessary legal challenge that should never have been brought in the first instance.
Deterrence of such unwarranted lawsuits is important when, as here, the law was clear from the
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outset that Plaintiffs had no viable cause of action, and this was made plain to them by the City
early in the litigation.

B.

Attorney fee awards under section l2-ll7 are mandatory.

It is important to underscore that, unlike other attorney fee provisions, section 12-117
does not entail an exercise of discretion. The Idaho Supreme Court has noted on numerous
occasions that, where the requirements of the statute are met, an award of attorney fees is
mandatory. ''This Court has further noted that Idaho Code § 12-117 is not a discretionary
statute; but it provides that the court shall award attorney fees where the state agency did not act
with a reasonable basis in fact or law in a proceeding involving a person who prevails in the
action." Rincover v. State of Idaho, Dep 't of Finance, 132 Idaho 547, 549, 976 P.2d 473, 475
(1999) (emphasis original). "The statute is not discretionary but provides that the court must
award attorney fees where a state agency did not act with a reasonable basis in fact or in Jaw in a
proceeding involving a person who prevails in the action." Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho
349, 356, 109 P.3d I 091, 1098 (2005).

C.

Litigation in the face of controlling facts and settled precedent
justifies an attorney fee award.

The most common successful defense to an attorney fee request is that the non-prevailing
party raised issues of first impression. There are dozens of such cases. E.g., Lake CDA

Investments, LLC v. Idaho Dep 't of Lands, 149 Idaho 274, 284-85, 233 P.3d 721, 731-32 (20 I 0).
The flip side, however, is equally compelling. Where parties ignore settled precedent, as the
PlaintitTs did here, they are subject to a mandatory award of fees under section 12-117. The
Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that failure to address controlling appellate decisions and failure
to address factual or legal findings of the district court equates to pursuing litigation without a
reasonable basis in fact or law. Waller v. State of Idaho, Dep 't of Health and Welfare, 146 Idaho
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234, 240, 192 PJd I 058, I 064 (2008). Other examples of parties paying the price for ignoring
settled precedent are found in Excel/ Construction, Inc. v. Idaho Dep 't of Commerce and Labor,
145 Idaho 783, 793, 186 P.3d 639, 649 (2008) (attorney fees awarded against agency that failed
to apply a case whose relevant facts were "virtually indistinguishable"), and Gallagher v. State,
141 Idaho 665, 669, 115 P.3d 756, 760 (2005) (attorney fees may be awarded when "the Jaw is
well-settled").
The same holds true under section 12-121. "Attorney fees are awardable if an appeal
does no more than simply invite an appellate court to second-guess the trial court on conflicting
evidence, or if the Jaw is well settled and appellant has made no substantial showing that the
district court misapplied the law." Johnson v. Edward, 113 Idaho 660, 662, 747 P.2d 69, 71
(1987).

D.

Plaintiffs refused to acknowledge controlling precedent.

Plaintiffs find themselves in a position similar to that of the non-prevailing parties in the
cases just cited. Like those parties, PlaintifTs here failed to address key facts and controlling
legal precedent.
(l)

Four-year statute of limitations

Their treatment of the four-year statute of limitations issue ignored the seemingly
inescapable fact that they had signed the Development Agreement on May 3, 2006, more than
four years before initiating the litigation. In addition to ignoring the key facts ofthe case,
Plaintiffs ignored controlling precedent establishing that the clock begins to run from the day the
loss becomes apparent-even if the full extent of the Joss is not yet known. JlcCuskey v.

Canyon County Comm 'rs ("JlcCuskey If'), 218 Idaho 213, 217, 912 P.2d I 00, 104 ( 1996) (citing
Tibbs v. CityofSandpoint, 100 Idaho 667,671,603 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1979)). Remarkably,
PlaintitTs cited JfcCuskey II to the Court, but refused to acknowledge the case's plain holding.
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Plaintiff's Jfemorandum in Opposition to Defendant's J!otionfor Summary Judgment at 6-10. It
is hard to imagine a more clear-cut case of pursuing litigation without a reasonable basis.
In State of Idaho v. Estate of Joe Kaminsky, 141 Idaho 436, 439-40, Ill P.3d 121, 124-25
(2005), the Court quoted the dual purposes of the statute recited above and declared that both
were violated. "The action was groundless because the Department clearly waited too long to
present its claim.... It is appropriate to discourage such action. Further, the Department's
action placed an unjustified financial burden on the Estate." !d. The same can be said here.
Ironically, the very case that hung the Plaintiffs on the statute of limitations,

lv!cCuskey II, also compels an attorney fee award. In that case the plaintiff claimed a temporary
taking from the time Canyon County issued a stop work order to the time the Idaho Supreme
Court voided the controlling ordinance in McCuskey v. Canyon County ("McCuskey f'), 123
Idaho 657, 851 P.2d 953 ( 1993). The McCuskey II Court dismissed the inverse condemnation
claim as time barred, concluding, based on Tibbs v. City ofSandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 603 P.2d
1001 ( 1979), that the statute of limitations began to run at the time of the stop work order not the
subsequent decision vindicating the plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court awarded attorney fees to
Canyon County. 3 "This Court clearly established the time when a cause of action accrues in an
inverse condemnation claim in Tibbs . ... McCuskey has provided no 'substantial' showing that
the district court misapplied the rule elucidated in these cases with his particular claim and has
given no compelling reason to deviate from the rule we have established." JfcCuskey II, 128
Idaho at 218,912 P.2d at 105. 4

3

The fee award in JfcCus/cey II was made under Idaho Code§ 12-121, not § 12-117, which, at the time,
was a one-way street and did not allow counties to obtain fee awards against private parties. As noted in section I at
page 3, however, the standards under the two statutes are essentially identical.
4

In Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777, 782, 53 P.3d 828, 833 (2002), the Court distinguished
McCus/cey II in denying attorney fees to Jefferson County. The Court declared, "However, we find the Covingtons
have made some valid arguments relating to their claim for inverse condemnation, which demonstrates that the
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Exactly the same can be said here. There was no novel question of law. There were no
unusual facts. This was a textbook statute of I imitations case controlled by Tibbs, JfcCuskey II,
and other settled authority. Accordingly, this is a textbook case for an award of attorney fees.

(2)

Tort Claims Act

PlaintitTs' position in this case was even weaker that the position of the plaintitTs in

Buckskin Properties, Inc. v. Valley County, Case No. CV-2009-554C, recently decided by this
Court. The Buckskin plaintiffs were not subject to the Tort Claims Act, because the defendant
was not a city. Here, it was a fatal tlaw. Plaintiffs responded that this defense was barred by
quasi-estoppel. However, they misrepresented the nature of quasi-estoppel and failed to advise
the Court of the key elements of this legal theory. Plaintiffs never bothered to explain how they
met those criteria, and, of course, they could not. In short, they had no reasonable basis to
pursue this case.
(3)

KMST

The facts of this case also ran headlong into K1HST, LLC v. County oj.Ada, 138 Idaho
577, 581,67 P.3d 56,60 (2003). Yet the Plaintiffs refused to acknowledge or meaningfully
address the hard facts: It was the developers themselves who presented the proposal to convey
the subject lots in their own application for tina! plat, it was the developers who agreed to
Development Agreement, and it was the developers who never objected to the arrangement or
disagreed with the express statements in the official record documenting the voluntary nature of

appeal is not frivolous or unreasonable." This was an apparent reference to a fairly complex debate over whether a
land use action authorizing a hot mix plant (which in tum emits odors that travel to the plaintitTs' property) is a
physical or regulatory taking. The complexity of the constitutional issues raised in Covington stands in contrast to
the cut and dried statute of limitations and other defenses presented by the City. The case at bar is also
distinguishable from Gibsonv. Ada County, 1421daho 746,756, 133 PJd 1211, 1221 (2006), ct?rt. dt?nit?d, 549 U.S.
994 (2006), rt?hearing denied, 549 U.S. 1159 (2007), where the Court denied attorney fees despite the plaintiff
blowing the statute of limitations because it found, "She made a good faith argument based on relevant authority that
the statute of limitations was tolled." Plaintiffs here have cited no relevant authority that supports their position.
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the arrangement. Even their own affidavits showed that they chose this course in order to speed
things along. See discussion in City's Response Brief Opposing Jfotionfor Reconsideration
dated July 5, 2011. PlaintitTs had no reasonable basis to ignore these undisputed facts and
should have realized that they barred recovery under KMST.

(4)

Two-year statute of limitations

Plaintiffs refused to recognize clear federal precedent showing that their federal claims
are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiffs' contention that they could escape the
two-year statute by failing to plead § 1983 ignored controlling Ninth Circuit law to the contrary.
Their argument on this point can fairly be described as frivolous.
(5)

Williamson County

Finally, even if the Plaintiffs could escape the two-year statute of limitations, they should
have known that their federal law claims would founder on the well-established ripeness tests set
out in Williamson County Regional Planning Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank ofJohnson City, 473

U.S. 172 (1985). For example, they simply ignored the U.S. Supreme Court's clear rule that
federal takings claims cannot be presented until they have tirst pursued and lost an inverse
condemnation claim based on state remedies. Pressing forward with their federal claims in the
face of such clear obstacles was patently unjustifiable.

E.

Plaintiffs' pursuit of this litigation following the Court's decision in
Buckskin is untenable.

As noted above, this Court handed down its Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's

.\lotion for Summary Judgment in the Buckskin matter on January 7, 2011. This was followed by
the Court's Jfemorandum Decision (1) Plaintiffs' Jlotionfor Partial Summary Judgment

(2) Defendant's .\lotion for Entry ofJudgment (3) Plaintiffs' .\lotion for Reconsideration!
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Amendment (4) Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees on April 11, 2011. The
Court entered its Judgment in this matter on April 19, 20 II.
The Buckskin case involved legal arguments and defenses that closely track those
presented in the case at bar. It should have informed Plaintiffs' judgment. They were certainly
aware of this litigation. Counsel on both sides of that case are the same counsel in the instant
action.
While the Court declined to award attorney fees in Buckskin, we urge that the situation is
different here. IfPlaintiffs' counsel initially was entitled to a learning curve on the statute of
limitations and other defenses, that cannot be said in the case at bar. The Court's decision in

Buckskin on January 7, 2011 should have been ample education for the Plaintiffs here. Yet they
pursued the litigation with undiminished vigor. Indeed, most of the legal expenses in this case
(which continue to mount) have been incurred after the Court's decision in Buckskin.

F.

The City went out of its way to bring this litigation to an early
conclusion.

Plaintiffs' pursuit of this litigation is particularly unjustified in the face ofthe City's
extraordinary efforts to bring this case to an early conclusion.
Rather than hold its fire for the courtroom, the City went out of its way to provide a
particularly detailed Answer to First Amended Complaint and Counterclaim ("Answer"). The
Answer went beyond the minimal requirements of code pleading, providing the Plaintiffs with a
careful analysis of the key evidence and the controlling law. Indeed, it included a half an inch of
exhibits. This should have been sufficient to call the Plaintiffs' attention to any issues they
might have previously overlooked. It should have ended the litigation before all the discovery
and motion practice. But it did not have that effect. Plaintiffs proceeded untazed.

CITY'S MDtORA~DUM OF COSTS .\~D AITOR~EY FEES WITII Sl'PPORTI~G STATDfE:vf
4432-4_1192297_10.00C

Page 10

49/

On April 15, 20 II, ten days after filing its .Hotion for Summary Judgment, undersigned
counsel for the City sent a letter to counsel for PlaintitTs urging settlement (the "Letter"). A copy
is attached hereto as Exhibit A. (The Letter provided: "This offer is not subject to Idaho Rule of
Evidence 408 and may be shared with the Court in the event settlement is not reached." Letter
at 2.)
In the Letter the City set out is argument in detail, comparing the facts to those of other
cases recently decided involving similar challenges to actions of Valley County. The Plaintiffs
ignored the letter and proceeded with the litigation.
Not surprisingly, the authorities cited in the Letter closely track those discussed in the
decision ultimately reached by this Court. After all, these are settled authorities, and the
outcome of this case should have been foreseen.

III.

ATTORNEY FEES WERE NECESSARY AND REASONABLY INCURRED.

Attorney fees incurred by the City also were necessary and reasonable. The City took the
initiative to reduce the cost of litigation by tiling its Alotion for Summary Judgment. In briefing
the motion, it presented its arguments fully and fairly so as to invite a meaningful response from
the Plaintitis.
The City and its counsel sought to keep their attorney fees as low as possible. In so
doing, however, they did not sacrifice the quality of the lawyering provided, nor are they
expected to do so under sections 12-117 or 12-121. After all, a great deal is at stake in this
litigation, particularly considering that these Plaintiffs are not the only ones so situated. The
reasonableness of the attorney fees charged is supported by the accompanying affidavits.
Rule 54(e)(3) sets out criteria for the Court to consider in determining the amount of
attorney fees to award. Those factors are addressed below.
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l.

Time and labor required: The actual time spent by the City's attorneys on this

matter is set forth in detail in the Affidavit ofChristopher H. Meyer and the exhibits thereto. It is
reasonable under the circumstances. See also Affidavit of William F Nichols and Affidavit of

.Hurray D. Feldman.
2.

The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved: The issues presented in this

case involve the interaction of three constitutional provisions, state and federal statutes, and
extensive case law. At the end of the day, the rule of law is clear and unmistakable. But tracing
through the precedents in both state and federal law justified retention of counsel with
specialized experience. Moreover, the stakes were high. The issues are of significant public
concern, implicating the ability of local governments to conduct their affairs in the context of
settled expectations. If local governments may be forced to reimburse developers in connection
with signed agreements called into question years later after the City has made investments and
taken other actions in reliance on those agreements, their ability to plan and budget will be
jeopardized. Moreover, had Plaintiffs prevailed, the precedent established by this case would
attract multiple other litigations by those seeking to undo past deals. Rather than presenting this
as a simple inverse condemnation under state law, they raised a broader range of claims and
alternative forms of relief including, notably, federal damage claims. This, in tum, led to more
complex legal defenses under section 1983, etc. Although the City provided an extensive and
thorough explanation in its brief as to why these claims and arguments failed, Plaintiffs
continued to pursue in them. Even after the Court's decision was rendered, Plaintiffs have
engaged in further strategic maneuvers requiring the City to incur further legal costs.
3.

The skill requisite to perform the legal services properly and the experience and

ability of the attorney: As set forth in the discussion of the previous factor, this case presented
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significant and complex issues of administrative Jaw, constitutional law, statutory interpretation,
and civil procedure. Messrs. Meyer and Hendrickson have extensive experience in the fields of
Jaw pertinent to this litigation, as detailed in their respective affidavits. Messrs. Meyer and
Hendrickson were specially retained in this matter. The City is not seeking recovery of attorney
fees for its city attorney, who provided oversight and review of this litigation.
4.

Prevailing charges for like work: Fees charged by Messrs. Meyer and

Hendrickson are at or below the prevailing charges for like work by attorneys of their caliber.
This statement is supported by the Ajjidavit of William F Nichols and the Affidavit oj}vfurray D.

Feldman. Mr. Meyer's hourly fee of$310 per hour was discounted from his regular rate as an
accommodation to the City of McCall. Work performed by other attorneys at Givens Pursley
was limited to brief strategic consultations. To the extent possible, costs were reduced by
employing paralegals for document management.
5.

Whether the fee is fixed or contingent: Undersigned counsel for the City charged

a tixed hourly fee for their work. Accordingly, no upward adjustment for a contingent fee is
appropriate.

7.

Time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances: There were no

particular time limitations that would support either an increase or decrease of the attorney fee.
8.

The amount involved and the results obtained: The results obtained were entirely

successful for the City. The amount charged was proportionate to the stakes involved and the
complexity of the litigation.

10.

The undesirability of the case: No adjustment to the attorney fees is necessary

based on this factor.
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11.

The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client: No

adjustment to the attorney fees is necessary based on this factor.
12.

Awards in similar cases: Undersigned counsel for the City are not aware of

awards having been made in similar cases, other than the case of Schaefer v. City of Sun Valley,
Case No. CV-06-882 (Idaho, Fifth Judicial Dist. July 3, 2007) (declaring unconstitutional Sun
Valley's affordable housing fee). A copy of the Judgment entered in at case is attached as
Exhibit C to the Affidavit of Christopher H .Heyer. In that case, the plaintiff prevailed and was
awarded attorney fees in the amount of $60,703 in addition to other costs. Counsel for the
plaintiff in that case were Christopher H. Meyer and Martin C. Hendrickson. That fee award was
based on Mr. Meyer's hourly fee in 2006 of $230 per hour. This is one of the three cases
mentioned in the briefing in the case at bar. 5 The City has described the case at bar as a
"copycat" lawsuit based on these earlier impact fee cases. These three cases are not a direct
parallel, however, because they were initiated by plaintiffs in a timely fashion before or shortly
after impact fees were paid. Accordingly, they did not trigger the defenses presented here. But
they do reflect the typical level of attorney involvement in cases of this nature. See Affidavit of

William F. Nichols and Affidavit ofJlurray D. Feldman.
On balance, these factors support an award of the attorney fees charged to the City in this
matter, as set out in the Memorandum of Costs above.

~The second was Cove Springs Development, Inc. v. Blaine County, Case No. CV2008-22 (Idaho, Fifth
Judicial Dist., June 3, 2008) (declaring unlawful and unconstitutional various exaction and comprehensive plan
ordinance provisions). This case, also litigated by Messrs. Meyer and Hendrickson, was settled following the
District Court's favorable decision on the merits. The third was litigated by Victor Villegas and was resolved in
favor of his client. Central Bd of Realtors, Inc. v. City of McCall, Case No. CV 2006-490-C (Idaho, Fourth Judicial
Dist., Feb. 19, 2008). An award may have been made in that case. Plaintiffs' counsel is in the best position to
provide that infonnation to the Court.
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DATED this ll 1h day of July, 2011.

GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By:

-~-"C•hrc:;.is. .;t-',o.p:.;:e=y:-he~-fi- =-'{!J4- -',.; . .:;-"':':.":.-~..e._r;;;::H-.

Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11th day of July, 20 II, the foregoing was filed, served,
and copied as follows:

DOCUMENT FILED:
Fourth Judicial District Court
Attn: Archie N. Banbury, Clerk
Valley County Courthouse
219 Main Street
Cascade, ID 8361 I
Facsimile: 208-382-7107

t8J
0
0
0
0

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-mail

t8J
0
0
0
t8J

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-mail

SERVICE COPIES TO:
Jed Manwaring, Esq.
Victor Villegas, Esq.
Evans Keane LLP
1405 West Main
P.O. Box 959
Boise, ID 83 70 I -0959
jmanwaring@evanskeane.com
vvillegas@evanskeane.com

COURTESY COPIES TO:
Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin
District Judge
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front St.
Boise, ID 83702

t8J
0
0

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail

Jason Gray
Law Clerk to Judge Michael McLaughlin
Fourth Judicial District Court
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street
Boise, ID 83 702
Email: jmgray@adaweb.net

0
0
0
t8J

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
E-mail

~4.t~
Christopher H. Meyer
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Exhibit A LETTER OF APRIL 15,2011 FROM THE CITY TO PLAINTIFFS
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Via Email and U.S. Mail

April IS, 2011
Jed W. Manwaring, Esq.
VictorS. Villegas, Esq.
Evans Keane LLP
1405 West Main Street
P.O. Box 959
Boise, ID 83701-0959
Email: vvillegas@evanskeane.com
Re: Hehr v. City of McCall, Case No.CV 201 0-276C
Dear Jed and Victor:
On April 5, 20I 1, the City filed its Motion for Summary Judgment together with
supporting brief and other materials. The matter is set for argument on May 11, 201 I. I write
because it seems unnecessary tor us to go through this exercise.
The defenses we have presented are rock solid. In addition to the defenses presented in
the Buckskin and White Cloud matters, this case presents the additional defense of the 180-day
notice requirement (which is applicable to cities but not to counties). I just don't see a way
around this one. The statute is clear on its face, and Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 571-73,
798 P.2d 27, 30-3 2 ( 1990) and BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise (" BHA If'), I4 I Idaho 168,
174-76, 108 P.3d 315,321-23 (2004) leave no room to maneuver.
This case is also very strong on the four-year statute of limitations. Unlike the White
Cloud matter (in which the Road Development Agreement was signed inside the four-year
period prior to the Complaint), the Development Agreement here was signed more than four
years before the Complaint.
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Jed W. Manwaring, Esq.
VictorS. Villegas, Esq.
April15,2011
Page 2
The facts here are distinguishable from Buckskin only in that in Buckskin there was a
tina! plat approvaJ on October 25, 2004 (subsequent to the CapitaJ Contribution Agreement) that
also was outside of the four-year period. That is the day upon which the District Court focused
in the decision. But the Court made it clear that it focused on October 25, 2004 because
"October 25, 2004 was the latest point in time that the statute of limitations could have began to
run as a matter of law." (Decision at 3.) The case law embraced by the District Court in
Buckskin and the Magistrate Judge in White Cloud makes it clear that the statute began to run at
least from the time of the Development Agreement, which firmly committed the Plaintiffs to
convey the property. Thus, this defense also is dispositive.
Then, of course, there are all the other barriers set out in the brief supporting the Motion
for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs' federal law claims will fare no better than did the rejected
federaJ claims in Buckskin and White Cloud. The plaintiffs might escape the two-year statute of
limitations or Williamson County, but not both. Finally, the Hehr Plaintiffs are much more
vulnerable under KMST given the fact that their project was grandfathered under Ordinance
No. 819. The record shows that the conveyance of the property was not required by the City and
that it was the result of an agreement between the parties.
This is a daunting set of obstacles. In Buckskin, the Plaintiffs avoided having to pay
attorney fees only because the Court found: "Both parties spent a significant amount of time
briefing the statute of limitations issue and it was not clear from the outset of the litigation
exactly when the statute of limitations began to run." With Buckskin as precedent, the Hehr
Plaintiffs will not have that shield. Indeed, the Court need not even reach the statute of
limitations and other issues given the 180-day rule.
Given all this, there does not seem to be a reason to keep the legal meter running. The
outcome is clear. If your clients continue to pursue this litigation, they will not only lose but will
be responsible for the City's attorney fees, which are not insubstantiaL
The City wants to get this matter behind us. Accordingly, if your clients will agree to
dismiss this case with prejudice, the City will not seek attorney fees. If this offer is not accepted,
however, the City will seek recovery of all attorney fees incurred. This offer is not subject to
Idaho Rule of Evidence 408 and may be shared with the Court in the event settlement is not
reached.
This offer expires on April 29, 201 1. At that point, we will need to gear up for oral
argument. I look forward to hearing from you after you have had an opportunity to share this
letter and the relevant pleadings with your clients.
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Jed W. Manwaring. Esq.
Victor S. Villegas, Esq.
AprillS, 2011
Page 3
Sincerely.

~~

Christopher H. Meyer
cc:

Mayor and City Council
William F. Nichols, Counsel
Lindley S. Kirkpatrick, City Manager
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114014$_414432-4

501

Christopher H. Meyer, ISB # 4461
Martin C. Hendrickson, ISB #5876
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Office: 208-388-1200
Fax: 208-388-1300
chrismeyer@givenspursley.com
mch@givenspursley.com
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Attorneys for Defendant and Counterc/aimant City ojL\-fcCa/1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE
VILLAGE, LLC,

Case No: CV 2010-276C
AFFIDAVIT OF

Plaintiffs,

MURRAY

D. FELDMAN

v.
CITY OF McCALL,
Defendant.

CITY OF McCALL,
Counterclaimant,

v.
R1CHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE
VILLAGE, LLC,
Counter-defendant.
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State of Idaho

)
) ss.
)

County of Ada

MURRAY D. FELDMAN, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states:
1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho. I make this

Affidavit based upon personal knowledge and to the best of my information and belief.
2.

I am a partner in the Jaw finn of Holland & Hart

LLP.

From 2001 to 2003 I headed

Holland & Hart's finn-wide environmental practice group. I currently serve, and have since
January 2009, as the administrative (managing) partner for the Boise office of my finn,
overseeing the activities of 37 attorneys, 9 legal assistants, and 28 support staff.
3.

I have been admitted to practice in Idaho, Colorado, and California (inactive

status), as well as before numerous federal district courts and the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.
4.

I hold a J.D. degree from the University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall)

School of Law ( 1988), an M.S. degree in Wildland Recreation Management from the University
of Idaho College of Natural Resources (1985), and a B.S. degree with high honors from the
University of California, Berkeley (I 982).
5.

I have been listed in the Best Lawyers in America® since 2000, in Chambers

USA's listing of America's leading lawyers for business since 2006, in Mountain States Super
Lawyers® since 2007, and in Who's Who Legal, the International Who's Who for Environmental
Lawyers since 20 I 0 (one of only seven lawyers named in Idaho). I have authored numerous law

review articles and other publications, and I am a regular speaker at legal forums throughout the
nation.
AFFIDAVIT OF "'lRRA YD. FELDMAl'l
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6.

[ have practiced law in Idaho since 1990. During that time, I have handled

numerous cases in state and federal courts throughout Idaho and elsewhere. I have also
represented a variety of clients at the administrative level before the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, the Interior Board of Land Appeals, the United States Forest Service, the
Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, the Idaho Department of Agriculture, the Idaho
Outfitters and Guides Licensing Board, the Idaho Department of Fish and Game, and the Idaho
Department of Water Resources. I have litigated a number oflocal-land use and planning and
zoning related matters in the Idaho state courts, or analogous administrative agency permitting
matters, including Laughy v. Idaho Dep 't of Transportation, 149 Idaho 867, 243 P .3d 1055
(2010); Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 950 P.2d 1262, 130 Idaho 923 (1998); Dirk Dunham v.

Ada County Highway District, No. CV -OC-00-05122 (Idaho 4th Jud. Dist. May 17, 2002)
(impact fee case); Ben Gnesa and Barry Wood v. State of Idaho, DEQ, Case Nos. CV-02-00716
(Idaho 5th Jud. Dist. Feb. 3, 2003); Neighborhood Preservation Ass 'n, Inc. v. Ada County

Highway District, No. CV OC 05-00938D (Idaho 4th Jud. Dist. Sept. 2005); Ada County
Highway District v. City of Boise City, Case No. CV OC 0614386 (Idaho 4th Jud. Dist. Dec. 22,
2006); Sandpoint Independent Highway District v. Board of County Commissioners of Bonner

County, 71 P.3d 1034, 138 Idaho 8837 (2003); and SavethePlateau.org. v. Ada County, Case No.
OC-0702034 (Idaho 4th Jud. Dist. Jan. 7, 2008). I have also handled planning and zoning
matters before various local boards, including those in Ada and Canyon counties and before the
City of Boise and City of Eagle. Many of these state-levellocalland-use and planning and
zoning cases have involved claims of and defenses to attorney fee recoveries. I have also been
involved in numerous cases involving attorney fee claims at the federal judicial and
administrative level, including Greater Owyhee Legal Defense v. U.S. Department of Defense,

AFFIDAVIT OF ~flRRAY
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889 F. Supp. 1295 (D. Idaho

1995)~

Idaho Sporting Congress v. Computrol. Inc., 952 F. Supp.

690 (D. Idaho 1996); Davis Afountains Trans-Pecos Heritage Ass 'n v. Federal Aviation

Administration, 116 Fed. Appx. 3 (5th Cir. 2004); St. John's Organic Farm v. Gem County
''-fosquito Abatement District, 574 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2009); Sullivan v. Sullivan,
20 I 0 WL 1651994 (D. Idaho Apr. 21 , 20 10) (order awarding attorney fees and costs in Hague
Convention action under International Child Abduction Remedies Act); and James G.

Katsilometes v. Bureau of Land Afanagement, IBLA 2003-160 (Order Nov. 3, 2004).
7.

Further information about my professional background, including litigation

experience and publications, is included in my resume, which is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
8.

I have reviewed the Court's Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment dated June 16, 2011. I also have reviewed a draft of the City's
N!emorandum ofCosts and Attorney Fees with Supporting Statement, together with drafts of the
referenced supporting affidavits and exhibits. Finally, I have discussed with Christopher H.
Meyer the course of proceedings and actions taken by the Plaintiffs and Defendant in this
litigation.
9.

Although the state statute of limitations and tort claims issues were relatively

straightforward, the litigation also presented a variety of other issues, particularly those involving
federal and state constitutional claims and associated procedural and jurisdictional issues, as well
as discovery. These issues demanded experienced litigation counsel familiar with this
specialized area. Likewise, the merits ofthe case called for assistance of counsel familiar with
the specialized area of impact fees and their constitutionality under state and federal law. Mr.
Meyer has substantial experience and expertise in these areas. From my review of the court's
decision, the time sheets of the Defendant's outside counsel submitted in support of the attorneys

AFFIDAVIT OF ~ft RRA Y 0. FEtDMAN
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fee motion, the work performed by Mr. Meyer and his co-counsel and legal assistant was
reasonable and necessary. In my experience there are only a small number of law firms in the
state and few in Valley County (especially ones that would not be conflicted out of representing
the City) that are available to handle this range of issues.
l 0.

I am familiar with the current hourly rates generally charged by attorneys

litigating matters such as this one in Idaho. For these types of proceedings, lawyers in the Boise,
Idaho market generally charge hourly rates ranges between $180 and $450. During the time
period in 2010 and 20 II when this case was litigated, my billing rates for this t}';'e of litigation
were in the range of$350 to $425 per hour.
11.

I am familiar with the qualifications, experience, and abilities of Christopher H.

Meyer and his law firm, Givens Pursley LLP. I know of Mr. Meyer's work and reputation from
his presentations at Continuing Legal Education conferences, his written materials for those
presentations, his publication of articles, his work on the Idaho Environmental Forum Steering
Committee, his past position at the University of Colorado School of Law where I observed one
of his seminars in 1987, and my involvement in matters where his firm was also representing
clients. I believe that the hourly rate charged by Mr. Meyer in this matter ($31 0/hour) is
reasonable, in light of the nature of this litigation, the stakes involved, and his abilities, skills,
and experience in these matters, and his total years of practice and experience.
12.

I have reviewed the rates charged by other counsel at Givens Pursley

LLP

who

performed work in this matter. I believe, based on my experience and knowledge and what I
personally charge and what other attorneys in my firm charge similarly situated clients in similar
matters, that those rates are reasonable and are at or below current hourly rates charged in the
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market for litigated matters involving land use exactions with associated administrative and
constitutional law dimensions.
13.

I have reviewed the total amounts of the attorney fees requested to be awarded in

this matter. In my opinion, the total requested attorney fees represent a reasonable charge for the
work performed given the nature of the matter, the effort required, the stakes involved, and the
issues required to be addressed.
I dec tare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

DATED this

/.Z~ay of July, 2011.

yj/J

~~~M

!} ;57

j/

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

,

a/4--

l~ day of July, 2011.

tary Public for Idaho
(,
iding at Middleton, Idaho j
Commission Expires: June 21, 2012
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the \2~ day of July, 20ll, the foregoing was filed,
served, and copied as follows:

DOCUMENT FILED:

~

Fourth Judicial District Court
Attn: Archie N. Banbury, Clerk
Valley County Courthouse
219 Main Street
Cascade, ID 83611
Facsimile: 208-382-7107

0
0

0

0

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-mail

SERVICE COPIES TO:

~

Jed Manwaring, Esq.
Victor Villegas, Esq.
Evans Keane LLP
1405 West Main
P.O. Box 959
Boise, ID 83701-0959
jmanwaring@ev anskeane .com
vvi llegas@evanskeane.com

0
0
0

~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-mail

COURTESY COPIES TO:
Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin
District Judge
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front St.
Boise, ID 83702

~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail

0
0
0

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
E-mail

0
0

Jason Gray
Law Clerk to Judge Michael McLaughlin
Fourth Judicial District Court
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street
Boise, ID 83702
Email: jmgray@adaweb.net

~

~Christopher H. Meyer
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MURRAY D. FELDMAN

Experience

Partner- Boise Office

Mr. Feldman's practice includes endangered species, environmental impact
assessment, environmental permitting, public lands, and environmental
insurance. He has represented regulated community interests and others in
Endangered Species Act and National Environmental Policy Act litigation
and administrative proceedings in the Pacific Northwest, New Mexico,
Nevada, Colorado, Texas, Michigan, and Alabama. He also represents
clients on land-use, contaminated site cleanup, and air and water quality
issues.

Environmental
Natural Resources
Environmental Litigation
Wildlife
Public Lands
Global Climate Change
Geothermal
Endangered Species

(208) 342·5000
mfeldman@hollandhart.com

Mr. Feldman was lead counsel in a significant federal court case concerning
the adequacy of environmental analyses for competing military and public
uses of over 3.2 million acres of public land in southwestern Idaho. He was
also lead counsel for interests challenging the Department of Defense's and
Department of Transportation's NEPA compliance for military training
activities in west Texas, which resulted in the first U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruling in over 20 years to set aside an agency's environmental
impact statement decision. He has represented clients in several
groundwater contamination and remediation cases. At the administrative
level, Mr. Feldman has represented clients before the Environmental
Protection Agency, Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, the
Interior Board of Land Appeals, and the United States Forest Service.
He has significant experience with the major federal laws affecting natural
resources and environmental matters, including the Endangered Species
Act; NEPA; Federal Land Policy and Management Act; National Forest
Management Act; and National Park Service Organic Act. He also advises
clients on permitting issues under the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, and
other federal and state environmental programs.
Mr. Feldman has been admitted to practice in California, Colorado, and
Idaho, and before the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Ninth and Tenth
Circuits and the federal district courts for the District of Idaho and the
Western District of Texas. Prior to joining Holland & Hart, he served as a
law clerk to Justice George Lohr of the Colorado Supreme Court. He has
been listed in the Best Lawyers in America® since 2000, in Chambers USA 's
listing of America's leading lawyers for business since 2006, and in
Mountain States Super Lawyers since 2007. From 2001-2003, he headed
Holland & Hart's firmwide environmental practice group. He is currently
the administrative partner for the firm's Boise Office.
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Honors
Volunteer Lawyer of the Year, Land and Water Fund of the Rockies,
1992
Celebrating Natural Resources Award (for contributions to interdisciplinary natural resource management), University of Idaho
College of Natural Resources, 2004

Professional and Civic Activities
Board Member and Past President (2007-2008), East Boise Little
League
Past Chair (2008), Idaho State Bar, Environment and Natural
Resources Law Section
Member, Steering Committee, Idaho Environmental Forum
Former President (2004-2006), University of Idaho College of Natural
Resources Alumni Board of Trustees

Publications and Speaking Engagements
"Taking A Harder Look At Direct, Indirect, And Cumulative Impacts,"
Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation NEPA Special Institute
(Oct. 2010).
"Give PECE a Chance: Evaluating Conservation Programs to Avoid
Endangered Species Act Listings," 53 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law
Institute 21-1 (2010) (co-author).
"Endangered Species Act Law, Policy, and Perspectives (2d edition)," ABA
Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources (2010) (peer
reviewer).
"Consideration of Climate Change in NEPA and ESA Processes," 45 Rocky
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation Journal 325 (2008) (lead author).
"Of Hard Looks, Reason, and Agency Expertise: Shifting Standards for
Implementing NEPA's Scientific Analysis Requirements," 53 Rocky
Mountain Mineral Law Institute 8-1 (2007) (lead author).
"Suggestions On How To Improve The Endangered Species Act," The
INGAA Foundation, Inc., Report No. F-2007-06 (November 2007) (coauthor).

EXHIBIT A
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"Photography and the Environment," The Advocate (Idaho State Bar
publication), June/July 2007, at 42.
"Storm Water Enforcement Response and Settlement Strategies," 21 Natural
Resources & Environment 17 (Spring 2007) (lead author).
"Our National Wild and Scenic Rivers System," 20 Natural Resources &
Environment 10 (Fall 2005) (lead author).
"Application of the 'Best Scientific Data Available' Standard in the
Endangered Species Act," 16 Tulane Environmental Law Journal 387
(2003) (co-author).
"The Growing Importance of Critical Habitat for Species Conservation," 16
Natural Resources & Environment 88 (Fall2001) (lead author).
"Growing Recreational Conflicts on the Public Lands," The Advocate (Idaho
State Bar publication), March 2001, at 14-16.
"Redefining Critical Habitat for Anadromous Fish in Central Idaho," in
Proceedings of High Altitude Revegetation Workshop No. 14,
Colorado State University (Info. Series No. 91 August 2000) (lead
author).

Education
University of California, Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law
Associate Editor, Ecology Law Quarterly

O.D. 1988)

University of Idaho (M.S. 1985)
Wildland Recreation Management (College of Natural Resources)
University of California, Berkeley (B.S. 1982)
Conservation of Natural Resources
with High Honors
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•
Jed W. Maawaring, ISB ## 3040
Victor S. Villegas, ISB t 5860
EVAt.~S KEAN:E '·'-'
1405 w. Mala Street
P.O. Box 959
Boise. Idaho 83701·0959
telephone: (208) 384-1800
Facsimile: (108) 345-3514
E·MaU:

JUL 21 20U
Case No.

lnllNo....~-6/'£) P.M

Riatt_ _ _-..IA.M..

JManwarfn~anskeaae.corn

VVillqu@evaukeaae..com

Attorneys for Plaintiff
JN TffE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OJ' VALLEY

RlCHARD HEHR and GR.EYSTONE
VILLAGE. LLC.

Case No. CV l010-276C

AFFIDAV1T OF VICfOR VILLEGAS
Plaintiffs,

v.
CITY OP McCALL,
Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO

)

) ss.
County of Ada

)

VICTOR VILLEGAS, being duly sworn upon oath deposes and says as follows:
1.
Hehr and

I am a partner in the law fim1 of EVANS KEANE u.P, and represent Plaintiffs Richard
Grey:~tonc

Village, LLC (''Piaintitts'•) in the abovc-cntided matter. and have personal

knowledge of the facts set forth in this affidavit.
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LLP
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208 345 3514

208 634 8262 p 3/7

Attached as Exhibit A to this affidavit is a true and conect copy of rbc Coun•s

Memorandum 0e(:ision in Buclr.skin Properties. inc. el aL v. Valley County, Case No. CV-2009-.554-

C, tiled January 7~ 2011.
3.

Attached as Exhibit B to this affidavit are true and correct copies of the Decision on

Summary Judgment entered July 3. 2007, in rhe mattet of Phil and Lynn Schaefer.

Plaintiffi/Counterdeftndanrs, v. City ofSun Valley. Idaho, a PoliticaJ subdivision o/tlre Stare of
Idaho. Defendanii'Counrerc/aimant, Ca~ No. CV -06-882; and tbe Order on Summary Judgment on
Counts 2 and 3 entered June 3, 2008 in the matter of Cove Springs Developmem. Inc .. a Nevada

corporation, and Redstone Partners. L.P.. a Nevada limited partnership. Petilioners/Plaintijft v.
Blaine County, a political subdivision ofthe Slate ofIdalro, and John Does J Through 10, Wlro.o;e
True Names Are Unknown. Respondents/Defendams, Case No. CV 2008-22.
4.

Attached as Exhibir C to this affidavit is a h'IJe and corrc~:t copy of Valley County's

Opening Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (minus Exhibits A, B and C) in

Buclcslcin Properti~s. Inc. uta/. v. Valley County, Case No. CV-2009·554-C, filed October l4, 20 I0.

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 25th day of July, 20 I I.

NoPUblic for Idaho
Residing in Boise, Idaho
My Commission Expires: 03/0812012
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVIC§

r HER.£BY CERTIFY that on tl1is 2.Sth day of July, 201 J, a true and correct copy of the
f'orcgoing document was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to; by fax
transmission to; by overnight delivery to; or by pet'Sonally dcHverina to or leavins with a person in
charge of the office as indicated below:
Christopher H. Meyer
Manin C. Hendrickson
Givens Pursley LLP

P.O. Box. 2720

[X] u.s. Mail
[ ] Fax
[ J Overnight Delivery
[ ) Hand Delivery

Boise, ID 8370 t ·2720
Telephone: (208) 388-1200
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300
Attomey~·fo,. Defenda.nt
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~
JAM 612n11
2
3

IN TH5 DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

4

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

5

1

8

BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC •. an Idaho
corporation. an<l TIMBERLINE
DEVELOPMENT. LLC, an Idaho limited

Case No. CV-2009-554-C
ME.'\t10RANOUM DECISION RE:
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

liability eompany,

g

Plaintiffs.
10

vs.
VALLEY COUNTY, a political subdivision,
12

Defendant

13

,.

APPeARANCES

15

For Plaintiff: Victor Villegas of evans Keane LLP

16

For Defendants: Christopher Meyer and Martin Hendrickson of Givens
17

Pu~ey

18

PROCEEDINGS

19

Thi$ matter came before the Court on the Defendant's Motion for Summary
21

Judgment. After hearing oral argument, the Court took the matter under advisement

22

23

BACKGROUND
The

Plaintiffs

Buckskin

Properties,

Inc.

("BucJ(skin")

and

Tlmberlitle

24

Development LLC ("Timberline") undertook a multi-phase Planned Unit Development in
28

Valley County, Idaho cafled The Meadows at West Mountain {the "Meadows"). Velley

EXHIBIT A
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3

County imposed the payment of impact fees as a condition
2

/9

to approve the Plaintiffs'

final plat for the various phases of the Meadows. The Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit seeking

3

a dedaration that the contracts under which Valley County required the payment of

4

impact fees are invalid and seeking a judgment that Valley County violated the

5

Plaintiffs' rights in conditioning approval of their project based on the payment of the

6

impact fees.

7
8

Valley County has filed the current Motion for Summary Judgment

seeking dismissal of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit on the grounds that the statute of limitations
has run and that the Plaintiffs voluntarily entered into the agreements and paid the fees.

9

LEGAL STANDARD

10

Summary judgment will be granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, and
11

12

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

13

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

14

matter of law." !.R.C.P. 56(c}. When considering a summary judgment motion, the trial

15

court must construe the record liberally in favor of the non-moving party and draw all

16

reasonable factual inferences in favor of such party.

17

Assoc. v. Bear Lake County, 118 Idaho 343, 346, 796 P.2d 1016, 1019 (1990). The

18

Bear Lake West Homeowner's

motion will be denied if conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence or if

19

reasonable people might reach different conclusions. Parker v. Kokot, 117 Idaho 963,
20

793 P.2d 195 (1990}.
21
22

The initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact

23

rests with the moving party. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency. Inc.• 126 Idaho 527, 531,

2•

887 P.2d 1034. 1038 (1994). If the moving party meets that burden, the party who

25

resists summary judgment has the responsibility to p4ace in the record before the court

26
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the existence of controverted material facts that require resolution at trial. Sparks v. St.
2

Luke's Regional Medical Center, Ltd., 115 Idaho 505, 508, 768 P.2d 768, 771 (1988).

3

The resisting party may not rely on his pleadings nor merely assert the existence of

4

facts which might support his legal theory. /d. He must establish the existence of those

5

facts by deposition, affidavit, or otherwise. ld.; I.R.C.P 56(e).

6
7

a

A mere scintilla of evidence or a slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to
withstand summary judgment.

Corbridge v. Clark Equipment Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87,

730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986). In other words, there must be evidence on which a jury

9

might rely. Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 871, 452 P.2d 362,
10

368 (1969).

Moreover, the existence of disputed facts will not defeat summary

11
12

judgment when the plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence

13

of an element essential to his case. and on which he will bear the burden of proof at

14

trial. Pounds v. Denison, 120 Idaho 425. 426, 816 P.2d 982. 983 (1991).

15
16
17

18

DISCUSSION
Valley County argues that the Plaintiffs' alegations of violations of the federal
constitution must be dismissed because the Plaintiffs' failed to bring this action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The Plaintiffs respond that they have not sought relief under 42

19

U.S.C. § 1983, nor were they required to do so. The Plaintiffs argue that an action for
20
21

22

inverse condemnation for violations of the Fifth Amendment can be brought
independent of a § 1983 action. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the

23

Const11ution of the United States, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth

24

Amendment. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), provides: "[N}or shall private

25

property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Artide 1, § 14, of the

26
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Constitution of the State of Idaho provides: "Private property may be taken for public
2
3

use, but not until a just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner prescribed by
law, shall be paid therefore.•

4

A property owner who believes that his or her property, or some interest therein,

5

has been invaded or appropriated to the extent of a taking, but without due process of

6

law and the payment of just compensation, may bring an action for inverse

7

8

condemnation. McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 747 P.2d 741 (1987). The
property owner cannot maintain an inverse condemnation action unless there has

9

actually been a taking of his or her property. Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho
10

777, 53 P.3d 828 (2002). Here, the Plaintiffs have not made a claim pursuant to 42
11

12
13

U.S.C. § 1983. However, they were not required to do so because they have a valid
daim pursuant to the State constitution.

14

Valley County argues that the Pfaintiffs failed to timely file this action within: (1)

15

the four-year statute of limitations under I. C. § 5-224 for an inverse condemnation

16

claim; (2) the two-year statute of limitations for a§ 1983 daim; (3) the three-year statue

17

of limitations for the taking of personal property; and (d) the six-month statute of

18

19
20

limitations for claims against a county.

The Plaintiffs respond that their inverse

condemnation claim was timely filed because the statute of limitations began to run on

I December

15. 2005 when the Plaintiffs drew a cashier's check in the amount of

21
22

23

$232,160.00 in order to pay the impact fees for Phases 2 and 3 of the Meadows.
Idaho Code § 5-224 contains the statute of limitations for an inverse
~[a]n

action for [inverse condemnation} must be

24

condemnation claim, and states:

25

commenced within four {4} years after the cause of action shall have accrued." See C &

26
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G. Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dlst. No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 143, 75 P.3d 194, 197 (2003).
2

The date when a cause of action accrues is a question of law to be detennined by this

3

Court where no disputed issues of material fact exist. /d. at 142, 75 P.3d at 196. "The

4

actual date of taking, although not readily susceptible to exact detenninatlon, is to be

5

fixed at the point in time at which the impairment, of such a degree and kind as to

6

constitute a substantial interference with plaintiffs' property interest. became apparent.·

7

Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 671, 603 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1979}.

8

The Complaint in this case was filed on December 1, 2009. The facts in this

9

case are essentially undisputed. The Plaintiffs are making a legal argument that the
10

Valley County's HtakingH did not occur until the cashier's check was drawn in order to
11

12

pay the impact fees on December 15, 2005. However, as Valley County points out, the

13

"Plaintiffs certainly knew the essential facts on July 14, 2004, the day they received the

14

Conditional Use Pennit and they signed the final Capital Contribution Agreement setting

15

out the contribution requirements in full detail. •

16

reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, October 25, 2004 was the date when the

17

statute of limitations began to run. This was the date when the dedication of right of

18
19

At the very latest, drawing all

way was accepted and It was at this point in time at which the impairment of such a
degree and kind as to constitute a substantial interference with the Plaintiffs' property

20

interest became apparent. Therefore, the Court grants the Defendant's Motion for
21

22
23

Summary Judgment because Plaintiffs are barred from recovering under their inverse
condemnation claim by I.C. § 5-224 because their Complaint was not filed within the

24

25

26
MEMORANDUM DECISION • CASE NO. CV-2008-554-C • PAGE 5

5/9

2(

7

'01/07 09:39: 53

/9

four-year statute of limitations.'
2

Although the Court is granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

3

based on the statute of limitations. the Court will address the remaining arguments

4

submitted by the parties in order to provide a more complete record. As a general rule,

5

a party must exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the courts to challenge

6

the validity of administrative acts. Arnzen v. State, 123 Idaho 899, 906, 854 P.2d 242,

7

8

249 (1993). However, there is an exception to that rule when the interests of justice so
require and the agency acted outside of its authority. Regan v. Kootenai County, 140

9

Idaho 721, 725, 100 P.3d 615, 619 (2004).

Valley County argues that summary

10

judgment should be granted because the Plaintiffs could have objected or otherwise
11

12

filed an appeal to the conditions of approval, but did not do so. The Plaintiffs respond

13

that they had no duty to exhaust any administrative remedies because the Plaintiffs'

14

claims meet both exceptions to the general rule of exhaustion.

15

record that Valley County did not follow the provisions set forth in the Idaho

16

Development Fee Act rtDfFA") and Valley County concedes as much.

17

speciflcaUy, Valley County failed to follow the procedure for the imposition of

18

It appears from the

More

development impact fees set forth in I. C. § 67-8206. As such, the Plaintiffs were not

19

required to exhaust their administrative remedies because the proper administrative
20

procedures were not in place.
21

22
23

Valley County also argues that the Plaintiffs should have raised their objections
to the impact fees with the local government in a timely manner in order to set up their

24
25
26

1
The Plaintiffs also argued that lhls action is subJect to a frve-year statute of limitations based on I.C. § 5216 However, this is not an action for breach of contract. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record
before the Court that the contract between lhe Plaintiffs and the Defendant was ever breached.
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claim that their payment was involuntary. In essence, Valley County is arguing that the
2

Plaintiffs should be precluded from maintaining this action because they did not object

3

during the public hearing on their previous approvals for Phases 1 through 3. The

4

Plaintiffs respond that they were not required to object because there is no Idaho law

5

requiring a party to object or otherwise pay under protest in order to later recover an

6

illegal fee and the Plaintiffs had no reason to question Valley County's LUOO at the

7

time of the public hearings on its CUP/PUD application. The Plajntiffs are correct. As

a

the Idaho Supreme Court stated in BHA lnvestl116nts, Inc. v. City of Boise, •[w]e have

9

not held, however. that when a city imposes a fee that it has no authority to impose at
10

all, such fee must be paid under protest before it can be recovered." 141 Idaho 168,
11

12

176, 108 P.3d 315, 323 {2004). Here, the Plaintiffs had no obligation to pay the impact

13

fees under protest in order to recover them later because Valley County did not have

14

the authority to impose the Impact fees as Valley County had not complied with the

15

procedures setforth in I.C. § 67-8206.

16

17

18

CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED this

_L day of January 2011.

19

20

21
22
23

24
25

26
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
2

I hereby certify that on the

~~y of January 2011, I mailed (served) a true

3

and correct copy of the within instrument to:
5
6
1

8

9
10

11

12
13

VALLEY COUNTY COURT
VIA EMAIL
Victor S. Villegas
EVANS KEANE. LLP
1405 W Main St
PO Box 959
Boise, 10 83701-0959
Fax: (208) 345-3514
Christopher H. Meyer
GIVENS PURSLEY lLP
601 W Bannock St
PO Box 2720
Boise,IO 83701-2720
Fax: {208) 388-1300

14
15

16
11

ARCHIE N. BANBURY
Clerk of the District Court

By:D~~

18

19

20
21

22

25
26
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RECEIVED
JUL16av

Ffl

Givens Pursley. U.P

1N THE DIS'l'lUCT CO'lJl1' OF 110! PIFJ1I JUDICIAL DISnUC:r OF
'11m STATE OF Ir>ABO. IN ANn FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE
)

)
)
v.

CJTY OF SUN V.AU...:BY, .D:>ABO, a
Polifie.lsubdfvit:ion ofelle SC&fl: ofJdabo
OG&DciiJlffCavi'I. . .Riant.

P~

)
)
)
)
}
)
)

C. No. CV-06-882
DICISJO!f ON

S\IMM.UY .JUDC1\aNT

PhiliDd L)'Qil Schaefer I.-e R.adl Pllrf:netshlp

filed 1bia 1awlllit oa 0cto1Mw' J8,11X/1, olaallca1iqtbc City otSm Vahy'J imposition of

u iD-Iieu tee on tbl Sc:hac:fc.l1. purJU11t to OrdDace 364, rhe Workferc:c Linbp
OtctiuDce. T.hil maucr canac ~ rfle Court by Onl Arpmeat oa M&y 3, 2001.
Chri&toplwr M.,.,. appearccl tor and ora bcbalto! plaintif!Wc~td~nts Phil and

I.)ml Scbdr, .., Nr.ltiDd PecbJa and Gc:oftrey"' WICdlc lppCinld b-OD
td~M'of~dd~ tbe CityofS. Valley•. Tke Court

,_dilcuaed

UU.liUbar It oral J~F~cat. mi&wed 1he brid'i. n caMiacted i:DIIepcodaat n::narcb em
the matter, and rendcn tbc: fbUowin& deciliGD.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Th.e fullowing facta are undisp\tt:M. On Apri121, 200S the City of Sun Valley
adopted Ordinance No. .363 and Ordinanco No. 364. Botb orctinanees SOllgbt to addrCSII

the growing need fur affordable workJOrce housing in Sun Valley. Otdiname 363 appJie.t
to residential aud multi-family development,. md Ordinmee 364, k:nown as WorlcjoTCII
Htnl$illg LinJcap Ordirlmlt:4, applies to sinsle-fami.ly coDStrlletian. Ordinance 363 is not
at issue in

lhe preaeot lawsuit.

Ordinance 364 provides that allappli.catiOill for Design Review in the City of Sllll

Valley •shaU rcqujre m approved WOl'fd.broe Housi.n& Unlcagc Plan such that a
perccntap of the employee boucing demand generated by the applicat:io.o will be
provided as Workforce Housing U:nita.,. Son Valley, Idabo On:linmce No. 364, § 9-9F·2.
Petmit approval for residential dove.lopmcmt requires the applicant to either "deveiop or

ensure development of twenty peccent (20%) of the employee housing unit demand
genented by the application eitber oosite or on oo Eligible Site prior lo or concw:rent

with the issuance of any building permits tor proposed new constructi.OD." ld. at 9-9F4(B). The ordinance tbcm sets fodb a formu.Ja to comp11ta tbe rotal on-site worlc.force

bouaing tmits a home-builder must provide. The fomrula is based upon the size of the

residential development, bow many employees wiU be requirod, and bow many
employees wiU rea.ide in a unit.

Ordmance 364 also providoa 1w)here alternatives to the on-site pzovision of such
housing iJ determined to be more practical, effidcnt, and equitable, this Article vrill set

fotlh standards for Eligible Site J:tousing. the conveyance ofland, or a payment in-lieu
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fee. .. Itl. at § 9-9F-i. For instance, iftbt fol'DUila yfcld.t a friction of a unit a homo-

builder has the option to either build a full unit or pay a tee in-lit~~. An in-lieu fee may
alto be l)lOvided wbelo the City Council finda on-site howint to be inappropriate or

impractical. Once coUected, the fcc& muat bo deposited iDto a WoxXfotce HO\lling Fuad
and used "solely to illcreuo and improve the supply of rental ~or for sale wori:tb:rw.
housing•.. "

PlaintiffSICounterdcfcndants Phil and Lynn Schaetec owned a lot in Sun Valley
and sougbt to ob1ain deaip. review approval a:nd a building permit fur a new home. The
City assessed an "fn..lieu.. foe of$11,.989.97 against the Schaci::rs pursllant to the
LinbBe Ordinance. The Schaefers filed this lawsuit and moved fur SlllilitUl1)' judgrueot

challeaging the constitutionality of Ord:i.nance 364. Sun Valley filed t countercJain1
reokin& a dec:laratillll that Ordinatlce 364 ia a permissible constitutional &action pursuant

to the ponce power of Article XII, § 2 of the Idaho Constitution.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Stlmmary Judgment is proper if tho "pleadings. deposiliOilS, and admis.'lions on
fi.Je, together with the a.ffidiiVils, if any, show that there is no genuine issue u to any

material fact and that the moving party i& entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule
S6(c). I.R.C.P. Ordinarily, the Court liberally construes all disputed facta in favor of the
noo.-moving party, and draws all reasonable i'nf'emlccs and conclusion~ supported by the

record in favor of the party opposing the motion. Boru: v. Swlwah, 119 Idaho 539. 541,

808 P.2d 876, 878 ( 1991) . If the evidence rovoals no disputed iasuca of material fact, tbe
lrial court should grant tbe motion for swnmary judgment Farm CrcdU Bank v.
S~o11,

125 Idaho 270,272, 869 P.2d 1365, 1367 (199-J). The fact that both parties
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mon for SllilUIWY judgment does Mt in and of itself establish chat there is no genuine
isauo of material &ct. Kromr.i v. AJD ln.s. Co., 110 Idaho 549, 551, 716 P.2d 1321

(1986).
The parties appear to agree tflat no facta are at issue.

ISSlJES
In tbe prestmt case the primary iuue is whether, as the City of Sun Valley argues,
tbll in-lieu fees provided by Ordinance 364 are a proper ext:tcise of awthori.ty under th5

police powers granted to ntunicipatities by the Idaho Constitution. T:n the alternative, the
City of Sun Valley argus that the Local Land Use Ptannin& Act (ILUP A) provides the
City wilh tbe authority to assoas in-lieu fees for tho purpose of affordable housing. In
rcaponae, tbe Schacfen fim argue that C>rdinmt;e 364 is an uncoostitutional tax.
Seeoodly, the Schacfenl contend tha:c is no legislation that psmita the City to aness the

in-lieu fee. Further, the Schaefers claim the ouly arsuable legislation that would permit
in-lieu mea would be the Idaho Development Jmpaot Pee Aot (lDIFA). IDIFA add1·csses
the city's authority to

II8SOSI

charges on new growth and development, and ilnportaru1y,

does not allow the imposition of in·Iieu fees for affordable housing. Therefore, tbe

Scbaems claim, the IDIFA pre-empts the area of impact fee assessment
The Court willmaly.m Doth iasuea in tum.

ANALYSIS

AI t}H, outset. a brief review ofthe law regarding a mWlicipality's authority to
asse:as ch8rges on tho public is nececsary. "ldabo baa long :recognized the propO&idon
that a municipal corporation, as a cmture of the 8la'IB. poasess and ac:teiasa only those

powers eithecexpressly or impliedly granted toil This position, also known as "Dillon's
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Rubs," has been geonlly recognized as tbo ptw.uina view in Idaho." Caaw v. Stat..
101 Idaho 158.610 P.2d 517, '20 (1980). (cit.UO. omitted).
Consequently, there ara three limited methoda by which a lDllTlicipalily may

iclpose charges on the public or plrt:i.colar peraons. ldabo Bldg. Commctors AMoc. Y.
CllyofCoolrd'Al4ne, 126 Idaho 540 (1995). Under Art. 12, § 2 ofthcidabo
CODif.i.tution, a municipality may enact regull'tions pursuant to Its police power, for the
fultbcrance of the public hea.ltb., safety or morals or welfare of its residents. .Brewtr.r v.
City ofPocats/lo, 114 Idaho 502. 503-504, 768 P .2d 765, 766-67 (1988). Ot1de.r its

police powers, a municipality may "provide for the collection of revenue incidental to the
eofumment of that regulation." ldo.lto Bldg. C011/FtlC/f.11'T A.uoc., 126 Idaho at 743, P.2d
at329.

A1&o pursuiiDt to a n:nmicipallty's police power,. Art. 8 § 3 of the Idaho
Constitution pennits the imposition of rates and charges to provide ~venue for pub he

works projects. Loumi8 ,, City ofHttiley, H91daho 434, 438, 807 P.ld 1272. 1276

(1991 ). Under this co.nstittttional grant of authority, the Idaho Legislature enacted the
ldtbo Revenue Bond Act, which allows cities to vote to approve the i.ssuaoce ofrcventJe

bonds to fmance tM cost or maiotenancc of public works. Id. In the present action it is
undisputed that Sun Valley did not atl!tmpt to hold an ~:lcction to provide a bobd to
fi.naDce affordable housing.

Finally, a Il1Uilicipelity may assess char&a on the public pursuant to specific
legjsiation permitting a mllnicipality to fuud a particular project through tbe assessment
G!taxet or fees. /d. This municipal autbority arises from Art 7, § 6 of the Idaho
Caostitution, which •aucws the legislature to invest in tht: corporate authorities ... the
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powec !o asaeaa and collect taxce fur all purposes of the <Xll'pOJ'Ition." Sim fl'altq Co. v.
City ofSa Valley, I~ Idaho 424,-427,708 P.2d 147. 150 (198S). Thia grant of

aWboJ:ity bowe\ler, is oot self-executma. A municipality may Ol1ly OJtCil'Cila this lu.in&
power pllrsuant to, and limilcd by tile authority IJ'8Il(ed by !he legislature.

The first issue of contention is tho scope of authority posscascd by muniapaliliea.
The City of Sun Valley claims a municipality a authority ia much broader than Dillon's
rule, whereby a city's exercise of authority is only improper if it con:fl.icts with the

general laws of the mte. TherefOre. 1he City may enact Ordinance 364 so long aa it does

not oonftiet with the state's general laws. The City citea the recect Supnmc Court
dec:i&i011 of Plaurmuu v. City ofPruiJJiuul, 139 Idaho 810, 87 P.3d. 297 (2004), as support

for this proposition. When considering a municipality' a police pawer, the Court in
Plu~r~mustatad

that. "the burden falls upon the party challenging the oxcroiae ofthla

power to show that such an exercise is either in conflict with the genenl.la.ws of the stato

or that it is unreasonable or arbitrary." Id. at 813.
While the City is correc.t that Pbmtmsr does set forth the law for a llNl'licipality's

police power, a municipality's aufhorityto tax requires separate authority. A City's
police power does not authorize a city to tax the public, but rather regulate tbe public and

in some instances as8CS8 a fee incidental to the regulation. As tbe Court recently 1nada
clear in Potts Co,.ltruclioll. QJmptury v. Nortlr Kootetai Wm.r District, ... municipal

corporation's taxa on the general public reqn:i:re B(*ific legislative authorization." 141

.klabo 678, 681, P.3d 1. 11 (2005). There1bte.lbedisti.nctian lies in whether a city has
imposed. a gene.ral tax, in which specific authorizing legislation is required, or acted

pursuaat to their police power, when a broader grmt of authority I'Jltists.
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The second issu that must be remlved prior to the asaeainl the COilltitutiODility

o!Orclinancc 364 reprda the diffinnee betwoe.n a tax and an exaction. The City spends
a conaidenblo amount of time argujng that tho in-lieu fee is an exat:tion rather than an
impact fee. The import of this atgUliiiSit il two-fold; first, that 111 exaction ia
ca:~stitntionally diltinct

ftom a Ceo, and second. because the in-lieu. fee is an exaction

rather than an impact fee, LUJP A doesn't apply. The City, bowiM:r, cite. oo Idaho law
supporting tbeac propositions and this Court can find none. The analy&i.s i!l' the same

wlledw it ia labeled fee or ao e.xaction. A municipality may regulate wilhin itt police
collect revenue if it ia iDCidentalln the cn.futt:ement ofthatregulatioo. 87'1/fWSJer, llS

Idaho 504. The first requirement is wbdher the municipality may lawfully regulatD

p111'.swmt to their pollee power. If tbe regulation fails to s:atisfy this requirement. lhea the
Court need not addtesa whether the revenue ia incideatallo the regulatioo. Here. the

regulation is an ordinance requiring developmeut to mitigate its effect on the houstng
l'l'llfket. The revenue at i.salo is an in-lieu fee. Whether the revenue is labeled an
exaction or an in-lieu fue does not remove it from the requirements of a valid exercise of
po.tice power.
Wilh regard to the lllgODlml. tbat an in-lieu fee is 1111 exactioo and not an impact

fcc, a%ld therefore ILUP A is inapplicable, the Cowt's holding ia the same. The label is
not the distinguishing factor. The question is wheth« the Idaho Legisl.ature baa

specifically authorized the collection of revenue. Thua, for purposes of this analysia,

whatber the charge is labeled an in-lieu fee or an exaction is inconsequential.
L

l

Ordlauu:e 364 llaot a lawful exercise of ~e City of Sua ValleJ'a Pollee
Power.

I
I
lI
I
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The City of S\a Valley argues that Ordiamce 364 ia merely a "resulatim of
development to ensure that new development adequately mi.tiptat Ita effect on the supply
of affordable workforce bouai.n&.. !U1d as such, fallt within a city's eatabliahad ponce
power authority to regulate for tbe fbrtbennco of tbe pubHe hoaltb. safety ox mm:ala or
ml!lre of ita residmta.

Furtl:lflr, since a municipality may impose fees incident.l1o

police power regulation. charging an in-lieu fee is permissible. Tile Schaeftlrs argue that
Oatinllll.Ce 364 ia nothing roon than a genetal tax, and thus requiteS specific legislative

allthorization.
A municipality's police power ariael from the Idaho Constitution, Art

xa. § 2,

which provides:
Any~ or i.D.r.:otparated aity or town may mab aDd enforce,
within ita limits. all auclJ local police, 4llllitlry atld other
regn.lations as are not in ca:atllct witb its clmter or with the genenl

laws.
As stated above. punruanl to a municipality's police power, a city may provide for

a fee i.nc:idental co the enforcement of that regulation. Brew.rtsr, 115 Jdabo at 504, P. 2d at
767. The funds generated must ..bear some n:asooablc relationship to the cost of
enforcing the regulation." Idtzlro Bldg Canrracton Assoc, 126 Idaho at 743, P 2d t11329.

However, if the regulation's purpose is to raiso revenue rather than regulate, it is a LaX,
and may only be upheld under tbe power of taxation. !d. The Idaho Supreme Court

cautiously reviews whether the collection of revenue is incidental to the enforcement of
that regulation, to enaure that the police power is not "resorted to as a shield or
subterlugc. under which to coact IIDd enforce a rev~mue-caisiq ordinance or statute." Jd,

FO$W's Inc.

11.

Bot# Ct:y, 63 klabo 201, 118 P.2d 721 (1941).
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In BrrNJttr v. City ofPocaullo, the Idaho Suprema Court analyzed the difference
betweea a fee and a tax. Oeoerally, tbc Court oonaidered a fee u revenue inc:identtl to

police power regula1iOilS. and a. tax to include ordinances enacted for tbe purpoae of
t.aimgreveouo. See pe.rally ~. SM Idaho Ill 502. 768 P.2d at 676. In tbat cua.
the Court held in'llalid 110 ardirla:nce that imposed a charge for the rcstoratio.11 and

mainteunce ofstteets on all owners oroccupantJ of property in the city, as an
unconstitutional tax. The cb.ar&c wu calculated porsuaut to a tbmtula raflectins the
trafiie estimated by that particul• property. ld at 502. Initially, the Court noted that the

ordinance had no tenna of regulation. The Court compared the alleged •'fee'' to 1 fee
upheld in Fostru 3 Inc. v. Boise City u

111

example of 1 revenue incidental to a valid

police power regulation. In Fosw '.r, tbc operation of parking meters was found to be

inc.id.erOl to tbe city's police power to regulate traffic and perking. However, the Court

foWid the revenue ftom the Pocatello ordi:n.Jnce had "no necCISIIY relationship to the
~

of travel o'fV its streets, but rather [wu] to generau: f\lnds for the non-

regulatoiy function ofrepairitll and mai.ntajning streets." ld. at 504.

In other eases dlstinguishing a fee from a t.ax. the Idabo Supreme Co11rt has placed
em.phuis on the tenns of the ordinance regarding who will benefit from the revenue

co11cctcd, whether it bo the particular cons001.er or the public at large. In ldolto Bui/dittg
Ct>Titl'tJCIIin Assoc. v. City o{Comsr D'AlB1J8, 126ldaho ?40, 890 P.2d 326 (1995). the

Court reviewed a case with fir.cll similar to the present case, where contractors chal1eoged

an ordinliDCc tha.t required payment of impact fees from new buildBrs to pay for the cost
of development as a ~n to the receipt of a building permit Tho Coob:actors
claimed that the City Jacked autbmity to collect lhe fees without autborizina legislation,
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and the City defended its oroinanoe by argn.in& the the wu a valid exercise: ot police
power. In diffilreotiating a fee ftotn a tax, the Court defined a fee u "a charge b- direct

ptlblic service rendered to the particular eonaumer, while a tu ia a forced contribution. by
tht 'j)Uhlic: at large to meet public :needa." 126 Idaho at 7.44, B90 P.2d at 330. The CoUlt

held the charge to be a tax because it benofited aU those wbo live in Coeur d•Aleoe
equally, yet only newcomers were ~Je fur the cost. ld. As tht Coi.Wt stated "(I ]he

ftd that additklnal services are made necessary by growth and dcveJ<Jpment does DOt
chanF the essmtial nature of tho services provided: tltey are for the public at large... Id.

S imi!arly, in .Brtlwsw, tbe Court viewed the atreet fee to be a cbarge on the occupaniB or
owners of pt'Operty for tho privilege having a public street abut their property, which is no
diffetellt ftom a privilege shared by the geoer:al public in tlus usage of public streets.
Brewstttr, 115 Idaho at 504,768 P.ld at 767.

The Court in IBCA. also expressed concern that the revenues coUccted pUISuant to

the ordinance wore paid into a general fund to be used ''for capital improvements
throughout the City by aU residents, aod not solely fur the benefit of those seeking the

building permit." ldoho Bldg Contractor! As3oc., 126 Idaho at 330, 890 P.2d at 330.

Because those fUod.s were not eann&Ited for use based on tho demand created by
development, they could not possibly relate. to any speci..fie regul.atiotl, but rather raise

revenue for alJ public facility infrastructure.
The Idaho Supreme Court hu found ordixlanoes requiring payment for water
services fD be a val.id oxerciao of a municipality's pol:ic:e power. In Loomis Y. City of

Hailq. the Court foUDd feca valid uoder the city's police power that were sqreptcd and
used tn repair and replace wllttlr system ~used by the city. 119 Idaho 434, 807
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P.2d 1272 (1991). Again in Potll Cmutnldlon Company"· NfJ1111 Koottmtd. Wa_.
DLttrld., the Court found the pmpoae ofwmr md sewer diatricts are to *'sei"V8 a public

usa and promote betltll. safety, prosperity. securily aod general welfilro of tho inhabitan18
of said district.• 141 IdUo 678.682. ll6P.3d 8 12 (2005). Tho Court fbuod !he fee to

be UIIICd toward the wate:r district 'a system and reasonably and rationally rela1ed to tbe
pUI'JlOSI' ofllie city's regulatory function of "insuring clean and safe water for tbo8e usera
of the district's system." ld. Thus the ordinance was upbeld the by the Court.
I'D the present cue, this Court finds that the puxpose ofOrdina:nce 364 is more

similar to a general lax than a fee because its clear purpose i.s In raise RM::nue rattw than
regulate. In order fur an ordinance to regalale, it must cxcrc:iac some control by a rule or
a restriction. Blacb Law Dictionary (7~ 2000. For oxample, inFo.rtu'1 tb.a Court

found that operating the parking rnetem was an essential part of the city's authority to
corrtrol traffic and

ptrtcinJ. In coxtrast, in BrtiWslilr !he Coorttound. the street fee was not

tailored to conlro.l an)IChing regarding str!lets. but raise revenue for maintenance aad

repair of the stn:eta. Similarly, Ordinance 364 is not designed to exercise control or
regulate the building of community housing, but merely ~ revenue. ·

Sun Valley also argue£ that it would be inconsistent to prohibit in-tiea fees while

allowing restrictions on development with regud to off-street pe;ddn.g. setback md height
regulaticms, and provide for on-site and aff-sito improvements neceaitated by new
growth. The Court .finds nothing inoonsiatenl wilh tbe above scenario. It is we1J settled

that municipalities arc able to rep/au development. Setbacks and height regulations ans

valid £eiU}stioJJS of l city's police power. Spren.gfr. Grwbb 01111 A.slodtlla Y. City of
Hau-,. 127 Idaho 576,903 P.2d 741 (19\lS). Fnrtbennore. municipalitiea bave been
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legislatively authori?AM! to enact 7mling regulations pum1ant to the Local Land Use
P1aming Ad. Pa:rldna reatrictiooa ~proper regulations under tbo oity'a rocognizod

police power to regula traffic ml part.ina. The in-lieu fees ISitl8l8d in OrdinluK:e 364,
as diacussed above, do not assear feel incidental to police power replatioJU, btlt insteed
generate revenue.
As stated above, 111:1other factor in establishing whether Ordinance 364's in-lieu

fee ia a tax, is determining who wiD bcnotit. h Bnwstcr stated. generally a tax benefits
1M pub& at large and a fee ia payment by a particular consumer for a public service.
A.ccording to Sun Va.llay, Ordinance 364 seeks to addreaa the lack of workforco housing

in tho Wood Ri'll'ee Valley, and its olfeot on local employer"s ability to attract and retain
employees. UIJ1'/t0 i11 Sllj)JKN1 ofSui& Yalltty't Motion for Sturtmary JudgrnMt a1ld
Mtmwmncbun in Oppmtton to &h~t~' Motion for 5\mtmary JudgmfmC. p.-4. It is

clear that the btme:fit of the ordinance serves new homo-builders aud the general public

equally. This Court eanuot distinguisb this situation from the orne that em ted in
Brtlwstv or ItiaAo Bviltlbfg Con.traatort Association, wbc=-e !be Court !ltated "'the

assessment bcre is no different than a charge for the privilogo ofUving in the City._"
Similal to Brewtlft', where Che City utilized a fonnula to dcteanine tlu:l omount of the

charge based on the tnffie estimated by that particular property, the City of Sun Valley
altempts to distinguish Otdinanoe 364 from a general tax by including a fb1mula to

ca.ltGlate the amount of the ft:e for each home-build« to Cll81II'C tbe builder does not bear
an inordinate amount of the cost. Despite tho city's effort, the problem remaina. The
ld: of workforce houing. like tho improwment of city streets. has an effect on the
p~~blic,

and thus the public should bear the cost. As tho Supreme Court stated in ldtlho
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Jhtildbfr Cottlracto'n Auoc., "the fact that addiliona11C:l"Yieea are made necesnry by

growth and development doca not chaD,te the essential nllUre of thb servicea provided:
thay are fi:Jt the public at large." 126 Idaho at 744, 890 P.2d 330.
Aamlltematmt arg11men1, the City tll.eP ISIIIIIts tbat tha-a ia a particnlar benefit

received by the Schaefi'Jrs. which i& the reticffrom consttuctiug and. dedicaf:in& a.
complete worldOroe housing unit as required by tile Ordinance. By paying the in-lieu fee,
the City claima. the Schaefers are saving money by payinl SUD Valley to assume th&
oosts aasoei.ncd with worldbrce housing. The City is likely com!Cl However, the City's

optiona Rally only provide one feasibJe selection to the avenge person. Tbt; alte:mative

optiot11, such u on-site hous:iog. eli.gib]e site houli:Dg or a conveyance of land to
Workfbrce Housing. are all unrealistic to the avenge applicant. Por example, if the

formula calculating the number of units the applicant shall provide prodtiCeS a ftuctioaal
mnnber, either the applicant must build an entire unit, or pay an in-lieu lee. Fnrther, if

tbe P&Z finds on-1rite housing to be impractical oc inappropriaee, ()('that it would be !l'lOt'e

practical for the required units to be pooled with housing units ftom other projects in the

aty, or a more viable project may be coostructed el&ewhere, tbc::n an applicant tnay eid1er
pay min-lieu fee or convey another piece of property. Ord.. 364, § 9-9F-4.D. However,

the conveyance ofland option ia only pOS51ble if ( 1) the app,licant owns another piece of
property in Sun Valley, and (2) the property is propcdy zoned, (3) the value of the
property is enongh to offset the City's development costs, and fulally (4) the proposal is
accepted by the Sun Valley Clty Counc:it. In addition. the developer must appraise the

property. and the City may require, prior to approval, tbat the property contain roads,
water supply, sewage disposal, an environmental report and other basic services. Ord.
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364, 9-9P-4.D.2. Due to the rrumerous obetlclea an applicant would conftont by
cb:Joaing any othor alternative options, the City hu effectively required m applies 110
pay an in-lieu fee. Consequently, it is umeaonable 110 claim !hat Schtefen have received

the beoetit ofuol bein& required to chooee the otbec tbree optiQIJS.

Sun Valley's claims that OrdiDince 364 does DOt sutler tiam. the same fllWs as
kiUo B'llildlng C01fti"'I,C.UJn A.nociati.on because Ordinance 364 specificaUy segregates
m:l allocatca the in-lim feea, and limits their usc to fimd tbe wortfbrce housing created

by the n.ew development. '!be Court agrees that the ordinance does not fail in tbis regard.

& slaecd above, the Court in Idaho Building ConJroc1or11 ~ pll1ially based its
invalidation of the Coeur d'Alene ordinance oa the tilc:t tbalt the 1leea wen~ aQCI.Imulated
inlo a general fund. The Court was conoemed tlult an impact fee could be usessed IIIIi
the banefit would go toward a.o lli1It'll.atrxl public need. Here, Ordinance 364 serves only

to mitigale the portion of the demand for affordable worldbrce houJillg direatly caused by

the new dcveiopmeot. Revenue provided fi:om in-lieu fees 1M to be deposited into an
interest bearing Worlc.rorce Housina F\tnd, aad solely 11.1ed to ..increase and improve the

supply of l1lntal and!or for sale woddbrcc housing affordable to nlOdcrate and Iow
i.ooomt households and whose i.noome is derived ti:om omploym.ent within Sun Valley or

when fcm.nd appropriate by the City, employed in Blaine County commonly known as tho
North Valley, includi11g the City of Ketchum and River Run." Ordinance., 364, § 9-9F·
4llD.l. Although Ordinance 364 san&fiea lbis one camponeat of a valid police powsr
reguJation. it faila OD the grounds discussed above.

Th.ia Court finds, tberef'Ote, that the Ordinaoce 364 in--lieu. is in reality an

iJDPOSition of a tax, and not a valid ex«cise of a municipality's police power.
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The CltJ,•
of an Ill-Ilea fee pamaaat te Ordfu.Dc8 364 Js aot
spedfteal.ty aathoriud by dae Idabo Lepdature.

l.

AJ diiCI.liiOd above, a municipality may also impoae taxes or .thea on the public by
JPfldflc autborizatiou from the Idaho legialatute. Idlzllt> Bl• ~1'$ .Maoc,126

Id.1ho at 742, &90 P.2d 328. Tbc:rc1bro. the oltly proper question fur th:ia Court ia wbethar
any specific autllorizatio:a ian the Jegialatnre exists. The City of Sun VaHey identities
the Local Land Use Planu.ing Act ("LLUPA j

I$

the IOUrCe of the City's authority. The

Schacfecs argue thal Ordinance 364 Ia without 1egiaJative authorizatioD. Tho Schaefers

1\utber contend that Ordinance 364 is pxeempted by Idaho law, particularly tM Impact
PeeArJ..
The Schaefera' arpmcnt is two fuld. Firat, the Idaho Legislatu:re did not
specifically authority tbe City to asaea in-lieu :tees. Second, the IDJFA preempted the
area ofimpect fees, and therefore the City could not assess :in-lieu fees. Here, the Court
need not proceed to Schaefer·s steond araument on preemption at this time. The
question to addreiS ia whether the Idaho Legi.sJature specifically authorized a

municipality to assess fees or taxes for affotd.a.b)e hOU&ing. [f so, the ordlnance would be
upheld oo tbal. bam. If no legislative aJJthority exists, thea no preemption argument is

necessary bcc::aae the .state did not grant specific authornation to tho city.
Fur!hmnore, preemption generally serves aa a limitation of authority &ranted to

mwricipaJiti.cs by tho Idaho Constitution. Caesar. 101 Idaho at 161. "The city carmot act
in an area which is so comp.letel:y covered by general law aa to indicate that it is a. rmtter-

of state coocem. Nor may it act in an mea w~ to do so, would conflict with tbe state's
geaera.llawa.• !d. For ins111Dce, a city's police poliMI ia limited in areu where the State
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to concede that tbe pteemption arpment would apply oaJy if the Court n:nmd Ord.inau.c:-.6

364 to be a. proper axercite of 1 municipality's police power. Only tbeo oould it be
argued that tha State hu preempted tho II"ell ol impact fees, and the city is prohibited

from acting in thlt :field. Since this Court found Ordin111oc 364 to be outside the

authodty of a mumcipality's police pewee, the Court nccci 110t decide whether IDIPA
preempted the ordinauce. Thoref01'8, siDce it is undisputed that ID1FA does not provide

the ncccssary au1hority ftom the legislature, tho Court will focus on the LLUPA.
The City deftnda Ordinance 364 by arguing that U.UPA provides the authority

neceasary far a municipality to a.aeu in-lieu fees foe affordable hou8ing. This Court
etnnOt fmd that LLUPA provides the City with any sucb authority.
'l'he Idaho Supreme Court has reviewed othe.r challenges to County ordinances
wbere the Couaty defended by identifying a specific grant of authority by tb.e J.egisla1ure.

One such lawsuit, Kootl!llfai Cowtty Prop~~.rty A.r.r ·,. v. KootflnQi Count) involved a

muoieipality's anempt to charge the public fees to estabJiab, maintaio and operate a solid

waste disposal system. ln that cue the Court upheld tho 8SSeSIIIIllC1lt of feu on the basis
that lhe Idaho legislature permitted the municipality tc fund a particular project ttuougb

the asscssmem of taXes or fees. 115 Idaho 676, 769 P.2d 553 (1989). The legislation at
iSI118 wu entitled Solid Wae Disposal Sit-es. Title 31, Chapter 44, which granted COUl1t.}l

commissioners tbe authority "to acquire, establish, :maintai.n and operate such solid waste
disposalaystems as are ntCCSS8l'Y and to provide reasomble and conveoient access to
m:h disposal s:ystema by all the citi%ens... I. C. § 31-4402.. Further. the statute provides

the board of county commisaioners the rollowing options to Llmd the waste disposal
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levy a tax. eolleet fees, use e.xistina revem1111, or collccC. money from any other

source, or anycombiDition ther~K>l. LC § 31-4404(1).
I'n contrut. the eityofSuu Val.ley faill to point to any languaae in the Looal Land
Uae Pluming Act that spceifi.caJly gnniB autbority to aaseca feci or taXes. lt ia evident
ftom the Solid Waste Disposal Sites Act that the 1qislatlm: providca xeveoue collection

a:utllcxity with specific language. In contrut. the City of Sun Valley cites the Court to
several sectiona ofllUP Au support fur the IegislaiUre's broad grant of authority.

Theac soetiODa provide d.ties with the authority to promote the general welfan~ of the
peopleolldaho byida:ltifYUag and assessing the need for atfordablc.housio& and
relf'liring cities to adcbss socll issues by implementing regu1ati.ons and standards. LC. §

67-6508, LC § 67-6511. Indeed, LLUPA provides a city with broad authority to regulate
in tho context of land use. However, notably absent from LLUP A is language pennitting
a city to aaesa taxes or fees.

Fur1hec, it is net at aU clear that Ordinance 364 is of the type that LLu1' A applies
to. "UUPA establiahes explicit and express procedures to be followed by the govc:n:ring

boards or commissioas when considering. emcting and amending toning plans and
ordinances." Rllardon v. Magic FlaJlq Sand fJifd Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 11 s. 119, 90
P.3d 340, 344 (2004). Furthar. zoning regulati001 "llrll divided in10 two classes; first,
tlose which rogulata the height and bulk oibuildinga within certain desiptcd <tistrict.s,
and second, those whi.cb prescribe the usc tD wbich buildinp within certain designated

district may be put... 0 'Connor v. Oty ofMokcow, 69 Idaho 37. 202 P .2d 401 (1949).
'!he standards listed in the ILUPA 8t'8 consist.cot with the above definition of zoning
l

repJatioas, liltin& "sucla thinp u bullding de&ip; blocb, !ott. mel tracts ofland; yaMs.
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courU, grec.obelra. planting stripa, pcd:l, md other open SIJa&Mi trees; signs; parkm&
sp~Cet~ road~ 1treet1,

lanes. b~lewaya, pedesmm walkway~. rigtu.af..way,

iflde•, alignments, and intencctions; lighting; em:mCD.ta f« public utilities; access tc

streets numbers and Jllllla; bouse numbers; schools, hospitals. and other public and
private development." I. C. § 67-6518. The common tbeme of the above standards is the
rtlpiati011 of lwf usc. Ordinance 364 does not impate standards related to the

regulation of land use, but rather seeks to impose fees upon landowners seeking a
building permit.

In sum. tile Court cannot find that the llUPA specifically grmts the City of Sun
Valley lhe authority to 1111t1a fees or taxes on the public. 'Ibere1bte, Ordinance 364
cannot be ~eld on the. basis that the City of Sun Valley may a&Bell8 an in-li110 fee

pursuant to specifit legislative authorization.
IDAHO TORT CLAIM ACf

The Sebaefers seek a refimd of the $11 ,989.91 in-lieu fee pursuant to the Idaho
Tort Claim Act, l.C. § 6-901 to 6-92.9. The City claims no refund is due because the city
acted 'Withoot n:cklea, will.t\tl mi wanton oonduct. as defined in 6-904C, Idaho Code."
LC. § 6-904A This Cowtcannot find that the City of Sun Valley enacted Ordinance 364

wiJJfully or rec.ldesaJy, and tberefu.re denies any rcfmJ:i pursuant to this act.
The Schaefen also seek a refbnd

OD

the buis that tbc state wu unjuatJy enriched

by receipt of m un0011£titutional tax. The Court in BHA.lmctmm~.r, inc., v. State. 13 8

Idaho 348, 355, 63 P.3d .474, 481 (2003), acknowledged such a claim may be appropriate
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(1) t be.netit ia confarnld upon dcleadant by plaintift;. (2) appreciltioD by the dcftm.danl of
the benetlt. rod (3) acc:eptaDce of the~ ander eircUIDJbncea thtt would be

inequitable 1br the defendant 1o J"11taiD the benefit without payrncU of the value thereof
Gib.tote

11.

Ada Couaty. 142 Idaho 746, l33 P.3d llll (2006). In the pte8CIIt action, the

City collected and appn:ciatcd receipt of S11,989

.n .from the Sabaofcrl.

Further. aa a

result of Ibis Courts niling reflll'din& the constitutionality of the ordinance, acceptance of
the char~ by lhe City would be inequittble. Thus, this Court finds tbe City til have been
ulijustly enricbed in the amount of$11,989.97 uu:1 tho Scbaefors are HEREBY entitled to

a refund in that amowat.

rn conclusioa. because Ordi.uanca 364 ia not a valid exercise of a m.unicipality"s
police powe£, IlCI' specifically antborizcd punuant to a specific legislative enactment, tile
Sc.haew's S'Uilllllai}' JudgJneOt Is H.Em.HBY GRANTED, and thus the City of Sun
Valley's SurrutiJirY Judgment is DBNIBD.
It is so orden:cl.

Distrlct Judge
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Martin A. Flannes, Idaho State Bar No. 2874
FLANNES LAW, PLLC
P.O. Box 1090
Hailey, ldaho 83333
Office: (208) 788-1315
Fax: (208) 788-1316
martin@flannes. net
Attorneys for Petitioners!Plainti.fft

Cove Springs Development, Inc. and
Redstone Partners, L. P.

IN THE DISTRICI' COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICI'
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE

COVE SPRINGS DEVELOPMENT, INC., a
Nevada corporation, and REDSTONE
PARTNERS, L.P., a Nevada limited
partnership,
Petitioners/Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. CV2008-22
ORDER ON SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON COUNTS 2 AND 3

BLAINE COUNTY, a political subdivision of
the State ofldaho, and JOHN DOES 1
THROUGH 20, Whose True Names Are
Unknown,
Respondents/Defendants,
TOM O'GARA, JOHN STEVENSON, and
GERRY BASHAW,
Intervenors.

------------· _____

_)
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This matter came on for hearing before the Court on May 29, 2008. Appearing at that
hearing on behalf of the Plaintiffs Cove Springs Development, Inc. and Redstone Partners, L.P.
were Chris Meyer, Boise, Idaho, Martin Hendrickson, Boise, Idaho, and Martin Flannes, Hailey,
Idaho. Appearing on behalf of the Defendant Blaine County was Tim Graves, Hailey, Idaho.
Also appearing at the hearing but not participating was Ned Williamson, Hailey, Idaho on behalf
of Intervenors Tom O'Gara, John Stevenson, and Gerry Bashaw. The Court, having reviewed
and considered the Petitioners/Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts 2 and 3, the
supporting pleadings, and the briefing with respect to the motion, and having heard and
considered the oral argument of respective counsel, finds and rules as follows:
CoH!!I .2- T~asheld. PUD, tllld CD Standtuds (or Contornrance with Comprehensm
Pl(!n fZO(J.i Ordinance1

1.

In its Answer, the County admitted paragraphs 211, 212, 213, 214, and 215 of

Cove Springs' Complaint, which state as follows:
211. County Subdivision Threshold Standard § 10-5-2B
states that no application shall be approved unless the Board
determines that: "The proposed subdivision ofland conforms to
and is in accordance with the comprehensive plan text and map."
212. County Subdivision Planned Unit Development
Standard§ l0-6-8A.10 states that a planned unit development is
contingent upon the Board's determination: "That the PUDwill
conform to the comprehensive plan."
2 I 3. County Subdivision Cluster Development Standard
§ 10-9-8E states that a clu::>ter development is contingent upon the
Board's determination: "That the A.-20 CD conforms to the goals,
recommendations and conclusions in the Blaine County
comprehensive plan."
214. Under Idaho law, the purpose of a comprehensive
plan is to serve as a general guide in instances involving 1.0ning
decisions such a(sJ revising or adoptin& a zoning ordinance.
215. Under Idaho law, the County may not elevate its
comprehensive plan to the level of controlling zoning law.
ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNTS lAND 3
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2.

The County admitted Paragraphs 211,212,213,214, and 2IS of Cove Springs'

Complaint. These are accurate statements of the law. Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353,
358, 2 PJd 738, 743 (2000).
3.

Subdivision Ordinance §§ I 0·5·2.8, I 0-6-8.A.1 0, and 10..9-8.E, as written in

2004, apply to the Cove Springs applications. These ordinances remain in effect throughout
Blaine County today with minor changes under the 2025 Ordinances which do not affect the
analysis or conclusions reached in this order.
4.

The Local Land Use Planning Act, Idaho Code§§ 67-6501 to 67-6537

("LLUPA") contemplates that the comprehensive plan shall serve as a pl8.1ming document to
guide the adoption of zoning and other ordinances. Comprehensive plans are forward-looking,
visionary documents. Although LLUPA requires that land use ordinances adopted by the County
should generafly reflect the broad goals and aspirations of the comprehensive plan, not all of the
specific provisions in a comprehensive plan are necessarily reflected in cunent zoning
ordinances. Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome CounJ.y, 2008 WL 803001 (Mar. 27, 2008). Thus, the
standards and conditions spelled out in its adopted land use ordinances constitute the County's
articulation as to how the comprehensive plan is to be applied to subdivision applications,
including the Cove Springs Applications. Cove Springs and all citizens of Blaine County are
entitled to rely on that articulation. Thus, individual zoning and subdiv1sion permit applications
are to be measured against the specific criteria set out in the applicable ordinances.
5.

The following statement by the Idaho Supreme Court is controlling here:
It is to be expected that the land to be subdivided may not agree
with all provisions in the comprehensive plan, but a more specific
analysis, resulting in denial of a subdivision applicatiot1 based
solely on non-compliance with the comprehensive plan elevates
the plan to the level of legally contro111ng zoning Jaw. Such a
result affords the Board unbounded discretion in examining a
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rage 3 of20

545

subdivision application and allows the Board to effectively re-zone
land based on the general language in the comprehensive plan. As
indicated above, the comprehensive plan is intended merely as a
guideline whose primary use is in guiding zoning decisions. Those
zoning decisions have already been made in this instance ....
Thus, . . . the Board [may not rely} completely on the
comprehensive plan in denying these applications, and should
instead have crafted its findings of fact and conclusions of law to
demonstrate that the goals of the comprehensive plan were
considered, but were simply used in conjunction with the zoning
ordinances, tbe subdivision ordinance and any other applicable
ordinances in evaluating the proposed development<:.
Urrulia, 134ldaho at 358-59, 2 P 3d 743-44.

6.

There is no issue before the Court on these present motions as to whether and

what extent the County may consider its comprehensive plan in passing upon a subdivision
application. More particularly, what weight Blaine County chooses to give to its comprehensive
plan in considering or passing upon a subdivision application, or the question of whether the

CoWlty can give its comprehensive plan !!!i: weight in passing upon a PUD or a Cluster
Development or a Subdivision Application, (as opposed to adopting a new ordinance, or
considering a conditional use permit, etc.) are not before the Court.
7.

County ordinances are law. By including in its ordinance 10-5-2.3 a requirement

that "No application shall be approved" unless the Board "detetmines the proposed subdivision
ccnfonns to and is in accordance with the comprehensive plan," Blaine County has elevated its
comprehensive plan "to the level of legally controlling zoning law." Therefore, this particular
provisiQD ofthis ordinance violates Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 358, 2 P 3rd 738,
743 (2000), and is contrary to law on its face.
8.

By including in its ordinance I 0-6-8.A.( I 0) a requirement that a planned unit

development is "contingent upon the Boards detem1ination" that "the PVD will conform to the
comprehensive plan," Blaine County has elevated its comprehensive plan "to the status oflegally
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controUing zoning law." Therefore. this particular provision of this ordinance violates Urrutia,
and is contrary to law on its face.
9.

By including in its ordinance 10-9-8.8 a rrJquirement that a Cluster Development

is "contingent upon the Boards determination" that the "A-20 CD conforms to the goals,

recommendations. and conclusions in the Blaine County comprehensive plan," Blaine County
has elevated its comprehensive plan "to the status of legally controlling zoning law." Therefore,

this particular provision of this ordinance violates Urrutia and is contrary to law on its face.

The Court therefore ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that Blaine County Code
Sections l 0-5-2.B, l 0-6-S.A.l 0, and 10-9-8.E are contrary to law and are therefore null, void,
and without further force and effect.

Count 2 - Unauthori:r.ed Exactions in Threshold. PUD, and CD Standards (20(}4
Ordinance)
10.

In its Answer, the County admitted paragraphs 219,221,223,225,226,227,228,

229, 230, 231, 233, 234, 235, 236, 240, 241, 243, 244, and 249 of Cove Springs' Complaint,
which state as follows:
219. County Subdivision Threshold Standard§ 10-5-2.C
states that no application shall be approved unless the Board
determines that: "The proposed subdivision shall not adversely
affect the quality of essential public services and facilities lo
current residents, including but not limited to school facilities,
school bus transp01tation, police and frre protection, emergency
services, and roads, and shall not require substantial additional
public funding in order to meet the needs created by the proposed
subdivision. The applicant shall be required by the Board to
mitigate the adverse effects of the proposed subdivision, which
may include., without limitation, contributions for additional capital
improvements, on-going maintenance, and tabor costs. The plan
for, timing of. and proposed phasing of the mitigation shall be in a
fonn acceptable to the Board."
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221. County Subdivision Planned Unit Development
Standard § 10-6-8.A.9 states that a planned unit development is
contingent upon the Board's determination: "TI1at the developer
will finance the improvement of the road network outside of the
PUD where traffic generated by the PUDs increased densities
make such improvements necessary ...
223.

County Subdivision Cluster Development Standard

§ 10-9-S.D makes approval of a Cluster Development contingent
upon a determination· "TI1at where off-site impacts are found to
result from the proposed development of the A-20 CD, the
developer has proposed improvements to mitigate said impacts.

Such improvements may include but not be limited to the road
network (road improvements not limited to surfacing, school bus
turnarounds, widening, intersections, bridges, culvet1s, and
drainage facilities), fire protection facilities, and trails/recreation."
225.

Idaho is a Dillon's Rule state.

226. Under Dillon's Rule, counties have no inherent
authority to regulate or to tax.
227. Under Dillon's Rule, the autholity of Idaho counties
to tax detives from grants found in or necessarily impJied by the
Idaho Constitution and state statutes.
228. The Idaho Constitution contains a grant of police
power to Idaho counties.
229. The grant of police power to counties contained in
the Idaho Constitution does not include a general authority to tax.
230. The police power includes the authority to impose
regulatory fees that are incidental to proper regulatory programs
for the purpose of funding such programs.
231. The police power includes the authority to charge
user fees for services provided by the County to a user of those
services.
233. Development impact fees and other measures whose
primary purpose is to generate revenue for services and capital
improvements benefiting the public in general are not incidental
regulatory fees.

Oltn~:a

ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNTS 2 AND 3

Page 6 of20

548

234. Development impact fees and other measures whose
primary purpose is to generate revenue for services and capital
improvements benefiting the public in general are not user fees for
services.

23 5. Development impact fees and other measures whose
primary purpose is to generate revenue for services and capital
improvements benefiting the public in general are not the sott of
traditional exactions authorized under the police power in
association with dedications within and primarily benefiting the

development.
236. Development impact fees and other measures whose
primary purpose is to generate revenue for services and capital
improvements benefiting the public in gece1'al are taxes.

240. Atticle VII,§ 6 of the fdaho Constitution is not selfexecuting. Any power of taxation authorized under this section
must be implemented by legislation.
24 I .

The only statute authorizing counties to assess

developme11t impact fees is the Idaho Development Fee Act, Idaho
Code§§ 67-8201 to 67-8216 ("IDIFA").
243. County Ordinances§§ J0-5-2.C, I0-6-8.A.9 and 109-8.0 do not comply with the procedural and substantive
requirements of IDIFA.
244.

The County did not enact County Ordinances§§ 10-

5-2.C, 10-6-8.A.9 and 10-9-8 .D pursuant to or in reliance on

IDIFA.
249. The County has no authority to enforce a void
ordinance or to apply a void ordinance to the Development
Applications.

II.

The County admitted Paragraphs 219,221, 223,225,226, 227,228,229,230,

231,233,234,235, 236,240, 24), 243,244, and 249 of Cove Springs' Complaint These are

accurate statements of the law. Idaho Building Con.t.ractors Ass 'n v. City ofCoeur d'Alene
C'!BCA"), 126 Idaho 740, 890 P.2d 326 (1995); Brewster v. City ofPocatello, liS Idaho 502,
768 p 2d 765 ( J 988).
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12.

Subdivision Ordinance§§ 10-5-2.C, 10-6-8.A.9, and 10-9-8.0, as written in 2004,

apply to the Cove Springs applications. These ordinances remain in effect throughout Blaine

County today with minor changes under the 2025 Ordinances which do not affect the analysis or
conclusions reached in this order.
13.

Subdivision Ordinance§§ I 0-5-2.C, 10-6-8.A.9, and 10-9-8.0 establish

development impact fees that the County seeks to impose without compliar.ce with IDlFA.
14.

The County has no inherent authority to impose taxes under its police power. The

County must impose development impact fees pursuant to IDfF A or not at all.
15.

The County could have imposed development impact fees to recover certain costs

associated with new developments pursuant to IDIF A, but apparently elected not to do so.
16.

The fees imposed under these ordinances are not incidental regulatory fees or user

fees, but are intended to raise revenues for public purposes benefiting the County as a whole.
AccordingJy, the fees imposed under these ordinances constitute illegal taxes in violation of the
Idaho Constitution and are, therefore, null and void.
17.
"Approval of a plat may ill!! be conditioned upon payment by the
subdivider of a specified portion of the cost of improvements if no power to exact
such a payment is delegated by the statutes. The county has a duty to keep all
roads in reasonable repair and may not discharge that duty by imposing the costs
on local developers, absent statutory authority; thus, requiring a developer to~~
a county road as a condition for approving a site olan js ultra vire~."'
83 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning a11d PlaMing § 485. at 420 (2003) (emphasis added).

18.

In addition. even if the County had inherent authority to impose taxes (which it

does not), Subdivision Ordinance §§ I 0-5-2.C, I 0-6-8.A.9, and l 0-9-8.0 are void because they
have been preempted by IDIFA. IDIFA is a broad regulatory program that comprehensively
addresses development impact fees in Idaho and wa..'l intended "to occupy the entire field of
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regulation.'' Envirosafe Services of Idaho v. County ofOwyhet~, 112 Idaho 687, 689, 735 P.2d
998, 1000 (1987).

19.

Specifically, with regard to designated paragraph 223, the County argues that

compliance with Standard § 10-9-8.0 is voluntary. While part of that may be true, the County

has made approval "contingent" on whether the proposed development has voluntarily agreed to
contribute tQ mitigate off site impacts. When viewed in context, the County has conditioned
approval upon an agreement by the developer to contribute to offsite improvements for clearl5designated public purposes. In other words, the County has conditioned approval upon the
developer's ag.""eement to voluntarily pay a tax. In that regard, the County seeks to do indirectly,

(by coercing payment of a fee for mitigation of offsite public impacts) what it may not do
directly (levy an "exaction" or tax for precisely the same purpose).
Idaho Code 67-6513 requires that: "Fees established for purposes of mitigating the
financial impacts of development must comply with the provisions of chapter 82, title 67, Idaho
Code." Additionally, the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act ("IDIFA") provides, at section 67-

8204( I 7): "A development impact fee ordiruu1ce shall include a schedule of deveJoprnent impact
fees for various land uses per unit of development.'' Blaine County's ordinance includes no such
fee schedule, an omission the County seeks to get around by arguing their fees are ''voluntary",

that the County does not need to enact or set a fee, (because they have placed the burden on the
developer to set a fee 1), and that d1e County may or may not actually set a fee requiring any
payment in any particular instance. The issue is not whether the County will or mighf set a fee;
the statute demands that they set a fee. TI1is attempt by the County (to avoid setting fees as

1
Blaine Counry Ordinance 10-9·8.0 provides thai approval is contingent upon a determination that " .. the
developer hns proposed improvements to mitigate such impacts "
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called for by IDIFA} runs afoul of lDlF A. Another subsection of the same statute sets forth the

re1ult. 67-8204(25) provides:
"Any provision of a development impact fee ordinance that is inconsistent
with the requirements ofthi.s chapter shall be mdl rmd void and tltal provi.rion
shallltave rro legal effect. A partial invalidity of a development impact fee
ordinance shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of the ordinance

that are inconsistent With the requirements of this chapter."

The CoUJt therefore ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that Sections J 0-5-2.C,
10-6-8.A.9, and I 0-9-8.0 are contrary to law and are therefore null, void, and without further

force and effect

Count 3 -Road Milifatkln Fee (2025 Ordinance)
J9.

In its Answer, tbe County admitted paragraphs 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231,

233,234,235,236,240, and 241 of Cove Springs' Complaint, which are quoted above.

20.

In its Answer, the County admitted paragraphs 256,257, and 258 of Cove

Springs' Complaint, which state as folloW'S:
256. The Road Mitigation Fee [defined in paragraph 254
ofthe Complaint as Public Ways and Property Ordinance§ 6-1-4
as amended in 2007) does not fall within the scope of IDIFA.

257. The Road Mitigation Fee does not comply with the
procedural and substantive requirements of IDIFA.
258. The County did not enact the Road Mitigation Fee
pursuant to or in reliance on IDlFA.
21.

The County admitted Paragraphs 225,226,227,228,229,230,231,233,234,

235, 236, 240,241, 256, 257, and 258 of Cove Splings' Complaint. These are accurate

statements of the law.
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22.

The Road Mitigation Fee required under Public Ways and Property Ordinance

§ 6~ 1.-6, (sometimes referred to as 6~ 1-4 in Cove Springs documents) as amended in 2007,
establishes a development impact fee th81 the County seeks to impose without compliance with

IDIFA.
23.

The County has no inherent authority to impose taxes under its police power. The

County must impose development impact fees pursuant to IDIFA or not at all.

24.

The County could have im?3sed development impact fees to recover costs

associated with roads pursuant to IDIFA, but elected not to do so.
25.

The Road Impact Fee is not an incidental regulatory fee or user fee, but is

intended to raise revenues for public purposes benefiting the County as a whole. Accordingly,
the fees imposed under this ordinance constitute illegal taxes in violation of the Idaho
Constitution and are, therefore, null and void. The County may not use an appliCWlt's failure to
pay an illegal fee as a basis for denial of a permit application.
26.

In addition, e\len if the County had inherent authority to impose taxes (which it

does not), the Road Impact Fee is void because it has been preempted by IDIFA. IDIFA is a
broad regulatory program that comprehensively addresses development impact fees in Idaho and

was intended ...to occupy the entire field of regulation." Envirosafo Services of Idaho v. County
of Owyhee, 112 Idaho 687, 689, 735 P.2d 998, lOOO (1987).

The Court therefore ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that Section 6-1-6 of the

Blaine County Code is contrary to law and is therefore null and void, and without further force
and effect.
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Cq_unt J -lnclHfif.ngrv Hogsin« Fee (2025 Ordinanu)
27.

In its Ansvver, the County admitted paragraphs 225, 226,227, 228,229,230, 231,

233,234, 235,236,240, and 241 ofCove Springs' Complaint, which are quoted above.
28.

In its Answer, the County admitted paragraphs 265, 266, 267, 268, and 269 of

Cove Springs' CompJaint. which state as follows:
265. Subdivision Ordinance§ 10..5-4 adopted in 2006,
provides, in relevant part: "JNCLUSIONARY HOUSING:
Twenty percent (200/o) of the lots and houses in all subdivisions,
including condominium subdivisions. approved and platted after
the adoption date hereof shall be permanently restricted as
community housing .... "

266. Pursuant to Subdivision Ordinance § 10-5-4, an
applicant for subdivision approval may propose and the Board may
approve, any of four (4) options, or a combination thereof, for
providing community housing that is required by the ordinance, as
follows: (1) the applicant build community housing on the site of
the subdivision; (2) the applicant build community housing off the
site of the subdivision; (3) the applicant convey land, either within
the subdivision or off the site ofthe subdivision, for community
housing; or (4) the applicant pay a fee in lieu for community
housing.
267. Subdivision Ordinance§
the scope ofiD IF A.

10~5-4

does not fall within

268. Subdivision Ordinance § I 0-5-4 does not comply
with the procedural and substantive requirements of IDIF A.
269. The County did not enact Subdivision Ordinance
§ 10-5-4 pursuant to or in reliance on IDJFA.

29.

The Cow1ty admitted Paragraphs 22:5, 226,227, 228,229, 230,231,233,234,

235, 236, 240, 24!, 265, 266, 267, 268, and 269 of Cove Springs' Complaint These are accurate
statements of the law.
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30.

The Inclusionary Housing Fee imposed under Subdivision Ordinance § 1Q..S-4

establishes a development impact fee that the County seeks to impose without compliance with
lDIFA.
31.

The County has no inherent authority to impose taxes under its police power. The

County must impose development impact fees pursuant to lD[FA or not at all.
32.

IDIFA authorizes certain categories of development impact fees, to wit

1. water supply,
2. wastewater facilities,
3. roads,
4. storm water collection facilities,
5. parks and ope11 space, and
6. public safety facilities.
Idaho Code§ 67-8203(24). Affordable workforce housing is not among them.
33.

Accordingly, the County has no authority to impose a development impact fee tor

affordable workforce housing, even if it complied with the procedural requirements of IDIF A. ff

the County wishes to provide affordable workforce housing, it must do so through the
expenditure of property tax revenues or other authorized means. lbe Legislature has not
authorized the CoW1ty to shift the cost of building affordable housing from the community as a
whole to individual developers and property owners.
34.

TI1e County has no inherent authority to impose taxes. The Inclusionary Housing

Fee is not an incidental regulatory fee or user fee, but is intended to raise revenues for public

purposes benefiting the County as a whole. Accordingly, the fees imposed under this ordinance
constitute illegal taxes in violation of the Idaho Constitution and are, therefore, null and void.

35.

In addition, even if the County had inherent authority to impose taxes (which it

does not), the Inclusionary Housing Fee is void because it has been preempted by IDIF A IDIFA

is a broad regulatory program that comprehensively addresses development impact fees in ldaho
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and was intended "to occupy the entire field of regulation.,. &virosafe Services of Idaho v.

County of Owyhee, 112 [daho 687, 689, 735 P.2d 998, WOO (1987).

The Court therefore ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that Section 10-5-4 of the
Blaine County Code is contrary to law, is therefore null and void, and without further force a11d
effect.
Coll!pl3 - Wildlife Overlq District ( 2025 Ordinance)
In its Answer, the County admitted paragraphs 262 and 263 of Cove Springs'

36.

Complaint, which state as follows:
262. The Wildlife Overlay District includes all
"Classified Lands" as defined in Zoning Ordinance§ 9-20-4.
263. "Classified Lands" are defined in Zoning Ordinance
§ 9-20-4 solely by reference to determinations made by the lDFG
[Idaho Department of Fish and Game].
37.

The County admitted Paragraphs 262 and 263 of Cove Springs' Complaint

TilCSe are accurate statements of the law as enacted by Blaine County.
Zoning Ordinance § 9-20-4 defines "Classified Lands" in terms of elk winter

38.

habitat, mule deer winter habitat, elk migration conidors. mule deer migration corridors, and
other areas identified by IDFG. The ordinance provides:
•

"Elk migration corridors in Blaine County are designated by IDF&G."

•

"Elk winter habitat in Blaine County is designated by IDF&G."

•

"Mule deer migration corridors are designated by IDF&G."

•

"Mule deer winter habitat in Blaine County is designated by IDF&G."
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39.

Zoning Ordinance§ 9-20·5 provides: "Prior to the planning or designating of any

subdivision, the applicant shall contact IDF&G and any other applicable agency or professional
as detetmined by the administrator to identify any classified lands on the subject property."
40.

LLUPA authorizes and mandates the establishment of zoning districts. Idaho

Code § 67-6511.

41.

LLOPA does not require creation of a zoning map in so many words, but it does

require the designation ofL.oning districts which, as a practical matter, may be displayed on a
zoning map.
42.

A zoning map describes current zoning. It is not to be confuse<! with the land use

map that is part of the comprehensive p!an. 2
43.

LLUPA does not expressly authorize overlay districts, which are special zones

imposed on top of an underlying zoning district However, zoning districts and overlay dist:licts

are permissible fonns of zoning, so long as they comply with statutory, common law, and
constitutional requirements for land use zoning. One of the requirements inherent in all zoning is
that landowners and other affected parties be infonned of the boundruies of the zones. This may

be accomplishe<l either by mapping or by the establishment of objective, textual standards that
allow persons to detennine with rea.•10nable certainty which zones apply to a given property.

44.

Accordingly, the County's adoption of a Wildlife Overlay District without

mapping its boundaries does not, in itself, violate LLUPA.
45.

However, the Wildlife Overlay District fails to provide any objective cliteria (or

any criteria at all) to define its boundaries, other than "references used by lDF &G"
Accordingly, there is no way for a person to determine whether a property is within or outside of
1
The operative provision simply refers to this as a "map." Idaho Code§ 67-6508{c). lt is referred to as a
"lend use map" in Idaho Code§ 67~509(d).
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the Wildlife Overlay District other than to ask for a determination by a third party (an IDFO
employee} who answers to no one within the County and who can issue a conclusory
determination on a case-by-case basis unbounded by any fixed, articulated standards or criteria.

Furthermore, the ordinance allows IDFG to modify such "references" from time to time without
any notice to and/or input from affected landowners.
The County argues that ''wildlife move" which makes the adoption of a map difficult.

Petitioners argue that the County had a map that was used prior to the adoption of this ordinance.
At different times, in different years. vittually everyone in Hailey, Bellevue, or Ketchum has
seen moose in the streets, elk in their yards or subdivisions, elk or deer wintering on surrounding
hillsides, bears along the river, etc. Yes, wildlife move, and they move in different quantities to
different locations in different years; however, the county ha.'l sought in this instance to avoid
responsibility for fixing or studying or ascertaining the general movement of various animals,
and/or zoning in accordance with general movements of particular populations, by delegating
this entire responsibility to the Idaho Department ofFish and Game.
Fish and Game undoubtedly has more expertise than the County Commissioners in this

area, but Fish and Game has no authority to set and/or designate zoning boundaries. The setting
of zoning boundaries is a function that rests entirely with tl)e designated agents of Blaine County.
In making this delegation, the County has unlawfully delegated all of its authority to
officially designate the boundaries of a zoning district, the Wildlife Overlay District, to a non
elected non county agent that needs to hold no hearings, accepts no public input, can change Jt'l
designations of"cla.ssified lands" (and therefore the zoning boundary line) daily, weekly, or
monthly, without notice, be subject to differing opinions and criteria within Fish and Game itself,
and are oot required to set forth their designations in a published map or guide for the benefit of
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landowners, buyers, sellers, developers, or the generaJ public. The botmdaries of the zoning
district don't even shift with the wildlife; they shift with the opinions of unknown persons in an
amorphous state agency.
Blaine County has wholly abandoned its exclusive stalutory obligation to establish a
zoning boundary in this instance. The fact that the public can find out where these botmdaries
exist by contacting Idaho Fish and Game, or possibly obtain a waiver from the County
administrator, or address grievances or complaints about the process or how Fish and Game
exercises its discretion, before the Board of Commissioners does not save the ordinance.
Contrary to the County's arguments, the Board of Commissioners, in this circumstance, is not
able to control the ability of Fish and Game to exercise discretion. lt is too late for there to be

any discussion regarding an exercise of discretion once Fish and Game has made a designation.
That comes about because Blaine County has delegated to Fish and Game the ability to set and

establish law - the boundary of a zoning district, which may not be delegated. Any challenge
after that is not a challenge to someone's exercise of discretion, it becomes a challenge to
legislative authority, something quite different.
46.

The delegation of land use planning and zoning authority contained in LLUPA is

a complete, comprehensive, and exclusive delegation to local city and county governments.
"The LLUPA provides both mandatory and exclusive procedures for the implementation of
planning and zoning." Sprenger. Grubb & Associates v. Hailey, 133 Idaho 320, 321, 986 P.2d
343, 344 (1999) ("Sprenger Grubb If'). "[LLUPAJ directs cities and counties to plan and zone .
. . . Exercise of the authority to zone and plan, whether by governing board or by the established
[planning and zoningj commissions, is made llUllldatory by I. C. § 67-6503." Gumprecht v. City

ofCoeur d'Alene, 104 Idaho 615,617,661 P.2d 1214, 1216 (1983), overruled on other grounds,
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City of Boist City v. Keep the CommandmenJs Coalition, 143 Idaho 254, 257, 141 P.Jd 1123,
1126 (2006). ''Tile legislature clearly intended that the authority to enact comprehensive plans,
establish zoning districts and adopt amendatOlJ' ordinances be exercised exclusively by city and
county legislative or governing bodies and pursuant to specific prescribed procedures."

Gumprechl, J04 Idaho at 618, 66 I P.2d at 1217 (1983). "We conclude that the power to approve

a subdivision application in the impact area resides exclusively with the County." Blaha v. Bd.
ofAda Courtly Commr's, 134 Idaho 770, 777, 9 P.Jd 1236, 1234 (2000) (only the county has the
authority to approve applications in the area of impact, even if the county wished to cede or
delegate that authority to a city).
47.

IDFG is charged by the Legislature with the regulation of fishing and hunting and

with wildlife research. Idaho Code§§ 36-101 to 36-124. It has no regulatory authority over
habitat on private lands.
48.

Zoning Ordinance § 9-20-4 constitutes an unlawful delegation of regulatory

authority by the County to another agency. Gumprecht, 104 Idaho at 617,661 P.2d at 1216
(holding that the City of Coeur d'Alene may not, in effect, delegate its planning and zoning
responsibilities under LLUPA to the people by holding an initiative election on zoning issues).
49.

LLUPA preempts Zoning Ordinance§ 9-20-4, because the ordinance violates

LLUP A's assignment of decision-making authority to local officials and authorizes non-elected
officials outside of county government to make binding determinations that affect the land use
entitlement process.
50.

If the County desires to make use of the expertise ofrDFG, the U.S. Fish and

Wildlife Service, the University of Idaho, the USDA Extension Service, or any other expert, it
should invite their views in the context of a hearing process that accommodates rebuttal of
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evidence and wbidl reserves the final decision to the Connty, as mandated by llUPA. The

result of that process sbouJd be the adoption ofa map or objective criteria that clearly define the
boundaries of the zone.

Sl.

AccordinaJy, Zoning Ordinance § 9-20-4 is inconsistent with fundamental

principles of main& law. Zoning Ordinance § 9-20~ on its face violates both U..UPA and tbe
due procea:a clauses of the Idaho and federal constitutions. The Court hereby declares. adjudges.

and decrees it is void and of no fUrther force and effect.

'fb.elefore., the Court ORDERS, ADJUDOES, AND DECREES that Blaine County Code

section 9-204 is contrary to law and is 1hecefore null and void. and without further force aod

II IS SO ORDIRIQ1

~

DATED this J~ day of

.2008.

ROB~

District Judge
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true and comet copy of the foregoing by the method indicated beJow, and addressed to the
following:

run J. Thomas
T"unothy .K. Oraves
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney's Office
201 2nd Ave. South. Suite 100

Hailey, ID 83333
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Martin C. Hendrickson
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E-mail
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Martin A. FJannes
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Hailey, Idaho 83333
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Hailey, ID 83333
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Hand DeHvered
--Overnight Mail
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E-mail
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E-mail
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208 345 3514

LLP

15:13

Matthew C. Williams. JSB 16271
Valley County Prosecutinl Attorney
P.O. Box 1350
Cascade, tO 83611

208 634 8262 p 7/7

.....__

C.MI•~.....,.._.

Telephone: (201) 382·7120

~------~'·*----~~~~

Facsimile: (201) 382-7124
mwilliams@co.vaJley.id. us
Christopher H. Meyer, ISB 114461
Martin c. Hendricbon, rsa #5116
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 W. BannockSt.
Pose Office Boll 2720
Boise. Idaho 83701-2720

COPY

Tclephoae; 208-318·1200
Facsimile: 201-318-1300
chrismcyer@givenspursley.com
m4:b@aivenspursley.com

Attorneys for Oefendaot
IN THE DISTIUCT COUR.T OF THE FOURTH JUDlCIAL DISTRICT OF
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INTRODUCTION

This is Defendant Valley County's ("County") opening brief in support of Valley
County's Motion/or Summary Judgment filed on this day. This brief in supported by VaJ/ey
County's Statement ofMaterial Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and the
Affidavit ofCynda Herrick filed herewith.

Plaintiffs seek the return of money paid years ago by the developers of a project pursuant
to a development agreement, claiming that the money paid was an illegal tax under Idaho law
1

and, therefore, was a per se taking under state and federallaw. Plaintiffs seek this relief despite
the fact that they voluntarily executed the agreement and have received the benefit of their
bargain through road improvements funded thereby and constructed by the County. The County
seeks dismissal of the action for a variety of jurisdictional and procedural reasons. Plaintiffs'
lawsuit also fails on the merits.
Plaintiff Buckskin Properties, Inc. ("Buckskin") was the initial developer of a residential
subdivision in Valley County known as The Meadows at West Mountain (..The Meadows").
Plaintiff Timberline Development, LLC ("Timberline") is the assignee/successor in interest of
Buckskin. Buckskin and Timberline are referred to collectively as "Plaintiffs" or "Developers."
The Developers contemplated that The Meadows would consist of 221 residential lots, 12
(later changed to 17) multi-family lots for condominiums containing 96 (later changed to 160)

1

U.S. Const amend. V (applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S.
Canst. amend. XIV). In paragraph 19 of their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs also allege
the County failed to comply with state law and thereby violated due process. Although the
Second Amended Complaint is not clear on this point, it appears that Plaintiffs have in mind
procedl.D1ll due process. In any event, their due process claim is indistinguishable from their
taking claim, both of which are prenrlsed solely on the same alleged state law violation.
Plaintiffs also seek declaratory and injunctive relief to the same effect
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units, two commercial lots, and open space. The Meadows was envisioned to be built in six
phases.

2

All land within the County's jurisdiction is zoned multiple use, pursuant to the County's
Land Use Development Ordinance ("LUDO"). Within this single district, various uses are listed
as "allowed" while others are listed as "conditional" necessitating a conditional use pennit
("CUP"). On or about Aprill, 2004, Buckskin filed an application with the Valley County
Planning and Zoning Commission ("P&Z") for a Planned Unit Development, Conditional Use
Permit, and Preliminary Plat (collectively "Application") for The Meadows.
On or about May 21, 2004, the Applicant submitted an updated version of the
Application ("Updated Application"). The Updated Application was filed after the
recommendation for approval by the P&Z on May 17, 2004 but before the final approval by the
Board ofCounty Commissioners on July 12,2004. The Application and the Updated
Application are referred to collectively hereinafter as the "Applications." The P&Z refers to the
Applications by the nwnber "PUD 04-01."
The proposed development was located within a rural area served by unpaved roads not
intended for urban-type residential development The County could have denied the
Applications outright on the basis of inadequate transportation infrastructure. Idaho Code § 676512(a). Alternatively, P&Z could have approved the Applications with the expectation that
roads serving The Meadows eventually would be improved as funds became available to the
County. The County developed a capital improvement program to give developers in fast-

1

The undisputed facts upon which Valley County's Motion for Summary Judgment is
based are set forth in detail in Valley County's Statement ofMaterial Facts in Support ofMotion
for Summary Judgment, which is filed contemporaneously herewith.
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growing. rural portions of the County the option of contributing their fair share to fund
accelerated construction of road improvements serving their developments.
At page 22 of the Application and page 23 of the Updated Application, under the heading
"I. Development Agreement," the Applications recite a provision from LUDO and then

reference a Preliminary Development Agreement, which was included as Appendix C to the
Applications.
The Preliminary Development Agreement (as drafted and proposed by the Applicant)
states at 1J 2.11 at page 3: "Also as a condition of designating the Property as a Planned Unit
Development and approving its development consistent with this Development Agreement the
County has required Developer to execute a separate Capital Contribution Agreement specifying
the funding mechanism and processes to provide the payment of monies to certain providers of
public services ...."
The Preliminary Development Agreement (as drafted and proposed by the Applicant)
states at 112.15 at page 4: "The County acknowledges that Developer is relying upon the
execution and continuing validity of this Development Agreement ... "
The Preliminary Development Agreement (as drafted and proposed by the Applicant)
states at 112.18 at page 4: "Development of the Property pursuant to this Development
Agreement will also result in significant benefits to Developer .... "
The Preliminary Development Agreement (as drafted and proposed by the Applicant)
states at 1J 2.19 at page 4: "Developer and the County have cooperated in the preparation of this
Development Agreement ......
The Preliminary Development Agreement (as drafted and proposed by the Applicant)
states at 1J 8.8 at page 15: "In the event of the default by any party to this Development
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Agreement. the non-defaulting party shaH be entitled to collect from the defaulting party its
provable damages, including, but not limited to, its reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses.

The Preliminary Development Agreement (as drafted and proposed by the Applicant)
states at~ 2.20 at page 4: •·The parties desire to enter into this Development Agreement ...."
The Preliminary Development Agreement (as drafted and proposed by the Applicant)
references and incorporates a Proposed Capital Contribution Agreement, which is set out as
Exhibit A to the Development Agreement.
The Proposed Capital Contribution Agreement (as drafted and proposed by the
Applicant) states a ~ II(A) at page 1: "Developer agrees to pay a road impact fee as established
by Valley County. Currently this fee has been set by the Valley County Engineer at $1,870.00
per equivalent single-family residential unit. ... "
At page 22 of the Application, under the heading "J. Impact Fees," the Application
recited a provision from LUDO and then stated: 3
The impact fees for the various improvements to The Meadows is
as folJows:
•
Road Improvements - $1870/unit
Sewer Service Connections - $2500/unit
•
•
Water Service Connections- TBD
The Application contains an "Impact Report" set out as Appendix D to the Application.
The Impact Report (as drafted and proposed by the Applicant) states on page l:
A professional traffic study was prepared by Dobie Engineering, Inc. as part of the Tamarack
Resort project.... The original estimated cost to complete this [sic] roadway improvements
was $6,000,000.00. The development is proposing in the Development Agreement to [sic] a road

1

This provision is restated at page 23 of the Updated Application.
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impact fee as established by Valley County. Currently this fee has been set by the Valley County
Engineer at $1,870.00 per equivalent single-family residential unit. ..."
A public hearing on the Application was held May 17, 2004. Joe Pachner, Project
Manager for Toothman-Orton Engineering Company, represented the Applicant at the May 17,
2004 hearing. The minutes of the May 17, 2004 hearing (at page 8) recite that Mr. Pachner
stated as follows: "The traffic report completed by the Tamarack Resort has been incorporated
into the design of this project. The impact of this project using this roadway is incorporated and
they will pay their proportional impact fees." At the conclusion of the May 17, 2004 hearing, the
P&Z voted three to two to recommend approval of the Application, subject to conditions set out
in the Staff Report for the hearing.
The Staff Report for the May 17, 2004 hearing contains the following proposed condition
number 12: "The Development Agreement and Capital Contribution Agreement must receive
approval from the Board of County Commissioners." On or about June 10, 2004, the P&Z
issued its Findings and Conclusions with respect to the Application. The Findings and
Conclusions contain the following condition number 12: "The Development Agreement and
Capital Contribution Agreement must receive approval from the Board of County
Commissioners."
On June 28, 2004, the Board of County Commissioners held a hearing on the Updated

Application. The Staff Report for the June 28, 2004 hearing contains the following proposed
condition number 12: "The Development Agreement and Capital Contribution Agreement must
receive approval from the Board of County Commissioners." The minutes of the June 28, 2004
hearing recite that the Applicant's representative, Joe Pachner, stated: ••Have been talking to
County Engineer to co-ordinate road requirements." This was the Applicants onJy statement
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with respect to obligations under its proposed Development Agreement and Capital Contribution
Agreement. There was no suggestion that Buckskin had any concern or objection to the
contributions they had offered by way of their Preliminary Development Agreement or Proposed
Capital Contribution Agreement.
On July 12, 2004, the Board of County Commissioners held a second hearing on the
Updated Application. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board voted to approve the Updated
Application and to enter into the Development Agreement and the Capital Contribution
Agreement as corrected and amended.
Nothing in the minutes of either the June 28, 2004 hearing or the July 12, 2004 hearing
suggests that the Applicant had any concerns or objections with the respect to the contribution
that the Applicant itself proposed in it Applications.
On July 14, 2004, the Board of County Commissioners issued a Conditional Use Pennit
for Planned Unit Development No. 04-01 ("CUP"). The CUP contains the following condition
number 12: "The Development Agreement and Capital Contribution Agreement must receive
approval from the Board of County Commissioners.,.
On the same day that the CUP was issued, July 14,2004, Jack. A. Charters of Buckskin
Properties, Inc. signed the Capital Contribution Agreement. The Capital Contribution
Agreement was signed by the Board of County Commissioners on July 26, 2004, and it was
recorded on August 4, 2004. The Capital Contribution Agreement recites that the date of the
agreement is July 12, 2004.
The Capital Contribution Agreement differed in some details from the earlier Proposed
Capital Contribution Agreement contained in the Applications. Notably, the new Capital
Contribution Agreement contemplated conveyance of property in lieu of payment of some of the
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fees. The basic ooncept of payment of proportionate costs associated with the development,
however, was unchanged from the original proposal of the Applicant
On August 26, 2004, Joe Pachner, acting on behalf of Buckskin, wrote a letter to the P&Z
Administrator addressing each of the conditions in the CUP for PUD 04-01. With respect to
condition number 12, he simply stated, "Please see attached approvals, dated August 16, 2004"
(referring to the date of that the Board signed the Capital Contribution Agreement). A similar
letter dated May 22, 2008 simply states "Noted" with respect to the same point. Neither letter
contains any suggestion that Buckskin had any concern or objection to the contributions required
under the CUP or any agreement with the County.
On September 9, 2004, the P&Z voted three to two to recommend approval of the final
plat for Phase 1 of the Meadows. The minutes of the hearing reflect Jack Charters was present.
The minutes reflect no expression of any concern with or objection to the obligations imposed
under the CUP, the Development Agreement, or the Capital Contribution Agreement.
On October 25, 2004, the Board of County Commissioners met and voted to approve the
final plat for Phase 1 of the Meadows. The minutes of the October 25, 2004 meeting specifically
reflect the County's acknowledgement that the conditions of the Capital Contribution Agreement
had been met with respect to Phase l. Nothing in the minutes of the October 25, 2004 meeting
reflects any expression of concern or objection by Buckskin with respect to the obligations
imposed under the CUP, the Development Agreement, or the Capital Contribution Agreement.
On December 6, 2004, a representative of Buckskin appeared at a public meeting of the
Board of County Commissioners to discuss concerns respecting certain Idaho Department of
Environmental Quality requirements applicable to The Meadows. Nothing in the minutes of the
December 6, 2004 meeting reflects any expression of concern or objection by Buckskin with
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respect to the obligations imposed under the CUP, the Development Agreement. or the Capital
Contribution Agreement.
On September 5, 2005, the P&Z met and voted to recommend approval of the final plats
for Phases 2 and 3 ofThe Meadows. Nothing in the minutes of the September 5, 2005 meeting
reflects any expression of concern or objection by Buckskin with respect to the obligations
imposed under the CUP, the Development Agreement. or the Capital Contribution Agreement.
On September 26, 2005, the Board of County Commissioners met and voted to approve
the final plats for Phases 2 and 3 of The Meadows. The minutes of the September 5, 2005
meeting reflect the Board's agreement to enter into a new Road Development Agreement with
Buckskin which included a payment of $232,160.00 for these phases. Nothing in the minutes of

the September 5, 2005 meeting reflects any expression of concern or objection by Buckskin with
respect to the obligations imposed under the CUP, the Development Agreement, the Capital
Contribution Agreement. or the Road Development Agreement
On the same day, September 26, 2005, the Board of County Commissioners and

Buckskin entered into the Road Development Agreement described in the preceding paragraph.
The Road Development Agreement states: "Developer has agreed to participate in the cost of
mitigating these impacts by contributing its proportionate share of the cost of the needed
improvements identified in the Agreement and listed in the attached Exhibit A."
On December 15, 2005, Timberline Development issued a check to the County in the
amount of$232,160 (reflecting a prior credit) in fulfillment of Buckskin's obligations under the
Road Development Agreement. The payment was not made under protest.
On June 3, 2009, Joe Pachner, on behalf of The Meadows, requested an extension of the
deadline for final plat on phases 4-6. In his letter, Mr. Pachner identified items that the
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developer was working on, including "Finalize the Road Development Agreement." The letter
stated, "The reorganized partnership is committed to diligently work towards submitting the
plans for review and completing the project." The letter contained no indication of any objection
or concern with respect to obligations lUlder the CUP, the Development Agreement, or with
respect to any Road Development Agreement
On July 9, 2009, the P&Z met and granted the requested extension of the deadline for
final plat on phases 4-6. The minutes of the meeting recited: "Staff explained that the applicant
was requesting an extension in order to finalize the road development aga=ement .... " The
minutes reflect no expression of concern by the Developers with respect to obligations under the
CUP, the Development Agreement, or any Road Development Agreement.
Plaintiffs have in their possession or have had access to each of the staff reports, letters,

and minutes quoted above. On no occasion have the Plaintiffs or anyone acting on their behalf
questioned the accuracy or completeness of any statement from any of those documents.
On or about December 1, 2009, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this action. The
Complaint states in paragraph II and 14 that the Capital Contribution Agreement and Road
Development Agreement entered into by Buckskin and/or Timberline were entered into "under
protest." The record documented above demonstrates that they were not entered into under
protest.
The Developers did not appeal, contest, or seek judicial review of the CUP (at either the
recommendation or final action stage). A judicial review of the CUP pursuant to the Local Land
Use Planning Act ("LLUPA") would have been the appropriate and timely means of initiating an
inverse condemnation action. Prior to this litigation, the Developers took no other action to
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protest or otherwise object to the CUP, the Mitigation Agreements, or payments made pursuant
to any of them.
The County accepted the money from the Developers in good faith and relied on those
payments and the tenns of the Mitigation Agreements. At no time did the Developers advise the
County that any of them might seek a refund of the money paid pursuant to the Mitigation
Agreements or that the County could not safely rely on that money being available to the County
for purposes of the Mitigation Agreements. Using money received from the Developers pursuant
to the Mitigation Agreements, the County undertook capital investments for roads in the vicinity
of The Meadows development All such monies spent by the County were spent in a<:cordance
with and in fulfiiJment of obligations on the County spelled out in the Mitigation Agreements.
But for the Mitigation Agreements and other similar voluntary development agreements, the
County would not have undertaken the road improvements and expenditures described above.
Those capital improvements are now in place. Those capital investments have improved
transportation access to The Meadows and have thereby benefited the Developers of The
Meadows and the current residents of The Meadows.
Having paid the money per their own Agreement, and having received the benefit of their
bargain, the Developers now want their money back. They brought this lawsuit claiming that the
County could not accept money under the Agreement because such money would be an illegal
tax under Idaho Jaw. This, they allege in tum, results in a per se taking under idaho and federal
4

law. Plaintiffs failed to plead this as a§ 1983 action. The County, however, has treated it as a
§ 1983 action, because that is the only cause of action available to Plaintiffs.

4

Section 1983 refers to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, also known as the Ku Klux Klan
Act, 17 Stat 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983). It provides in relevant part: "Every
person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
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Plaintiffs' claim fails on the merits. Whatever money the Developers have paid or will
pay under the Agreement is paid voluntarily. Therefore. as a matter of Idaho law, it is not an
actionable taking. Moreover, the Developers should have raised their objection at the time. It is
too late to raise the issue now. [n any event, for a variety of reasons discussed below, the Court
lacks jurisdiction over this case.
ARGUMENT

I.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO PLEAD A RIGHT OF ACflON FOR THI ALLEGED
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS.

Plaintiffs have identified no private right of action for their federal constitutional claims
against the County.
Where the Congress has created an explicit cause of action for federal constitutional
deprivation, that remedy is exclusive and a so-called "Bivens" s action is not available. The
Ninth Circuit has so held:
Plaintiff has no cause of action directly under the United
States Constitution. We have previously held that a litigant
complaining of a violation of a constitutional right must utilize 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 was available to Azul, but plaintiff
failed to file its complaint within the applicable limitations period.

Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory reliefwas unavailable."
s An implied cause of action was necessary in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau ofNarcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971), because that case involved a constitutional
violation by~ agents making § 1983 unavailable.
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Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 108 t ( 1993). [f Plaintiffs have any cause of action for their federal claims, it must be under

§ 1983.
Plaintiffs' failure to plead a cause of action is a sufficient basis to dismiss their federal
claims. In the event the Court overlooks this pleadin& failure or allows the Plaintiffs to amend

their complaint, this brief assumes that Plaintiffs' case is premised on § 1983.
As will be shown below, Plaintiffs' § 1983 action is unavailing.

II.

THIS LAWSUIT IS BARRED BY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

Plaintiffs' claims are barred by their failure to brio& their action within two years as

required by Idaho's statute of limitations for personal injury torts, Idaho Code § 5-219(4). This
lawsuit was flled on December l, 2009. All of the actions described in the Complaints occurred
more than two years before that.
It is, admittedly, counter-intuitive that Idaho's statute of limitations for personal torts
would apply. But the law is well settled. AU § 1983 actions, regardless of their nature, are
subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury (torts). Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.
261,266-67 (1985); Owens v. 0/cure, 488 U.S. 235,249-50 (1985)~ Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S.
384, 387 (2007).
Finally, in 1985 the Supreme Court seized the opportunity
to put an end to the "uncertainty and time-consuming litigation that
is foreign to the central purposes of section 1983." In Wilson v.
Garcia, the Court, affirming a decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, decided that henceforth all section 1983 claims
are to be characterized as personal injury actions for statute of
limitations purposes, regardless of the underlying cause of action.
Robert M. Jarvis, The Continuing Problem ofStatutes of Limitations in Section 1983 Cases: Is

the Answer Out at Sea?, 22 J. Marshall L. Rev. 285,287 (1988).
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Wilson held that this one-size-fits-all approach applies even where the State's highest
court has ruled that some other statute of limitations should apply to the particular type of§ 1983
action.
Idaho courts have followed Wilson, applying Idaho's two-year statute of limitations
(Idaho Code§ 5-219(4)), regardless ofthe nature ofthe § 1983 action. McCabe v. Craven, 145
Idaho 954, 957, 188 P.Jd 896, 899 (2008); Osborn v. Salinas, 131 Idaho 456, 458, 958 P.2d

1142,1144(1998);/dahoStateBarv. Tway, 128Idaho794, 798,919P.2d323,327(1996);
Mason v. Tucker and Assoc., 125 Idaho 429, 436, 871 P.2d 846, 853 (1994); Herrera v. Conner,
Ill Idaho 1012, 1016,729 P.2d 1075, 1079 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987); Henderson v. State, I 10

Idaho 308,310-11, 715 P.2d 978,980-81 (1986). 6 The Ninth Circuit also has followed this rule
with respect to inverse condemnation actions under§ 1983. Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v.

City of Morgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651,655 (91h Cir. 2003).
Plaintiffs may contend that this is not a § 1983 case. Indeed, as previously noted, they
have not pled it as a § 1983 case. That is their error. If it is not a § 1983 case, the federal law
claims must be thrown out because, as discussed above, there is no other cause of action
available to them. If the Court forgives their pleading error, then the case must be thrown out
under the statute of limitations.
As for the state constitutional claims, other statutes of limitations may apply. (These
would also apply to both state and federal claims should the Court determine, for some reason,
that the ruJe in Wilson is not applicable here.) To the extent the Developers' Complaint (or any
6

On only one occasion has the Idaho Supreme Court has strayed from this clear line of
precedent. Tn 2006, the Idaho Supreme Court applied the four-year "residual" statute of
limitations in an inverse condemnation case raised by way of§ 1983. City of Coeur d'Alene v.
Simpson, 142 [daho 839, 846-47, 136 P.3d 310, 317-18 (2006). This decision cannot be
reconciled with prior precedent, which was not discussed, much less overruled, in the Simpson
case. Most likely, the Wilson rule was not briefed.
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further amendment thereof) sounds in tort, it is barred by the Developers' failure to meet
procedural requirements and deadlines established in Idaho's Tort Claim Act, Idaho Code§§ 6906 and 6-911. This, too, is a two-year rule.
Plaintiffs' inverse condemnation under the Idaho Constitution are subject to Idaho's
residual four-year statute of limitations. Idaho Code§ 5-224; Wadsworth v. Idaho Department of
Transportation, 128 Idaho 439,442, 915 P.2d I, 4 (1996). Plaintiffs have blown that statute too.
It first proposed the mitigation fees in its own application filed on April l, 2004, over six years
ago. The P&Z recommended approval of a CUP including those mitigation provisions on May
17, 2004. The CUP was finally approved on July 12, 2004 and was issued on July 14, 2004.
The Capital Contribution Agreement was signed by Buckskin on July 26, 2004. The Road
Development Agreement was executed on September 26,2005. Each of these occurred more

than four years before the suit was fi1ed on December I, 2009. The fact that some actions
occurred in less than four years (such as the issuance of a check for phase 2 of the development),
does not cure the violation of the four-year statute of limitations. The actions of the County
giving rise to this lawsuit all occurred earlier.
In addition, the Complaint violates the three-year statute of limitations set out in Idaho
Code§ 5-218(3) for a taking of personal property. The money paid to the County by Developers
pursuant to the Road Development Agreement is personal property. (In contrast, payment made
pursuant to the earlier Capital Contribution Agreement was a donation of real property and
would not be subject to this statute of limitations.)
The Complaint also violates the six-month statute of limitations set out in Idaho Code

§ 5-221 for claims rejected by a board of county commissioners. Exhaustion and ripeness
principles discussed below require Developers to have sought relief from the County before
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bringing this lawsuit. Had they done so in a timely fashion, this would have occurred wetl over

six months ago. Developers should not be able to avoid this statute of limitations by failing to
take mandatory procedural actions.
Ill.

THIS LAWSUIT DOES NOT SATISFY THE TWO RIPENESS REQUIREMENTS OF

WIUIAMSON COIJNTY.

A.

Overview

In Williamson County Regional Planning Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank ofJohnson City,
473 U.S. 172 (1985), the Supreme Court established two tests for plaintiffs alleging an
uncompensated taking in federal court.' First, the claim must be ripe in the sense that the wouldbe plaintiff has availed itself of all opportunities to obtain relief at the administrative level.

Second, before seeking federal court jurisdiction, the plaintiff must utilize state judicial
procedures for inverse condemnation and be denied such compensation. The Plaintiffs fail both
tests.
In Williamson County, a developer sought zoning approval for a residential subdivision.
The developer obtained preliminary plat approval. Before the final plat was submitted, however,
the County amended and toughened the zoning ordinance resulting in a substantial reduction in

the number of lots allowed. The County then disapproved the final plat based on noncompliance
with the revised ordinance.

Plaintiff brought a § 1983 action in federal court alleging, among other things, a taking of
its property. The focus of the argwnent at trial and on appeal was on whether temporary takings

7

Williamson County has been recognized and followed by the Idaho Supreme Court, as
well. KMST. LLC v. County ofAda, 138 Idaho 577, 581-82, 67 P.3d 56, 60-61 (2003 ); City of
Coeur d'Alene 11. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 845-46, 136 P.3d 310, 316-17 (2006).
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an: compensable.' The U.S. Supreme Court, however, changed course and threw the case out on
two procedural grounds. Both were described as ripeness tests. This is not ripeness in the

ordinary sense, however. This is a special variety of ripeness applicable only to federal takings
claims. As noted in footnote 7, however, this law is equally applicable to federal constitutional
claims raised in state court.

B.

Test 1: The "final decision" requirement

First, the Williamson County Court held that in order to be ripe for judicial review, the
decision appealed from must have been a "final decision":
As this Court has made clear in several recent decisions. a
claim that the application of governmental regulations effects a
taking of property is not ripe until the government entity charged
with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision
regarding application of the regulations to the property at issue.''

Williamson County at 186. Although the local planning commission had squarely and repeatedly
rejected the preliminary plat, that was not final enough, said the Court, because the developer
had failed to seek a variance.
As in Hodel, Agins, and Penn Central, then, respondent has
not yet obtained a final decision regarding how it will be allowed
to develop its property. Our reluctance to examine taking claims
until such a final decision has been made is compelied by the very
nature of the inquiry required by the Just Compensation Clause .
. . . Those factors [which determine whether there has been a
takingj simply cannot be evaluated until the administrative agency
has arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will
8

The trial court rejected the jury's award of$350,000 for a temporary taking, but issued
an injunction ordering the Commission to apply the 1973 ordinance. 'lbe Commission did not
appeal the ruling that it must apply the 1973 ordinance. Instead, the plaintiff appealed the
judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the temporary taking. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit
reinstated the award for a temporary taking. On certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Commission contended that even if it should have applied the 1973 ordinance, its failure to do so
constituted at most a temporary regulatory interference that, even if it is a taking, does not give
rise to a claim for money damages. The Supreme Court did not reach the Commission's
argwnent, instead finding that the plaintiff's claim was not ripe.
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apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question.

Williamson County at 190-91 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn.,
Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Agins v. City ofTibwon, 441 U.S. 255 (1980); Penn Central Tramp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)). The message of these four Supreme Court cases is

that developers must take full advantage of opportunities for securing relief from the local
governing body. Until that happens, the finality requirement is not met and the case is not ripe.
While Williamson County dealt with the failure to seek a variance, the holding is equally
applicable to Plaintiffs' failure to oppose the recommendation made by the P&Z. 9 The ..factors"
at issue in Williamson County were the traditional federal regulatory takings tests, e.g., "the
effect [of the decision] on the value of respondent's property and investment-backed profit
expectations." Williamson County at 200. The factors at issue here are state law considerations
involving, notably, whether the payment is voluntary. In either case. the federal court is not in a
position to evaluate the factors when the plaintiff has not even bothered to ask the local
government for relief. In other words, Plaintiffs must raise and press their objections with the
local government in a timely and meaningful way in order to set up their claim that the exaction
is involuntary. The Developers here did just the opposite. Not only did the Developers fail to
oppose the mitigation requirements included by the P&Z, they actually proposed these

9

In discussing the difference between ripeness and exhaustion. the Court noted:
"Similarly, respondent would not be required to appeal the Commission's rejection of the
preliminary plat to the Board of Zoning Appeals, because the Board was empowered, at most, to
review that rejection, not to participate in the Commission's decisionmaking." Williamson
County at 193. This example, however, is limited to Tennessee's peculiar appeal mechanism in
which the Board sits in the nature of an appellate body. In Idaho, where cities and counties have
the authority to not only reverse the planning and zoning commission but to modify that
decision, such an appeal presumably would be necessary in order to satisfy Williamson County's
''fmal decision" requirement.
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conditions in their own Applications. Accordingly, there is no "final decision" in the sense of
Williamson County.

c.

Test l: The requirement to employ state invene condemnation
procedures.

The second holding in the case, also framed in terms of ripeness, is even more restrictive.
As a practical matter, it bars federal court litigation involving regulatory takings claims aimed at
state or local governments (at least in jurisdictions, like Idaho, that allow inverse condemnation
actions). The Williamson County Court held that when a regulatory taking is alleged against a
state or local government agency, the property owner must first "seek compensation through the
procedures the State has provided for doing so" before litigating in federal court. Williamson
County at 194.

Thus, we have held that taking claims against the Federal
Government are premature until the property owner has availed
itself of the process provided by the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491.
Similarly, if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking
just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of
the Just Compensation Clause until it bas used the procedure and
been denied just compensation.
Williamson County at 195 (citing Ruclcelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016-20 (1984)).

In other words, where state courts will entertain inverse compensation actions. the
landowner must avail itself of that remedy (and be denied) before initiating federal litigation.
This is necessary, the Court explained, because the Just Compensation Clause does not prohibit
takings. It simply prohibits takings without just compensation. Thus, it is n~ssary to tum first
to the state to see if compensation will be granted. Williamson County at 194-95.
In Idaho, an allegation of inverse condemnation based on a denial or restrictive approval
ofa land use application may be pursued by seekingjudicial reviewofthe decision or. in some
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circumstances, by way of complaint 10 Under Williamson County, this is a prerequisite to a
federal claim alleging a taking. Having failed to employ this procedure. Developers are barred
from pursuing the matter by way of a takings claim under the Constitution.

D.

Tbe same rules apply to due proeeaa claima.

Reframing the question as a due process violation does not change the outcome. In

Williamson County, the Commission urged that the developer's takings claim should be analyzed
instead as a due process claim. (The Commission hoped that by reframing it as a due process
question, it would not give rise to damages for the temporary taking.) The Court said it does not
matter whether you call it a taking or a due process violation; these specialized ripeness tests are
a requirement in any event "In sum, respondent [developer]'s claim is premature, whether it is

analyzed as a deprivation of property without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, or
as a taking under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Williamson County at

200; 13B Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1238 (3rd
ed. 2004).
E.

Exceptions are inapplicable

Subsequent federal cases have carved out a few exceptions to the strict ripeness rules set
out in Williamson County (e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 618-26 (2001) (futility
exception); Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725,730 (1997) (exception for
10

ldaho first recognized a cause of action for inverse condemnation in Boise Valley
Const. Co. v. Kroeger, 11 Idaho 384, J05 P. 1070 ( 1909). It continues to r~ognize the action.
..A property owner who believes that his or her property, or some interest therein, has been
invaded or appropriated to the extent of a taking, but without due process of Jaw and the payment
of compensation, may bring an action for inverse condemnation." KMST. LLC v. County ofAda,
1381daho 577,581,67 P.Jd 56,60 (2003). To support a claim for inverse condemnation, "the
action must be: (I) instituted by a property owner who (2) asserts that his property, or some
interest therein, has been invaded or appropriated (3) to the extent of a taking, (4) but without
due process of law, and (5) without payment ofjust compensation." Covington v. Jefferson
Cormty, 137 Idaho 777,780,53 P.Jd 828, 831 (2002).
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artificially created finality requirements)). 11 None are applicable here.

12

Accordingly, the black

letter rule in Williamson County applies, and Developers have not met it.

IV.

THE DEVILOPERS, CLAIMS ALSO FAIL TWO TESTS EST ABLISH ED UNDER KMST
AND WHITE.

A.

Overview

If the Developers' constitutional claims survive the hurdles described above, they
nonetheless fail as a matter of state procedural and substantive law.
Developers' lawsuit follows on the heels of three recent "illegal tax" cases which struck
down impact fees imposed by local governments.

13

Plaintiffs' suit is a copycat. But it is a

flawed copycat Plaintiffs fail to recognize that their situation is fundamentally different in two
ways. First. they failed to exhaust. The Developers paid the money without objection and
without administrative or judicial appeal, accepted the benefits of roads constructed on their

behalf, and then, years later, brought a lawsuit. Second, their payment was voluntary. In the
case at bar, fees were not imposed by the governing body pursuant to ordinance (as they were in

Sun Valley, McCall, and Blaine Cowuy). Instead. they were proposed by the Developers and
11

These exceptions have been recognized in Idaho as well. City of Coeur d'Alene v.
Simpson, 142 Idaho 839,845-46, 136 P.Jd 310,316-17 (2006).
12

The first of the Williamson County ripeness requirements (final decision) does not
apply to physical takings, while the second one (utilization of inverse condemnation) does.
Plaintiffs contend at page 7 of Plaintifft' Reply to County's Response to Application for
Preliminary Injunction (Document 25) that the County's action constitutes a physical taking. As
the County explained at pages 3-5 of County's Surreply to Application for Preliminary
Injunction (Document 30), Plaintiffs' allegation is of a regulatory taking. There is no foundation
for even an allegation of a physical taking.
13

Cove Springs Development, Inc. v. Blaine County, Case No. CV2008-22 (Idaho, Fifth
Judicial Dist, June 3, 2008) (declaring unlawful and unconstitutional various exaction and
comprehensive plan ordinance provisions); Schaefer v. City ofSun Valley, Case No. CV -06-882
(Idaho, Fifth Judicial Dist. July 3, 2007) (declaring unconstitutional Sun Valley's impact fee for
affordable housing); Mountain Central Bd of Realtors, Inc. v. City of McCall, Case No. CV
2006-490-C (Idaho, Fourth Judicial Dist, Feb. 19, 2008) (invalidated two ordinances imposing
impact fees for affordable housing).
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reflected in written agreements entered into in good faith by the parties. In other words, they
were contract payments, not impact fees.
Both of these flaws were present also in KMST, UC v. County ofA.da, 138 Idaho 577,
583, 67 P.3d 56, 62 (2003), a case that is controlling here. In

KMST. a developer brought two

claims against the Ada County Highway District ("ACHD"), one in connection with ACHD's
road dedication requirement and another in connection with ACHD's impact fees. (Despite the
case name, the claims against Ada County were not pursued on appeal.) The Idaho Supreme
Court dismissed both ACHD claims on technical grounds--Williamson County ripeness (as to
the dedication) and exhaustion (as to the impact fees). We have already addressed Williamson
County. The exhaustion requirement, however, is an additional state law requirement. The

KAIST Court went on to opine as to the merits of the takings claim on the road dedication saying
that this was not a taking because it was voluntarily offered. In essence, it was a not a "taking"
but a "giving" (our words, not the Court's). This holding, too, is on point and is a fatal flaw
going to the merits of Plaintiffs' claim.
B.

The Developers failed to exhaust

In KMST, the plaintiff failed to exhaust because it paid the fees rather than appealing

them.
[KMST] simply paid the impact fees in the amount initially
calculated. Having done so, it cannot now claim that the amount
of the impact fees constituted an unconstitutional taking of its
property.
As a general rule, a party must exhaust administrative
remedies before resorting to court to challenge the validity of
administrative acts. . . . KMST had the opportunity to challenge
the calculation of the impact fees administratively. and it chose not
to do so.
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KMST, 137 Idaho at 583, 67 P.3d at 62. 14
The Developers are in the same position. They could have withdrawn the offer they
made in their own Applications to provide mitigation. They could have raised their concerns in

any of the hearings before the P&Z. Likewise, they could have objected to the P&Z's
recommendation when the matter was taken up by the Board of County Commissioners. They

did none of these. Accordingly, they have failed to exhaust, as required by KMST.
KMST recognizes limited exceptions to the exhaustion requirement, notably "when the
agency acted outside its authority." KMST, 138 Idaho at 582, 67 P.Jd at 61. Those exceptions
were not applicable in KMST, nor are they applicable here.

15

And for good reason. The policy

14

ACHD's impact fees were imposed pursuant to the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act
(''IDIFA"), Idaho Code§§ 67-8201 to 67-8216. Valley County has not yet adopted an IDIFAcompliant impact fee ordinance (although it is in the process of doing so). But K.MST remains on
point The exhaustion requirement is not a function ofiDIFA. It is based on general principles
of administrative law. "As a general rule, a party must exhaust administrative remedies before
resorting to the courts to challenge the validity of administrative acts. KMSI, 137 Idaho at 583,
67 P.3d at 62.
IS A review of the cases Shows that this exception applies only to facial challenges to
ordinances and statutes. The clearest statement that exhaustion is required in as awlied
constitutional challenges is found in Whitt! v. Bannock County Comm 'rs, 139ldaho 396, 80 P.3d
332 (2003). In White, the Court rejected an end run around the judicial review requirements in
the Local Land Use Planning Act by a neighbor challenging zoning approval for an asphalt plant.
Rather than pursuing an administrative appeal. Mr. White filed suit raising various ..as applied"
due process challenges to the zoning approval. The County sought dismissal for failure to
exhaust. The Court recognized that there are exceptions to the exhaustion requirement but said
they did not apply. "We also conclude that the recognized exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine
do not apply to the present case where the question of a conditional use permit 'is one within the
zoning authority's specialization and when the administrative remedy is as likely as the judicial
remedy to provide the wanted relief."' White, 139 Idaho at 402, 80 PJd at 338 (citing Fairway
Development Co. v. Bannock County, 119 Idaho 121, 124, 804 P.2d 294, 297 (1990)). The
obvious conclusion is that when parties to a zoning matter wish to challenge the constitutional
adequacy of administrative proceedings (as opposed to the ordinance itself), they must first
present their objections to the local governmental officials and give them an opportunity to
consider and, if necessary, address the alleged violations...As we have previously recognized,
important policy considerations underlie the requirement for exhausting administrative remedies,
such as providing the opportunity for mitigating or curing errors without judicial intervention,
deferring to the administrative processes established by the Legislature and the administrative
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considerations articulated by the Court in White are poignantly applicable here. Had the
Developers timely opposed the mitigation proposal, objected to the Mitigation Agreements, or
stated that they were acting under protest. the County would have been on notice as to the
situation. Because the Developers did not take such action, there is no way of knowing how
events might have unfolded. The Developers might have proceeded with their Applications
without any mitigation proposal, but it would have been much harder to sell the lots if the project

was accessed by unimproved roads. 16 Instead, the Developers pursued their offer of mitigation
and entered into the Mitigation Agreements. The County also complied with the tenns of the
Mitigation Agreements, spending road development money on road improvements that directly
benefited the Developers. The message from KMST and White is that developers cannot play it
both ways. There is a reason the Legislature created an administrative appeal process. It is to
avoid lawsuits like this one.
C.

Developen' actions were voluntary.

The KMST case also applied Williamson CounJy in ruling that KMST' s action could not
be challenged under § 1983 because its decision was not a "final decision." The Court then went
on to say that even if ACHD's recommendation had been a final decision, it would not have
constituted a taking because the dedication was voluntary. 17 In a pre-application meeting with
body, and the sense of comity for the quasi-judicial functions of the administrative body."
White, 139 Idaho at 337-38, 80 P.3d at 401-02. Thus, although the Court did not say so in so
many words, it is inescapable from White that the exhaustion exception does not apply to "as
applied" constitutional challenges.
16

Had the Developers withdrawn their offer to provide road mitigation set out in their
own Applications, the County would have been entitled to withhold approval of the project or to
condition timing of the development upon finding other funding for the necessary road
construction. The County certainly has that authority. Idaho Code§ 67-6512(a).
17

Technically one might argue that this was dictum, but Justice Eismann's language
made it clear that the Court intended it as a ruling.
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ACHD staff, KMST was advised that staff would recommend a requirement of a road dedication.
In order to move things along, KMST agreed to tbe dedication and included it in its application.
This proved fatal to KMST' s taking claim.
KMST representatives included the construction and dedication of
Bird Street in the application because they were concerned that
failing to do so would delay closing on the property and
development of the property. KMST'~ groperty was not taken. It
voluntarily decided to dedicate the road to the public in order to
soeed approval of its development Having done so. it cannot now
claim that its property was "taken."

KMST, 138 Idaho at 582,67 P.3d at 61 (emphasis supplied) (internal quotations identifying
district court's language omitted). This language is significant because it shows that it makes no
difference that the developer was motivated by a desire to speed the processing of its application~
the developer's action is stiU voluntary.
The Developers' situation here is indistinguishable. Perhaps they were not pleased with
the idea of paying their fair share of transportation costs, but they did not say so and they
certainly did not challenge the County's authority to accept such mitigation. One way or
another, the Developers needed to assure the County that adequate infrastructure would be in
place to support the new development. The Developers could have simply waited until the
County was able to raise the funds to build that infrastructure. Instead, in order to speed their
project forward, the Developers elected to make payments to the County reflecting the project's
proportionate share of transportation impact costs.
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Having so elected, the Developers cannot now be heard to complain that the payments
they agreed to make were illegal taxes. This was the holding of the Idaho Supreme Court in

KMST.' 8
V.

IF PLAINTIFFS' INVIRSE CONDEMNATION ACTION JS DISMISSED, ITS REQUEST
FOR DECLARATORY RELII:F IS MOOT.

The core of Plaintiffs' claim, of course, is its desire to get its money back-i.e., their
inverse condemnation claim. As shown above, that claim is procedurally and substantively
flawed. If the County is under no obligation to return the money, Plaintiffs' ancillary request for
declaratory relief is meaningless and moot. It would be of academic interest only and is not a
proper subject for judicial action.

VI.

PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR RELIEF WITH RESPECT TO FlJTURE ACTIONS IS NOT
RIPE.

This lawsuit is focused primarily on past actions-notably the Mitigation Agreements.
Plaintiffs, however, have also included requests for injunctive and declaratory relief with respect
to actions that might be taken by the County in the future.
Obviously, the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a lawsuit respecting things the
Plaintiffs think the County might do in the future. What actions the Plaintiffs and the County
might take in the future regarding yet-to-be negotiated future road development agreements is
plainly speculative. Indeed, the County is now undergoing a complete review of its policies
regarding permitting of new developments and is exploring the enactment of a new IDIF Acompliant ordinance that would moot any claims with respect to future development agreements.

11

Developers may contend that their action was not voluntary, but no evidence supports
this. Valley County's Staterrumt of Material Facts Not in Dispute fully documents the voluntary
nature of the Developers' actions.

VALLEY COUNTY'S OPENING BRIEF IN SUPPORT Oli MOTION FOR SVMMARY JUDGMENT
10915-1_ County_s Brief ISO MSJ

Page 25

591

The Court cannot entertain lawsuits over such patently unripe allegations. Equitable principles
prevent the Developers from obtaining the remedies they seek here.

VII.

EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES PREVENT THE DEVELOPERS FROM OBTAINING THE
REMEDIES THEY SEIK HERL

The Developers benefited substantially from their arrangement with the County. As a
result of the Agreement, the Developers did not have to wait for the County to find the money to
build roads, and the approved portions of their project were completed before the economic
crash. Those roads are now in place, and the property continues to benefit from an improved
regional road network. Despite those benefits. Plaintiffs want their money back.
The law of common law of equity, however, prevents the Developers from having their
cake and eating it, too. Settled equitable principles demand that the Developers not prevail in
their attempt to profit from what amounts to nothing more than reneging on an explicit
agreement regarding the most appropriate way to finance necessary road improvements.
First, the law abhors the unjust enrichment of one party at the expense of another, and it
is a general principle oflaw that one should be required to make restitution of benefits received,
retained, or appropriated from another. 66 Am. Jur. 2d Restitution and Implied Contracts§ 8
(200 I). Allowing the Developers to recover the negotiated transportation payments from the
County would result in an unjust enrichment for the Developers at the expense of the County.
Equity does not permit the Developers to profit from the County's expenditure of public funds
without providing anything in return. See Barry v. Pacific West Construction, Inc., 140 Idaho
827, 103 P.3d 440 (2004) (general contractor was unjustly enriched by uncompensated work of
subcontractor).
Second. someone who performs substantial services for another without an express
agreement for compensation ordinarily becomes entitled to the reasonable value of those
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services. 66 Am. Jur. 2d Restitution and Implied Contracts§ 37 (2001). Again., even if there
were no valid agreement between the parties, the fact remains that the County performed the
substantial service of designing, financing, and building the road network to serve the
Developers' property. Under this theory of quantum meruit, the County is entitled to the
reasonable value of the work and material provided to the Developers. The negotiated
transportation-related cost in the Agreement represents the reasonable value and should not be
returned to Developers.
Third, courts in equity can use "promissory estoppel" to enforce a promise made without
consideration when the following elements are present: (i) the detriment suffered in reliance on
the promise was substantial in an economic sense; (ii) the substantial loss to the promisee acting
in reliance was, or should have been, foreseen by the promisor; and (iii) the promisee must have
acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on the promise made. Rule Sales and Service, Inc. v. U.S.
Bank National Association, 133 Idaho 669, 674, 991 P.2d 857, 862 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000). Put

another way, "the doctrine requires only that it be foreseeable to the promisor that the promisee
would take some action or forbearance in reliance upon the promise and would thereby suffer .
substantial loss if the promise were to be dishonored." ld at 675, 991 P.2d at 863. In this action.
by trying to get its money back, the Developers are essentially claiming a right to take back their
promise to pay. But the County already relied on that promise and, reasonably and justifiably,
suffered a substantial economic detriment in response. To allow the Developers to dishonor their
promise now would be a great injustice.
Fourth, the equitable principle of laches provides that a plaintiff is estopped from
asserting the alleged invasion of his rights when: (i) the plaintiff delayed in asserting these rights;
(ii) the plaintiff had notice and an opportunity to institute a suit; (iii) the defendant did not know
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that the plaintiff would assert such rights; and (iv) the delayed suit would injure or prejudice the
defendant. Finucane v. Village of Hayden, 86 Idaho 199, 205, 384 P.2d 236, 240 (1963). All
those tests are met here. Allowing the Developers to recover the negotiated transportationrelated costs now will require the County to burden its citizens to raise money to pay the
Developers for expenditures already made on behalf of the Developers. This financial burden
would result in a windfall to the Developers and severely injure and prejudice the County.
Equity should prevent such a result. The undisputed facts in the record show that Plaintiffs did
not raise any objection to any action of the County. Plaintiffs may claim that they did not object
because they assumed the County's actions were lawful. That is, in effect, an admission that
they did not question the County's actions, and, in any event, it is insufficient to overcome the
equities favoring the County.
Finally, the equitable concept of"waiver" applies in an action for breach of contract and
states that "a party who accepts the other's performance without objection is assumed to have
received the pcrfonnance contemplated by the agreement." 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts§ 640
(2001). "A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage [and
the] party asserting the waiver must show that he has acted in reliance upon such a waiver and
reasonably altered his position to his detriment." Dennett v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21, 26, 936 P.2d
219, 224 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997). Here, the Developers are not claiming breach of contract
against the County, but the principles behind the concept of waiver instruct that the Developers
cannot now complain that the road construction under the terms of the Mitigation Agreements
was anything but acceptable. Until this suit was flled, Developers did not characterize the
negotiated transportation-related payment as an illegal impact fee or assert its purported rights to
be free from illegal impact fees. Had the Developers done so, the County could have responded
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a<."Cordin~,tly

lhc

then. J(owever, nothing of the sort toolc place and the County acted in reliance on

Dcvel~(l':n'

a.c\:cplaru.."t: of the Cuunty •s J:k:Tfunnam:c: uf its duties under the A~mt:m.

Waiver principles soould prevent the Developers from asserting that the County did anything
'Wrung now.
CONC.:LliSION

In short, payments made by Plaintiffs were not illegal taxes but were voluntarily

negotiated payments that benetited them by funding road construction oo an expedited basis.
Even if those paymeol3 had been illegal taxes. however, it is too late to challenge them now.
Plaintiffs were obligated to challenge them at the time. Doing so now violates the statute of
limitations a.'l well as weU-seuled exhaustion and ripeness principles. For these and all of the

other legal and equitable rea.'lons discu.'l~d above. judgment should be entered dismissing
Plaintiffs' lawsuit.
t'.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the /

1(,.

day of October, 2010, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated:
Jed Manwaring
Victor Villegas
Evans Keane LLP
1405 West Main
P.O. Box959
Boise, ID 83701..0959
jmanwaring@evanskeane.com
vvillegas@evanskeane.com

~0

8

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Express Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile
E-Mail

-Mart1n C.-HtAdrichozr

11~ (~ I.JJ//14t4
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LIST OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit A -Conditional Use Permit (May 24, 2005)
Exhibit B-Road Development Agreement (June 26,2006 -effective date)
Exhibit C -Plaintiffs' discovery responses (July 26, 20 l 0)
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